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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the connection between phenomenology and creative production 
in selected works of twentieth-century Modernist writers Virginia Woolf, Gertrude 
Stein and Wallace Stevens. Particular emphasis on philosopher Edmund Husserl's 
concept of phenomenological reduction and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's interpretation 
thereof creates an interpretive foundation from which to clarify the three writers' 
aesthetic inquiries. Alongside the phenomenological thought of Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty, I draw upon contemporary theorist Mieke Bal's theory of visual 
experience, which sheds new light on the phenomenological relation between seer 
and seen, creative subject and object, reader and text. This thesis is not a study of 
influence but an intertextual examination, which brings to light a kinship of method 
and concern between phenomenology and the three literary Modernists' concerns 
with creativity, arguing that the reduction offers a heretofore-overlooked clue to the 
nature of Modernist aesthetics at large. 
Literary criticism has already approached the work of Modernist writers - that of 
Stevens in particular - through Husserlian phenomenology. In correlation with the 
well-established view that Modernist artists, due to the substantial changes taking 
place in the social sphere, shifted their attention inward, detaching the artist's 
creation from the plane of ordinary life, much of this scholarship has interpreted the 
method of reduction as a complete rejection or elimination of daily life, leaving the 
individual consciousness in an isolated and enclosed space. 
This study both argues against this misunderstanding of the reduction and takes issue 
with the view of Modernist art as upholding the idea of a mind/world opposition. I 
clarify that the reduction seeks to return to the foundation for human perceptions and 
expressions prior to objective points of view and scientific notions. The turn to this 
"phenomenological standpoint' 'is not a turn away from objectivity but points to the 
fact that objective and factual meaning is constituted through conscious acts. The 
reduction, in other words, points to the necessary co-operation and interdependence 
of the external and the internal, the objective and the subjective. It is this aspect of 
the Modernist text that I bring to the fore. I show how the very different writings of 
Woolf, Stein and Stevens, through shifts of attitude comparable to reduction, 
promote not a separation of subject and object-world, but a grounding of objective 
thought in the pre-reflective intentional experience of the subject. Rather than cutting 
off the artist/artwork from the world, the perceiver from the perceived, their 
phenomenological writings aim to restore openness onto the world. 
The thesis is divided into four chapters and a Postface. The first chapter explains 
why and how the thought of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Bal offer foundations for 
my examination. Chapters Two, Three and Four critically explore the kinship of 
method between phenomenology and the writings of Woolf, Stein, and Stevens, 
respectively. The Postface not only looks back and sums up the main points of the 
three chapters but also briefly opens onto the present and identifies similar 
phenomenological patterns in the work of contemporary poet John Ashbery and the 
artist Joseph Cornell, thereby underscoring my view that the reduction offers a 
significant clue to Modernist art at large. 
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PREFACE: 
MARKS, BUTTONS AND NOTES AS TEXTUAL NAVELS 
Philosophy is not the reflection ofa pre-existing truth, but, 
like art, the act of bringing truth into being 
-Maurice Merleau-Ponty, PP (xx) 
[T]he text is an occasionfor, not the cause of, meaning.. 
-Mieke Bal, "Dispersing the Image" (76) 
The purpose of this study is to examine the connection between phenomenology and 
creative production in selected writings of Virginia Woolf (1882-1941), in particular 
"The Mark on the Wall" (1917), To the Lighthouse (1927), and The Waves (193 1), 
Gertrude Stein's (1874-1946) Tender Buttons (1914), and selected poems of Wallace 
Stevens (1879-195 5), focusing especially on "The Idea of Order at Key Wesf ' 
(1935) and "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction" (1942). 1 use Edmund Husserl's 
(1859-193 8) phenomenological concept of epocU or reduction, and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty's (1907-61) interpretation thereof, as a tool to articulate more clearly 
the aesthetic inquiries of Woolf, Stein and Stevens, the affinities of which have been 
heretofore overlooked in literary criticism. I argue that the mode of operation of the 
epochi is the engine of the repetitive patterns at the core of the selected works, 
xii 
which are all about creative production itself Drawing upon theorist Mieke Bal's 
essay "Dispersing the Image: Vermeer Story, "' I move "beyond the word image 
opposition"2 and read the works of Woolf, Stevens and Stein against a background 
of Paul Cezanne's art, which Merleau-Ponty, in his 1945 esssay "CLanne's Doubt, " 
uses as an example of phenomenological work with paint. Bal's theory, which 
considers sight as semiotic and visual art as narrative, places emphasis on the 
relation between perception and language, the visual and the textual, which includes 
our roles as seers and readers. "[T]he text is an occasion for, not the cause of 
meaning, " she stresses. 31 thus look at the repetitive nature of creative production in 
terms of writer as well as reader. Writer/Painter, reader/viewer and text/painting: 
each is an essential part of the work's making and re-making. 
In terms of structure, the thesis is divided into four chapters and rounds off 
with a Postface. Chapter One critically explains why and how the phenomenology of 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and Bal's visual theory serve as a framework for my 
examination. Chapters Two, Three and Four critically explore the kinship of method 
and concern between phenomenology and the work of Woolf, Stein, and Stevens, 
respectively. The Postface not only looks back upon my examinations of the three 
writers' works but also opens onto the present, begins again, and underlines my 
argument that the Husserlian concept of reduction is a clue to the nature of 
I Mieke Dal, "Dispersing the Image: Vermeer Story, " in Looking In: The Art of Viewing 
(Amsterdam: G+13 Arts International, 2001), 65-9 1. 
21 have borrowed the phrase "beyond the word image oppositiore' from Mieke Bal's work 
Reading Rembrandt: Beyond the Word Image Opposition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991). 
3 Dal, "Dispersing the Image, " 76. 
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Modernist aesthetics at large. In accordance with the fact that the reduction restores 
openness to the world, I end the thesis by offering a new "opening" which identifies 
phenomenological patterns of opening in the work of contemporary poet John 
Ashbery (1927) and the box constructions of Surrealist artist Joseph Cornell (1903- 
77). 
The introductory chapter clarifies Husserl's speculations about reduction, 
spanning from Ideas (1913) to The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology (1954), and Merleau-Ponty's interpretations thereof in 
Phýnomenology ofPerception (1945), "Uzanne's Doubt" (1945) and Yhe Visible 
and the Invisible (1964). Blaming the political and historical disasters of the early 
twentieth century on Western man's naYve acceptance of common-sense beliefs and 
judgements about the world, Husserl insisted on returning to the grounds of 
philosophical inquiry by presenting a philosophical mode of operation: the epocU or 
phenomenological reduction. By enacting the epochi, the phenomenologist could 
"bracket" - suspend - common assumptions about the world, render a purity of 
consciousness accessible, and thus re-leam to see the world in its original but lost 
idea (Ideas, 107-114). For Merleau-Ponty, the roots of our familiar world are also 
found in primordial ideas, not of how phenomena appear to pure consciousness, as 
Husserl set out to show, but of how they appear to the embodied subject. 
Consciousness, he stresses, comes to birth in the body. Only by enacting the 
reduction, by "bracketing" what we, according to habit, believe to be real, can we 
"re-achiev[e] a direct and primitive contact with the world" (PP, vii). In Merleau- 
Ponty's essay 'Uzanne's Doubt, " the method of reduction serves as a tool to 
xiv 
describe creative production in general, bringing to light the starting-point of the 
artist's creative process - that primary impulse of ... wonder' in the face of the world" 
(PP, xiii). 
Mieke Bal's metaphor of the "textual navel" helps us visualise the mode of 
operation of the phenomenological reduction, not only in terms of the artist's process 
of creation but also in terms of our roles as creative readers. Bal introduces the 
metaphor in the essay "Dispersing the Image, " an unusual reading of Vermeer's 
painting Woman Holding a Balance (ca. 1664) relating to Bal's own fascination 
with a nail and a hole in the wall next to a painting in the painting. There is a link, 
Bal argues, between the light that falls near the navel of the woman in the painting 
and the light that falls on the wall, near the nail and the hole: "Vermeer's light directs 
our gaze to the place of the navel by way of the textual navel: the nail and the hole. A 
Bal gives us her definition: 
The navel. .. is a metaphor for an element, often a tiny 
detail, that hits 
the viewer, is processed by her or him, and textualizes the image on 
its own terms. Such details need not be bodily, but calling them 
"textual navels" keeps us aware of the bodiliness of looking. 5 
It is exactly the embodiment not only of "looking" but also of all sense experience 
that Merleau-Ponty stresses in his phenomenology of perception. The philosopher 
describes the genesis of perceptual experience by situating the Husserlian epochi 
directly within the physical world. The "bracketing" or suspension of habitual 
4 Bal, "Dispersing the Image, " p. 87. 
5 Ibid., p. 84. 
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experience re-awakens in the perceiver a state of wonder and amazement in the face 
of the object. It is the "expressive operation of the body, begun by the smallest 
perception which is amplified into painting and art" (Signs, 70). Similarly, Bal's 
navel is that fine visual detail in the object which "hits the viewer, " re-awakens a 
sense of wonder, and activates him/her to re-discover, reflect on, and participate in 
the art work's coming into being: 
The work no longer stands alone: the viewer must now acknowledge 
that she makes it work; the surface is no longer still but tells a story of 
its and her making ... In attracting attention to the actual work that 
representing involves as well as to the work of reading or viewing, the 
nail and the hole are traces of the work of art, in all senses of that 
word. 
The nail and the hole, two examples of what Bal terms "textual navels, " proclaim 
both the birth and the production of art, revealing how the viewer or reader is a 
necessary part of that production. 
In a letter to Wallace Stevens, Jean Wahl refers to Husserl's affirniation of 
"an enormous... a priori in our minds, an inexhaustible infinity of a priori .. the 
approach to the unapproachable" (OP, 194). 1 use Bal's navel metaphor as my 
"approach to the unapproachable. " The "un-approachable" is that pre-objective and 
pre-communicative dimension of experience which, in different ways, is ever- 
present as the source of creative production in the work of Woolf, Stein and Stevens. 
"It may be that there is a zone of silence in every art, " Woolf writes in "Walter 
Ibid., 84,77. 
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Sickert, " "[t]he artists themselves live in if' (CE 2,236). Stein certainly "lived in it. " 
a 
The non-sense language of her Tender Buttons is an attempt to capture primordial 
experience, the natural "silent' 'order of things prior to the structures of grammar and 
reason: "I had to feel anything and everything that for me was existing so intensely 
that I could put it down in writing as a thing in itself without at all necessarily using 
its name" ("PG, " 145). Through naming we try to make the world our own but, as 
Stevens puts it in "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction", "we live in a place / That is not 
our own" (CP, 383) and "[flrom this the poem springs": 
There was a muddy centre before we breathed 
There was a myth before the myth began, 
Venerable and articulate and complete. (CP, 383) 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology seeks to uncover the genesis of perception 
- he calls it "the lived experience, that which we actually perceive" ("Doubt, " 14) - 
and to describe how this experience bears on the formation of linguistic and 
conceptual meaning. My argument is that the writings of Woolf, Stein, and Stevens, 
like the paintings of Uzanne, lay bare the tension between perception and 
conception. For none of the three writers does the emphasis fall on the result but on 
the act - Stevens calls it "the act of the mind" (CP, 240) - of articulating the 
"unapproachable" source of creative production. In claiming this, I take my bearings 
from Kevin Hart: "[Husserl's] incessant broodings over the reduction speak more 
vividly of something central to art than do his disciples' extensions of 
phenomenology into aesthetics. " "Everything begins with the reduction, " Hart 
writes, meaning that the reduction - that state of fascination, which releases some 
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primary impulse in the art maker - is the point of departure (and point of return) in 
every creative process. 71 want to show that creative production for Woolf, Stein and 
Stevens begins (and ends) at this "navel" point. 
A navel, the central knot of the body, is a sign of dependence on and yet 
detachment from the mother. In other words, it points in two directions at once and 
this double nature is relevant to my argument that Woolf, Stein and Stevens present 
us with works of phenomenological "perpetual beginning. " "The philosopher is a 
perpetual beginner, " writes Merleau-Ponty, " which "means... that philosophy is an 
ever-renewed experiment in making its own beginning; that it consists wholly in the 
description of this beginning" (PP, xiv). The "navel" metaphor highlights this 
perpetual genesis in that it, on the one hand, signifies the opening point of an open- 
ended creative process - the umbilical cord has been cut, as it were. On the other 
hand, being a "trace of the mother, "8 it also points back to the source of this 
creativity, that is to say, to the pre-communicative phase when the umbilical cord 
was still attached. The navel, then, is a metaphor for the division of experience that 
phenomenology brings to light: "not only are we dealing with what is given but also 
with what is presupposed in order for the giving to occur. "9 That which is 
"presupposed" is exactly the Husserlian notion of an "enormous... a priori in our 
minds, " which Jean Wahl refers to in his letter to Stevens. 
By opening up my reading of creative production through Woolf's "The 
Mark on the Wall, " Stein's Tender Buttons, and Stevens's "Notes toward a Supreme 
7 Kevin Hart, "The Experience of Poetry, " Boxkite 2 (1998): 286,285. 
8 Bal, "Dispersing the Image, " 83. 
9 Hart, "The Experience of Poetry, " 288. 
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Fiction, " I too start at the navel. In my reading of Woolf s "The Mark on the Wall, " I 
show that a black mark on a wall on which the narrator fixes her eye serves as the 
actual point of departure of her/our imaginary journey. Likewise, the "Buttons" of 
Gertrude Stein's Tender Buttons can be thought of as navel points - belly buttons - 
and designate starting points for creativity: buttons must be pressed to switch on a 
process. Finally, in "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction", Stevens presents us with 
"Notes, " preparatory scribbles that lead toward but never fully reach a "Supreme 
Fiction. " Like the nail and the hole in Vermeer's painting, Woolf s "mark, " Stein's 
"buttons, " and Stevens's "notes" are those fine details which highlight the 
preliminary phase of creative production. Marks, buttons, and notes are points in a 
continuum of creative opening but are also, inevitably, points of eternal return to the 
pre-objective and pre-communicative source of this creativity. This 
phenomenological process of "perpetual beginning" is what Woolf calls .... the eternal 
renewal, the incessant rise and fall and fall and rise again" (W, 247), what Stein 
refers to as "[b]eginning again and again [which] is a natural thing, " ("CE, " 23) and 
what Stevens tenns the "ancient cycle, " which 
satisfies 
Belief in an immaculate beginning 
And sends us, winged by an unconscious will, 
To an immaculate end. We move between these 
points: 
From that ever-early candor to its late plural. (CP, 382) 
xix 
The reduction, then, is not only a point of departure for creative production, it is also 
a point of eternal return. Merleau-Ponty writes: "The most important lesson that the 
reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (PP, xiv). As soon 
as the "a priori... the unapproachable" has been approached through language, the 
art maker's initial state of fascination, the "Thing itself '(1deas, 66) will have 
vanished: 
... if the thing itself were reached, it would be from that moment 
arrayed before us and stripped of its mystery. It would cease to exist 
as a thing at the very moment when we thought to possess it. What 
makes the "reality" of the thing is therefore precisely what snatches it 
from our grasp. (PP, 233) 
My final aim in this study is to show how the works of the three Modernists 
anticipate this "fate of perception, " that is to say, the inability completely to grasp 
what Woolf s Lily Briscoe calls "the thing itself before it has been made anything" 
(L, 260). 10 
10 1 have borrowed the term "fate of perceptiolf' from Geoff Ward, Statues ofLiberty: The 
New York School ofPoets (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 156. 
CHAPTER 1 
MODERNISM AND THE AESTHETICS OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
In carrying out this epochi, we obviously continue to stand on 
the ground of the world, it is now reduced to the life-world which 
is validfor us prescienctifically. 
-Edmund Husserl, Crisis 2 (147) 
[I]ntentionality li's] too often cited as the main discovery of 
phenomenology, whereas it is understandable only through 
the reduction. 
-Maurice Merleau-Ponty, PP (PP, xvii) 
1. "The Breakdown of the Obiect" 
In his 1934 essay "Recent Irish Poetry, " Samuel Beckett claimed that Modem Irish 
poetry expressed an awareness of "the breakdown of the object, " which had 
occasioned a "rupture of the lines of communication. " The task of the Modem artist 
was therefore to "state the space that intervenes between him and the world of 
2 
obj ects. "' The "breakdown of the obi ect' ' can also be used as a characterisation of 
the radical changes that were taking place in Western culture from about 1890 to 
1930. It is a well-established view that the changes in the arts during this period, 
which is known as Modernism, were related to substantial changes taking place in 
the social sphere. Advances made within technology and nuclear physics, and 
changes of thought within social and political structures, changed the concept of 
what constituted reality. The scientific, religious and political beliefs that had 
previously asserted an objective reality were gradually breaking down: objectivity 
and factuality in all its form were threatened by "rupture" and a lack of coherence. 
"All human relations have shifted, " Virginia Woolf pointed out in "Mr. Bennett and 
Mrs. Brown" (1924), "[a]nd when human relations change there is at the same time a 
change in religion, conduct, politics and literature" (WE, 71). This change of 
relations, which Woolf placed "about the year 19 10" (WE, 7 1), was marked by what 
Stephen Kern, in a more recent study of the conceptual changes of time and space 
from 1880 to 1918, refers to as "antithetical developments" between "dialectically 
related pairs": the individual and the public, identity and difference, subjectivity and 
objectivity. Kern writes: 
As the public became more intrusive, the individual retreated into a 
more strongly fortified and isolated private world. That is why we can 
observe in this period both a greater interpenetration and a greater 
separation of the two worlds. 2 
1 Samuel Beckett, "Recent Irish Poetry, " Disfecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic 
Fragment (New York: Grove Press, 1984), 70. 
2 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), 191. 
3 
About the year 1913, in his "General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology" 
entitled Ideas, the German philosopher Edmund Husserl introduced the epochi, the 
phenomenological concept of reduction, as a tool to analyse these tensions between 
man and world. Husserl blamed the breakdown of social and political forms, leading 
to what he would later call "Europe's sickness" (Crisis 1,153), on the fact that the 
"ordinary science[s] of fact"(1deas, 184) had obscured the original foundation for 
knowledge. Western man's unquestioning trust in pre-conceived scientific notions, 
asserting an objective and ready-made reality, had separated him from "the absolute 
ground of pure pre-conceptual experience" (Ideas, 27). It had made him lose sight of 
the fact that consciousness itself was the source of the meaning of the world, that 
objectivity arises from an intending subjectivity. Husserl thought of phenomenology 
as a "first philosophy" or a philosophy of "a radical beginning" (Ideas, 27). The goal 
of the epochi was to get "Back to the things themselves (zu den Sachen selbst), 0,3 that 
is to say, to recover how the world was "first' 'experienced and constituted through 
consciousness. The mode of operation of "bracketing" (Ideas, 107-114) central to the 
epochi would help put out of play pre-conceived objectivity, uncover the world's 
essential structure - the "primal ground" (Husserl Short, 10) for knowledge - and 
thus provide an exact description of things as these were met with in immediate 
experience. By returning to the pre-reflective dimension of experience, the subject 
could get back to the "thing itself, " see clearly the depth of his involvement with the 
world, "state the space" - to use Beckett's terminology - between himself and a 
broken object-world, and cure Europe of its "sickness. "' 
3 E(hnund Husserl as cited in Joseph J. Kockelmans, Martin Heidegger. - A First Introduction 
to His Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965). 
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Epoche as Aesthetic Tool 
This study explores the related patterns between phenomenology and creative 
production in selected works of the high Modernist writers Virginia Woolf, Gertrude 
Stein, and Wallace Stevens. Particular emphasis on the Husserlian reduction and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty's later interpretation of this concept creates an interpretive 
foundation from which to clarify the aesthetic inquiries of the three Modernist 
writers, the affinities of which, I argue, offer heretofore overlooked clues to the 
nature of Modernist aesthetics at large. In arguing this, I am taking my bearings from 
Kevin Hart's statement: "[Husserl's] incessant broodings over the reduction speak. . 
vividly of something central to aft. " 4 
What I propose is not a study of influence; rather, I offer an intertextual 
examination, which highlights the kinship of method and concern between 
phenomenology and the aesthetics of Woolf, Stein and Stevens. What I hope to show 
is that the works of the three Modernists in different ways evidence a breakdown of 
old beliefs and a change of relations within Modernist culture. All respond to and 
offer a critique of this "breakdown"; all aim to reclaim the space between subject and 
object-world; all imply that the cure to this breakdown can be found in a 
phenomenological shift of attitude, the main purpose of which is to get back to "the 
thing itself, " that is to say, to uncover the creative subject's pre-reflective experience 
of the world, taking this as a new starting-point for the creation and understanding of 
art. 
4 Hart, "The Experience of Poetry, " 286. 
5 
While Virginia Woolf would set out in the Modem world of broken objects 
to "seek among phrases and fragments something unbroken" (W, 210), Gertrude 
Stein portrayed the "twentieth century" as "a time when everything cracks, " which 
she claimed, "is a more splendid thing than a period where everything follows itself' 
fp; 
k. - wasso, 49). Stein's "splendid" twentieth century evidences a time of radical 
change, of showing forth what lies beneath the cracked surface of habituality. 5 
Wallace Stevens also confronted the broken object-world by challenging his reader: 
"Piece the world together boys, but not with your / Hands" (CP, 192). According to 
him "the great poems of heaven and hell [had] been written and the great poem of 
the earth remain[ed] to be writteif ' (NA, 142). He regarded the poet as "the priest of 
the invisible" (OP, 169) whose "'Supreme Fiction"(CP, 380) was to impose new 
secular orders on the world and thus serve as a substitute for the breakdown of 
traditional faith. In Adagia Stevens writes: 
The relation of art to life is of the first importance especially in a 
sceptical age since, in the absence of a belief in God, the mind turns 
to its own creations and examines them, not alone from the aesthetic 
point of view, but for what they reveal, for what they validate and 
invalidate, for the support that they give. (OP, 159) 
Similarly, in "The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet, " Stevens claims, "the poet 
must get rid of the hieratic in everything that concerns him" (NA, 58). By putting out 
of play the traditional "hieratic" notions about the world, the poet could turn to "the 
poem of the act of the mind" (CP, 240) - the creations of his own consciousness - 
5 The word "splendid" derives from the Latin "splendidus, " meaning "bright, shining, 
glittering, brilliant... illustrious, shoKy. " See The Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. James 
Morwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 130.1 will elaborate on Stein's logic of the 
"splendid" in Chapter 3 of this study. 
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and thus re-perceive the world in its original "first idea7' (Stevens, Letters, 426). 
"[P]oetic truth, " then, meant a turning away from belief in some higher being and 
became "an agreement with reality" (NA, 54), revealing "[a] new knowledge of 
reality" (CP, 534) different from that of nineteenth century Realism. The Realist art 
of representation or mirroring had attempted to give a true image of what was 
considered a free-standing reality but was criticised by Virginia Woolf, in "Modem 
Fiction, " for being "materialist! 'and "concerned with not the spirit but with the 
body" (CD, 6). For the Modernist artist, language could no longer simply represent 
"reality. " All forms of expression and inquiry underwent a radical shift of attitude, a 
clue to which lies in Gertrude Stein's commentary on the work of Picasso: "No one 
had ever tried to express things seen not as one knows them but as they are when one 
sees them without remembering having looked at them" (Picasso, 15). In trying to 
express a pre-objective and thus more direct experience of the world, the new 
realism of Modernism was concerned not with "the reflection of a pre-existing 
truth, " to borrow from Merleau-Ponty, but with "the act of bringing truth into 
being. " (PP, xx), thus attempting to get closer to "the thing itself. " 
It should be stressed that the phenomenological "thing itself' that I have 
taken as my guiding theme has nothing to do with the Kantian notion of "the thing 
in itself' (the "Ding an Sich"), signifying what Kant termed the noumenon, which 
exists "not as an object of our sensuous intuition7but refers to the thing or event as it 
is "in itself, " independent of human experience. 6 Unlike Kant's "thing in itself, " the 
Husserlian "thing itself' lays bare the world as phenomenon, that is to say, in tenns 
of how consciousness experiences it, For Husserl, "things" can only exist as the 
phenomena or essences that are given to the subject in immediate experience: 
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1934), 186. 
7 
"Locating the object as thing or as intended phenomenon depends on the perspective 
of the inquirer. ', 7 
Clues to the three literary Modernists' concerns with the pre-reflective "thing 
itself 'pervade their work. In her autobiographical essay "A Sketch of the Past, " 
Woolf chants: "we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself' (MB, 
72); in "Modem Fiction, " she is in quest of "life, or spirit, truth or reality, this, the 
essential thing" (CD, 7); and in To the Lighthouse, the painter Lily Briscoe yearns to 
pin down the pre-reflective moment of sensation, "before habits had spun themselves 
across the surface" (L, 25 8), "the thing itself before it had been made anythine' (L, 
260; italics mine). In a highly experimental manner Stein's work Tender Buttons 
attempts to unfold what the writer time and again refers to as "the thing in itself' 
("PP, " 113,119; "PG, " 147; italics mine), hereby trying to express the inside, pre- 
objective impression of the object at hand -a "rudimentary" (TB, 4) and still 
undeveloped first impression. In "The Course of a Particular, " Wallace Stevens 
writes of "the final finding in the air, in the thing / Itself' (OP, 97) and in the final 
poem of his Collected Poems, he attempts to get close to "Not Ideas About the Thing 
But the Thing Itself' (CP, 534). Throughout his writings, the poet also refers to the 
pre-objective experience of the "thing itself' as the "first idea" (Stevens, Letters, 
426-427). Poetry is his tool for relearning to see the world "with an ignorant eye / 
And see it clearly in the idea of it" (CP, 380). 
Before turning to Woolf, Stein and Stevens's quests to grasp, in writing, the 
pre-reflective "thing, " it is necessary to examine and clarify the fundamentals of and 
relationship between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's philosophical inquiries and 
establish an interpretive foundation from which to read the selected works. 
7 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 14. 
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Il. Husserl's "First Philosophv" and the "Crisis" of Modernist Culture 
The fundamentals of the epochi introduced in Ideas remain a guiding theme in 
Husserl's later phenomenology. Just as Beckett in 1934 claimed that Modem culture 
was marked by the "breakdown of the object, " in the mid thirties Husserl would 
begin speculating on the theme of the "crisis of European existence... the 
breakdown of lif6" (Crisis 2,299), the source of which was Modem man's "ndve" 
trust in "the objective sciencee' - both "mathematical natural science" and the 
"humanistic sciences" - which had provided the objective norm for all knowledge 
(Crisis 1,184,151-52). 8 As David Carr points out: "The problem of the 'crisis' was 
much in the air during this period... Many people, notably the Nazis themselves, 
were convinced that Europe was confronted not merely with a political crisis but 
with a crisis of its very civilization. "9 
In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 
Husserl insisted on "carry[ing] out an epoche in regard to all objective theoretical 
intererests" (Crisis 2,135). Due to his unquestioning acceptance of the objective 
norms for all knowledge, Modem man, Husserl argued, had lost sight of the original 
ground of philosophy. The crisis of Modem civilisation could only be cured by a 
recovery of this ground and the key to this, he claimed, was in the method of epochg. 
Through "bracketing" or suspending "the general thesis of the natural standpoint" 
(Ideas, 106) - both common-sense and scientific reflections about the world - the 
subject could return to the "phenomenological standpoint" (Ideas, 114). The latter 
8 Husserl writes: "Us objectivism or this psychological interpretation [of objective sciences] 
of the world, despite it seeming self-evident, is a naYve one-sidedness that never was understood to be 
such" (Crisis 1,184). 
9 David Carr, introduction to The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, by Husserl , xvi. 
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was part of a "phenomenological residuum... which renders pure consciousness 
accessible to us" (Ideas, 113), exposing to the subject the world as phenomenenon, 
bringing to light the original data of consciousness (the "thing itself") without the 
obstructions of pre-conceptions and scientific thematisations. 10 It would, however, be 
a mistake to interpret the phenomenological meaning of "bracketing" in accordance 
with Terry Eagleton's definition of the Modernist artwork: 
the modernist work brackets off the reference or real historical world, 
thickens its textures and deranges its form to forestall instant 
consurnability, and draws its own language protectively around it to 
become a mysteriously autotelic object, free of all contaminating 
truck with the real. Brooding self-reflexively on its own being, it 
distances itself though irony from the shame of being no more than a 
brute self-identical thing. " 
Eagleton's definition of the Modernist work, is, as Christopher Butler has noted, 
"very reminiscenf 'of Peter BUrger's often-mentioned political interpretations in 
Yheory of the Avant-Garde (1984) that "see the artist's techniques as symptomatic of 
larger, all-embracing cultural forces, which it tends to hypostatize as 'discourses, ' 
which are curiously independent of the individuals using them. , 12 A common view 
underlying Modernism defines the Modernist creation as a subjective act of self- 
preservation. Due to the lack of grounding in a rapidly transforming cultural 
situation, the individual artist shifts his focus inward and creates a space of retreat, 
10 For my understanding of Husserl's "crisis" in relation to the changes in Modernist culture, 
I am indebted to Gary Overvold's article "Husserl, Mann, and the Modernist Crisis of Culture. " 
Analecta Husserliana 49 (1996): 251-52. 
11 Terry Eagleton as cited in Christopher Butler, Early Modernism: Literature, Music, and 
Painting in Europe, 1900-1916 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 273. 
12 Ibid., 273,269. 
10 
which negates the intrusive facts of objective reality. According to Andreas 
Huyssen's well-established diagnosis of Modernism in After the Great Divide 
(1986), the "core of the modernist aesthetic" upholds an ideal of "genuine art" 
against the "anxiety of contamination7by "inauthentic mass culture. "13 The 
Modernist artwork is in this sense "the expression of a purely individual 
consciousness, " which is "totally separate from the realms of mass culture and 
everyday life. 9t14 Similarly, Eagleton's "brackets" operate to negate external reality, 
turning the Modernist artwork into an object of "fetishism, " an "autonomous, self- 
regarding, impenetrable modernist artifact, "15 which Butler describes as a "comic" 
and "grotesquely exaggerated" picture of the Modernist artwork, offering a 
"completely one-sided"' interpretation which "see[s] works of art as anxiously 
alienated from the external world and themselves. " The Modernist artwork, Butler 
points out, "asks us to be aware of the relationship between technique and idea, 
medium and message. "16 
I feel that my phenomenological approach supports the kind of reading Butler 
calls for in this section. It would be a mistake to read the phenomenological 
procedure of "bracketing" in a similar manner, that is, as a cutting off or negation of 
the real, both alienating and isolating the artist and artwork from the world, thus 
13 Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 
53, vii, 53. 
14 Ibid., 53. 
's Eagleton as cited in C. Butler, Early Modernism, 274. 
16 C. Butler, Early Modernism, 273,274. Other scholarship since the work of Bijrger and 
Huyssen has, like Butler, opposed the notion of a genuine high art and low mass culture divide. Mark 
S. Morrison, for instance, offers a "'revisioning' of modernism, " which argues for an interdependence 
of modernist art and the commercial mass market press. See Morrison, The Public Face of 
Modernism: Little Magazines, Audiences, and Reception 1905-1920 (London: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2001), 5. See also Kevin J. H. Dettmar and Stephen Watts, eds., Marketing 
Modernisms: Self-Promotion, Canonization, and Rereading (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1996). 
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placing emphasis on introspection and the purely inward space of consciousness and 
imagination. In Ideas, Husserl stresses: 
We do not abandon the thesis we have adopted, we make no change 
in our conviction... And yet the thesis undergoes a modification - 
whilst remaining in itself what it is, we set it as it were "out of 
action", we "disconnect it". "bracket it". It still remains there like 
the bracketed in the bracket, like the disconnected outside the 
connexional system. We can also say: The thesis is experience as 
lived (Erlebnis), but we make "no use" of it... (Ideas, 108). 
The "thesis we have adopted" - our conventional preconceptions and expectations - 
thus remains there "like the bracketed in the bracket" (Ideas, 108): it is never 
abandoned but simply not made use of. Yet, the philosopher Maurice Natanson 
points out, "[flew concepts in phenomenology have led to as much misunderstanding 
as epoch6. The chief problem seems to be that it is interpreted as signifying the 
denial or, somehow, the cancellation of reality. , 17 As the following chapter will 
demonstrate, this misunderstanding of the reduction is a common feature in previous 
phenomenological approaches to the writings of Woolf and Stevens in particular. In 
order to avoid such a misunderstanding, a clarification of the phenomenological 
notions of "horizon7' and "intentionality" will be helpful. 
The word reduction stems from the Latin re-ducere, to lead or bring back. ' 8 
In its root sense, then, the act of reduction indicates a leading back to a more 
primordial dimension of experience. In the Ideas, Husserl writes: "we start from that 
17 Maurice Natanson, Edmund HusserL Philosopher ofInfinite Tasks (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973), 57. 
'a Max van Manen, "Phenomenology Online, " http: fl www. phenomenologyonline. com/ 
inquiry/lO. htn-A (accessed 20 April 2004). 
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which antedates all standpoints: from the totality of the intuitively self-given which 
is prior to any theorizing reflection7' (Ideas, 78). Prior to our daily world of habit lies 
a pre-predicative world of infinity, an "infinity of a priori, " as Jean Wahl called it in 
his letter to Stevens: "Along with [an] a priori repetition which is axial to everyday 
reality there is what Husserl would call a 'horizon' of continuity. "' 9 The world of the 
"natural attitude" is situated within the temporal horizons of past and future. Time is 
an infinite continuum, an infinite "stream" where one horizon passes into the other. 
Continuity and repetition, then, are "immanent to li&': they are conditions 
essential to the possibility of experience. These conditions are "always... in 
advance' (Crisis 2,110), providing the ground for all our acts and expressions. 
From this emerges the meaning of the concept of "intentionality, " the "axis of 
phenomenology, " which refers to the activity of consciousness. 20 
The present is the focal point of conscious life, Husserl points out, but always 
against a background of the stream of the world's temporal horizons: "The world 
now present to me, and in every waking 'now' obviously so, has its temporal 
horizon, infinite in both directions, its known and unknown, its intimately alive and 
its unalive past and future" (Ideas, 102). The idea of "the stream of consciousness" 
traditionally referred to in connection with the self-conscious techniques of high 
Modernist writers such as Woolf and Joyce has been approached foremost through 
William James's Principles ofPsychology: "Consciousness... does not appear to 
itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it 
presents itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or 'stream' 
is the metaphor by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let 
19 Maurice Natanson, The Erotic Bird. - Phenomenology in Literature (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), IS. 
20 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 103. 
13 
us call it the stream ofthought, ofconsciousness, or ofsubjective life. "21 As James's 
"actual practice points in the direction of what Husserl later explicateV and is a 
significant factor in the relation between the Modernists and phenomenology, it is 
odd that the related patterns between Husserlian thought and Modernist concerns 
with the intentional acts of consciousness is a rarely trodden field. 22 Borrowing the 
term from James, in Ideas, Husserl speaks of "the stream of experience" (Ideas, 
23 116). Elsewhere he speaks of it as a "flow": 
The perceived thing can be, without being perceived, without my 
being aware of it even as potential only... and perhaps without itself 
changing at all. But the perception itself is what it is within the steady 
flow of consciousness, and it is itself constantly in flux; the 
perceptual now is ever passing over into the adjacent consciousness of 
the just-past, a new now simultaneously gleams forth and so on. 
(Ideas, 130) 
Consciousness is a dynamic movement, continually surging forward: "Intentionality 
is a flow, a river which consciousness is immersed in, making it unnecessary to say that 
one can 'step' into the river; one is the river. ', 24 
21 William James, 7he Principles ofPsychology (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 155. 
For examinations of the Modernist "stream of consciousness" in the light of James's thought, see Robert 
Humphrey, Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1954); and Melvin Friedman, Stream of Consciousness: A Study ofLiterary Method 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955). James Naremore also devotes a chapter to "Virginia 
Woolf and the Stream of Consciousness" in The World Without a Selffew Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1973), 60-252. 
22 Bruce Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology: A Study of "The Principles of 
Psychology" (London: Indiana University Press, 1968), 6. 
23 The fact that Husserl's thoughts about the nature of consciousness were influenced by 
James is mentioned in Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology, 154. 
24 Natanson, Erotic Bird, 25. 
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This intentionality of consciousness, however, cannot be opened up without 
the reduction. In Ideas Husserl stresses, "it is only with the phenomenological 
reduction which would convert radicalism into conscious work, that genuine world- 
performing philosophizing begins" (Ideas, 19) -a point which is reiterated in 
Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology ofPerception: "intentionality [is] too often cited as 
the main discovery of phenomenology, whereas it is understandable only through the 
reduction" (PP, xvii). Epochj opens onto intentionality, to the fact that 
consciousness is always already immersed in a world of change and continuity. 
Judith Butler adds to our understanding of this concept: 
The notion that consciousness belongs solely to the domain of 
subjectivity thus misses the phenomenological point that subjectivity 
always belongs to the world: consciousness is always consciousness 
of its object, it is nothing without its preposition, and its preposition 
marks its kinship with the world that it interrogates. Consciousness is, 
thus, in its very structure, in an implicit relation to the world it seeks 
to know, and seeks to know that world precisely to the extent that it is 
"of' it in some way. 25 
The key to our understanding of the presence of things, then, lies in the intentionality 
of consciousness, in "the essential nature of 'the consciousness of something"' 
(Ideas, 115). Consciousness by its very nature is always consciousness-of, every act of 
thinking implies an object thought of To be intended is to be constantly built up 
through acts of the mind: 
25 Judith Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, by Natanson, x. 
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the thing is the intentional unity, that which we are conscious of as 
one and self-identical within the continuously ordered flow of 
perceptual pattems as they pass from the one into the other. (Ideas, 13 1) 
That which Husserl calls the "intentional unity" or "ffie thing itself' refers not to a 
thing but to the relation between the object side of the intentional structure (also 
called the "noema") and the subject side; the intending act (also called the "noesis") 
(Ideas, 272-276). It is not the opposition but the implicit relation between the two 
that the epochg brings to clarity. 
Thus, there are two inter-related tenns at work here: horizon and 
intentionality. Intentionality concerns our consciousness or perceptions of things and 
at its periphery lies the horizon of continuity. Husserl's epochi is a "mere change of 
standpoinf' (Ideas, 15), serving as a tool to illuminate what it means for a human 
being to be conscious of and operate within this horizon. Phenomenology aims 
towards a "full insighf ' (Ideas, 113) into the world, which, Husserl claimed, had 
been obscured by man's unquestioning belief in the objective sciences. Through the 
operation of "bracketing, " the preconceptions and theoretical notions ruling our daily 
world of fact are never left behind but temporarily withheld: "I do not then deny this 
'world, ' as though I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is there as though I were a 
sceptic, but I use the 'phenomenological' epoche, which completely bars me from 
using any judgement that concerns spatio-temporal existence (Dasein)" (Ideas, 111). 
"[R]eduction, " then, "is ironically a protest against reductionism" 26 It does not 
imply abandonment of one world for another but a shift in the direction of one's 
attention; a shift away from our surface world of facts and back to its underlying 
ground or constitutive essence. Nothing is changed through the reduction; no 
26 See Manen, http: //phenomenologyonline. com/inquiry/IO. html. 
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previous reality is cancelled. The method of "bracketine' does not reject the real 
world, leaving the subject alienated and isolated; rather, it "restor[es] openness" to 
the world. 27 The "brackets" of phenomenology, then, are brackets of opening, as it 
were, as they aim to bring to light the condition that underlies experience and makes 
it possible. The goal of the reduction is to achieve a better understanding of man's 
placement within the world of everyday life. 
Husserl wanted to show that embedded in daily life is the genesis of 
philosophy, a "first philosophy. " In Ideas he claims: "the immediate a priori 
phenomenology.. is the 'first philosophy' in itself, the philosophy of the 
Beginning" (Ideas, 16). Phenomenology was to be a "rigorous science" (Crisis 1, 
71), which could give a new certainty of roots by grounding theoretical reflection in 
pre-reflective intentional experience. The reduction makes visible the usually 
invisible but essential structure upon which our visible world rests. Only by 
suspending habituality can consciousness rc-exarnine itself and see clearly that 
objectivity and factuality in all its forms are "product[s] of human praxis 
accomplishment[s] of a unique mode of intending subjectivity. "28 Although the 
reduction turns the perceiver into a "non-participating spectator, ', 29 it does not detach 
him from ordinary life; rather it sheds a clarifying light on the object in its relation to 
the subject. Mark Kingswell offers an illuminating explanation of this paradox: "the 
epochi takes the phenomenologist not out of the world but, in a sense, more deeply 
into it. " This shift of attitude, he explains, "serves to point out a central paradox in 
27 Ibid. 
28 John Barnett Brough, "Art and Artworld: Some Ideas for a Husserlian Aesthetic, " Edmund 
Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition: Essays in Phenomenology, ed. Robert Sokolowski 
(Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of Arnerica Press, 1988), 32. 
29 Edmund Husserl, quoted in Max van Manen, Researching Lived Experience: Human 
Sciencefor an Action Sensitive Pedagogy (Ontario: The Althouse Press, 1990), 182. 
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human experience as Husserl explores it. How is it that I am both a subject 
experiencing the world and an object within the world? 9930 The reduction, then, 
points to "both a greater interpenetration and a greater separatioif 'of the individual 
and world. 31 It brings to light neither a complete dichotomy, nor a complete unity 
between subjectivity and objectivity but a paradoxical "in between, " a space between 
the subject and the object-world, perceiver and perceived. In this study, I will be 
calling this the paradox of the "eye/I, " indicating that the perceiving subject is at 
once an active "eye, " observing and reflecting upon the world from the outside, and 
a passive "l, " a component within a world of continuity. 
Husserl's work offers several versions of the reduction, the complexity of 
which makes it impossible to penetrate every aspect of them in the space available. 
What I shall do instead is focus on what he termed the eidetic reduction. Husserl 
described phenomenology as the "eidetic science, " the science of "the Eidos, the 
pure essence" (Ideas, 62,57). Essences, which are also spoken of as phenomena, are 
objects of intentional acts; they are "simply aspects or qualities of object-as- 
intended . 9932 "Phenomenology 
is the study of essences" (PP, vii), writes Merleau- 
Ponty- "Looking for the world's essence... is looking for what it is as a fact for us, 
before any thematization" (PP, xv. ). Analyses of the primacy of perception are thus 
"eidetie' or "essentiar' analyses. Whenever I use the terms epocU or reduction, 
then, I refer to the eidetic reduction, signifying a "change of standpoinf '(1deas, 15), 
30 Mark Kingswell, "Husserl's Sense of Wonder, " The Philosophical Forum 3 1, no. I 
(Spring 2000): 102,99. For another illurninating explanation of this paradoxical relation between 
subject and object-world, see Brough, "Art and Artworld. " 
3' Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 19 1. 
32 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 4. 
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which directs our attention to the essence or eidos that lies on the other side of our 
everyday, concrete fact-world. 
111. The Bodv as Consciousness: Merleau-Pontv's Refinement of Husserl 
To sum up, the project of phenomenology takes the immediate data of consciousness - 
the data of the intentional act - as its starting point. This intentional unity - the '7Wng 
itself' (Ideas, 66)-bctwecn the act of consciousness and the object as intended always 
manifests itself against a temporal horizon of continuity - an infinite "stream". 
Intentionality cannot be opened without the reduction. 
Like his predecessor Husserl, the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty sought a philosophical beginning free from preconceived views about reality. 
He intended to "[b]are all the roots" and bring to light "the science of pre-science" 
through the reduction (VI, 169,167). For both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the role 
of the reduction is to lead us back to meanings that remain latent within the world of 
daily life. However, whereas Husserl's point of departure for his "first philosophy" is 
consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty it is the body: "'my consciousness'. .. is 
sustained, subtended, by the prereflective and preobjective unity of my body" (VI, 
141-142). As James Tuedio puts it: "where Husserl would place the principal focus 
on 'consciousness (as embodied), ' Merleau-Ponty chooses to begin with 'the body as 
consciousness. ,, 33 For Merleau-Ponty, whose existential phenomenology was based 
on both the fundamentals of Husserl's philosophical method and Heidegger's notion 
33 James Tuedio, "Bodily Anticipation of Reflexive Thought" Philosophy Today 29 (1985): 
102. 
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of "Being-in-world, " the roots of our acts and expressions lie in primordial 
assumptions, not about how phenomena appear to us as given in consciousness, as 
Husserl set out to show, but about the body in-the-world. 34 The efforts of his thought 
are centred upon "reachieving, " through the reduction, "a direct and primitive 
contact with the world" (PP, vii) from which our acts, expressions and relations 
stem. 
What the thought of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have in common, however, - 
and this is where my emphasis lies - is that the primordial bond between 
consciousness (embodied) or body (as consiousness) and world is the "starting-point 
and basis" (Ideas, 245) of phenomenological investigation. What I wish to show is 
that such pre-reflective intentionality is also the "starting-point and basis" for the 
creative procedures in the work of Woolf, Stein and Stevens. In my examinations of 
the three writers' works I will refer to both Husserl's notion of the epochi and 
Merleau-Ponty's re-interpretation of the concept. Most clearly in "Uzanne's 
Doubt" (1945) and "Eye and Mind" (1964), his well-known essays on aesthetics, but 
also implicitly in his longer works Phenomenology ofPerception (1945) and The 
Visible and Invisible (1964), Merleau-Ponty uses the reduction to articulate the 
aesthetic experience of the Modernist artist and the ontology of the artwork. The 
reduction offers a tool to articulate not only Cezanne's phenomenology of painting, 
but to formulate an aesthetics, a pattern of thought which sheds new light on creative 
production at large. 35 Through the method of "bracketing, " it is not only the 
34 In Phenomenology ofPerception Merleau-Ponty writes: "Far from being, as has been 
thought a procedure of idealistic philosophy, phenomenological reduction belongs to existential 
philosophy: Heidegger's 'being-in-the-world' appears only against the background of the 
phenomenological reduction" (PP, xiv). 
35 For extended accounts of Merleau-Ponty's aesthetics and writings on the arts see Galen A. 
Johnson, ed. The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader. - Philosophy and Painting (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1993). 
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scientific or rational individual but also the creating artist that can "relear[n] to look 
at the world" (PP, xx) as it is met with in immediate, pre-objective experience, 
"before it is a thing one speaks of .. before it has been reduced to a set of 
manageable, disposable significations" (VI, 102). Just as Husserl's phenomenology 
describes how the world is constituted through acts of consciousnesss, so does 
Merleau-Ponty's aesthetics describe how the artwork - both visual art and text - is 
constituted and experienced primarily through the body: "It is my body which gives 
significance not only to the natural object, but also to cultural objects like words 
Before becoming an indication of a concept it is first of all an event which grips my 
body... " (PP, 235). 
Whereas Husserl introduced the epoche to ground all thought in the 
intentionality of consciousness, thereby offering a tool to overcome the "space" 
between the subject and a Modem world in crisis, in Merleau-Ponty's writings on 
the arts, it is the painter's or writer's bodily encounter with the world that is 
expressed onto the blank space of his canvas or page. His phenomenology of 
perception, then, reclaims the space between the embodied subject and the object- 
world. The reduction does not only lie at the core of Merleau-Ponty's aesthetic 
concerns as they appear in his 1945 essay 'Uzanne's Doubt" but it is also the 
engine of his later concepts of "6cart, " "flesh" and "hyperdialectic. " These concerns 
and concepts, the fundamentals of which are explained in the following three 
sections, will be drawn upon and discussed throughout this study. 
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Epochj in "Cizanne's Doubt" 
The point of departure for Merleau-Ponty's essay on Cezanne's painting is e 
reduction, a "bracketing" of common assumptions about what the world ought to 
look like and how this should be portrayed in art. In stark contrast to the ... natural' 
perception" of Renaissance art, 36 creating geometrically "correct' 'landscapes, 
Cezanne's goal was a visual art, which was not an illusion. Hence Merleau-Ponty's 
reading of Cezanne through phenomenological "bracketing" or suspension: 
We live in the midst of man-made objects, among tools, in houses, 
cities and most of the time we see them only through the human 
actions which put them to use... Cezanne's painting suspends these 
habits of thought and reveals the base of inhuman nature upon which 
man has installed himself. ("Doubt, " 16) 
Cezanne's mode of suspension opens up what Merleau-Ponty tenns "the lived 
perspective, that which we actually perceive" as opposed to "a geometric or 
photographic one" ("Doubf ', 14). Just as Husserl sought to uncover through the 
epochi the original data of consciousness, so does the "lived perspective" expose the 
original instincts - the "mute perceptioe' (VI, 15 5) - of the perceiving body. 
37 
"Cezanne's Doubt" exemplifies this position. In a form of art that fused 
perception and conception, Uzanne attempted to grasp the coming into being of the 
landscape which was at once the object of his eye and an infinite world of change 
within which his body was immersed. In a conversation with Joachim Gasquet - 
36 See Isabelle Cahn, Paul Cizanne: A Life in Art (London: Cassell, 1995), 14-15. 
37 Michael Philipson's reference to phenomenology in his reading of C6zanne has been very 
important to my understanding of the implications of the reduction. See Philipson, Painting, 
Language and Modernity (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 48-56. 
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which, it could be argued, must have influenced Merleau-Ponty's approach in 
"CLanne's Doubf '- the painter said: 
The landscape becomes reflective, human and thinks itself through 
me. I make it an object, let it project itself and endure within my 
painting ... I become the subjective consciousness of the 
landscape 
38 
and my painting becomes its objective consciousness. 
This is what recent philosophers have called "Cezanne's enigma": "Man absent from 
but entirely within the landscap e09 - an enigma which recalls the paradox of the 
eye/I laid bare through Husserl's reduction. 
As the outer landscape originated within Uzanne, as it were; as he was 
s"germinating' with the countryside" C'Doubt, " 17), he traced the growth of his own 
creation. Hence Merleau-Ponty's claim that he offers us "the impression of an 
emerging order, an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes" 
("Doubt, " 14). In Phenomenology ofPerception, Merleau-Ponty also touches upon 
this thought: 
In the work of his earlier years, Uzanne tried to paint the expression 
first and foremost, and that is why he never caught it. He gradually 
learned that expression is the language of the thing itselfand springs 
from its conftguration. His painting is an attempt to recapture the 
physiognomy of things and faces by the integral reproduction of their 
sensible configuration. This is what nature constantly and effortlessly 
38 C6zanne as cited in Joyce Medina, C&anne and Modernism: The Poetics ofPainting 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 2. 
39 Gilles Deleuze and Rlix Guattari, "at is Philosophy? (London, New York: Verso, 
1994), 169. 
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achieves, and it is why the paintings of Uzanne are "those of a pre- 
world in which as yet no men existed. " (PP, 322) 
Uzanne attempted to capture how expression stemmed from this primordial vision: 
"he wanted to depict matter as it takes on form, the birth of order through 
spontaneous organization7 CDoubt, " 13). On his journey towards the realisation of 
the object, he had to pass through the primordial appearances of this object "before it 
is a thing one speaks of and which is taken for granted, before it has been reduced to 
a set of manageable disposable significations. " (VI, 102) Uzanne's paintings convey 
a sense of the unfamiliar, "as if viewed by a creature of another species" ("Doubt, " 
16) belonging to a "pre-world. "40 
Thus Merleau-Ponty found in C6zanne a paradigm for the reduction, that is, a 
shift of standpoint through which the familiar is rendered strange, but, using the 
words of Judith Butler, "that strangeness is exposed as the condition of possibility of 
the ordinary. "41 Towards the end of the essay Merleau-Ponty concludes: "Only one 
emotion is possible for this painter - the feeling of strangeness - and only one of 
lyricism - that of the continual rebirth of existence" C'Doubt, " 18). Uzanne's 
"Iyricism" lies in the primordial bond between subject and world. Since the body (as 
consciousness) is in the world, the creative process corresponds with the "continual 
rebirth of existence" and the creating artist becomes a "perpetual beginner" (PP, 
xiv). Anticipating the aims of the Cubists, who "produced a many-faceted 
interpretation of their chosen subject matter, taking the viewer's eye around it,, 942 
C6zanne would paint the same landscape imagery of Mont Sainte Victoire and the 
40 For a further discussion of Uzanne's work, see the section entitled "Interrelation and 
Separation: Dialectical Tensions in Paul Uzanne's The Large Bathers and Virginia Woolf s The 
Waves" in Chapter Two of this study. 
41 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xv. 
42 Cahn, Paul Cizanne, 35. 
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same still life objects - the same blue carafe, sugar bowl, vessels and apples - over 
and over again: 
Here on the bank of the river the motifs multiply, the same subject 
seen from 
a different angle offers subject for study of the most powerful interest 
and so varied that I think I could occupy myself for months without 
changing place, by turning more to the right, now more to the left. 43 
By painting the same motifs again and again, the object remained ever-new: 
wonder at the object would constantly be renewed. In Phenomenology ofPerception 
Merleau-Ponty claims: "The best formulation of the reduction is probably that given 
by Eugen Fink, Husserl's assistant, when he spoke of 'wonder' in the face of the 
world" (PP, xxi). The experience of wonder, then, is a key to the "first philosophy" 
of phenomenology, recalling Aristotle's claim that "wonder is the source origin of 
philosophy itself, because it represents man's primary thirst for knowledge. A4 In a 
core passage from Phenomenology ofPerception, Merleau-Ponty links this experience 
to the nature of Modem thought: 
The unfinished nature of phenomenology and the inchoative 
atmosphere which has surrounded it are not to be taken as a sign of 
failure... If phenomenology was a movement before becoming a 
43 Paul Uzanne, Cizanne's Letters, ed. John Rewald (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1976), 
327. 
44 Stephen Halliwell Aristotle's Poetics (London: Duckworth, 1986), p. 75. For a recent 
examination of the notion of "wonder" in phenomenology see Mark Kingswell, "Husserl's Sense of 
Wonder. " Other recent approaches to the concept of "wonder" include Ronald W. Hepburn, 
"Wonder, " in Wonder and Other Essays: Eight Studies in Aesthetics and Neighboring Fields 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984); and Philip Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the 
Aesthetics ofRare Experience (Cambridge Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 
1998). 
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doctrine or a philosophical system, this was attributable neither to 
accident, nor to fraudulent intent. It is as painstaking as the work of 
Balzac, Proust, Valery or Uzanne - by reason of the same kind of 
attentiveness and wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same 
will to seize the meaning of the world or of history as that meaning 
comes into being. In this way it merges into the general effort of 
modem thought. (PP, xxi) 
Phenomenology, then, re-awakens an awareness of the world as this is met in 
immediate, "lived" experience, making us see the world as if this were new. 
Uzanne, Merleau-Ponty claims, "speaks as the first men spoke and paints as if no 
one had ever painted before"C'Doubf ' 19). His perpetual doubts in his "process of 
expressing" ("Doubf' 17) are "those of the first word" C'Doubt", 19), of how to 
make the first mark on a blank canvas. 
Flesh: An "Intermundane Space" 
Intentionality for Merleau-Ponty is action. Through the body "'we have direct access 
to space"; it is "our expression in the world, the visible forms of our intentions" 
(Primacy, 5). Consciousness, in other words, comes to birth in the body; hence 
intentionality is always corporeal and assigned to what Merleau-Ponty in his later 
work terms "flesW' (VI, 13 9). 
Just as all our visible perceptions are conditioned by a pre-existing ground or 
horizon, our ability to speak about the world is conditioned by an unspoken, bodily 
communication with it. Merleau-Ponty points out that this primary bodily 
communication is the foundation for all thought and expressions. "Meaning is 
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invisible, " stresses Merleau-Ponty, "but the invisible is not the contradictory of the 
visible: the visible itself has an invisible inner framework (membrure)" (Merleau- 
Ponty, VI, 215-216). Likewise, language has a silent centre, a "core of primary 
meaning round which the acts of naming and expression take shape" (PP xv). Just as 
everything visible rests on an "invisible inner famework, " so does all speech rest on 
a bodily, "mute perception7(VI, 155) of the world. In Merleau-Ponty's later 
phenomenology, the space of difference between these invisible/mute and 
visible/spoken dimensions of experience bears the name of "6cart". Jerrold Seigel 
explains the philosopher's most difficult concept: 
The Gestalt psychologists had shown that perception depends on the 
contrast between 'figure' and 'background'; what we perceive is 
conditioned by the ground against which we see it. All perception 
rests on this separation or distance (icart) between something seen 
and what it is seen against: we perceive objects by reference to this 
ecart, but we do not perceive the divergence itself- Hence the 
difference is the invisible ground of all our perceiving, the 
unperceived phenomenon on which our seeing rests. 45 
tcart is thus "a principle of differentiation, " existing within being. 46 All our 
perceptions and clear expressions are grounded in this separation between the 
invisible and the visible, the pre-reflective and the reflective, the pre-semantic and 
the articulated. "This separation (ecart)... forms meaning" (VI, 216) - but we are 
not aware of it as it is prior to our ability to reflect on and speak about the world. 
45 Jerrold Seigel, "A Unique way of Existing: Merleau-Ponty and the Subject, " Journal of the 
History ofPhilosophy 29, no. I (January 1991): 475. 
46 Ibid., 475. 
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From the unperceived icart emerges Merleau-Ponty's notion of "flesw': "my 
body is made of the same flesh as the world... this flesh of my body is shared by the 
world, the world reflects it" (VI, 249). The body, Merleau-Ponty tells us, has a 
twofold being that locates it at once apart from other sensible beings as a 
seeing/touching subject and among them as a seen/touched "thing": "every 
perception is doubled with counterperception ..., is an act with two 
faces" (VI, 
264). The paradox of the eye/I brought to light through the reduction thus becomes 
the paradox of the "lived" experience of the body. We are all caught up in the'Wesh 
of the world" (VI 248) as both perceiving and perceived beings, at once distanced 
from and intertwined with experience. The structure of flesh is therefore chiasmic 
(VI, 264): it refers neither to a complete separation nor a unity between invisibility 
and visibility, mute perception and speech, seer and seen; rather, it points to an 
"intermundane space ... where our gazes cross and our perceptions overlap" 
(VI, 48), 
thus stating the space between them. "Flesh7' is a "general thing, midway between 
the spatio-temporal individual and the idea" (VI 139). 
"Hyperdialectic" 
In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty comments on the fact that the 
concept of reduction was a point of eternal return in the thinking of Husserl. The 
philosopher re-examined the implications of the reduction from his Ideas to the 
Crisis without ever reaching a conclusion. Thus, Merleau-Ponty claims: "rhe most 
important lesson that the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete 
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reduction" (pp" XiV). 47 A key to this dilemma lies in the fact that the world persists 
in its own renewal and that the subject is in this world as a camal being. Hence, 
"[t]he philosopher is a perpetual beginner.... It means also that philosophy is an 
ever-renewed experiment in making its own beginning; that it consists wholly in the 
description of this beginning. " (PP, xiv). This impossibility of reduction, leading to 
the perpetual beginning of the phenomenologist, should not be taken as a sign of 
futility, Merleau-Ponty suggests, but as a constant reminder of the pre-reflective 
dimension of reality, the "first philosophy" embedded within daily life from which 
our critical and theoretical reflections arise. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: "reflection 
does not grasp its full significance unless it refers to the unreflective fund of 
experience which it presupposes, upon which it draws, and which constitutes for it a 
kind of original past, a past which has never been a present" (PP, 242). 
In Merleau-Ponty's final work The Visible and the Invisible, the impossibility 
of complete reduction is given a dialectical importance, culminating in the notion of 
"hyperdialectic" (VI, 94), a dialectic "without synthesis" (VI, 95) which is, 
nevertheless, "a good dialectic" in that "it is conscious of the fact that every thesis is 
an idealization, that Being is not made up of idealizations of things said, as the old 
logic believed, but of bound wholes"(VI, 94). Although the "hyperdialectic" of the 
perpetually beginning phenomenologist never reaches a point of closure, this should 
not be taken as a sign of futility or "scepticisrW' (VI, 95): "as a philosophical theme: 
47 In the preface to Ideas, Husserl's comments on the incompleteness of his own project, 
implying his inability ever to reach the realm of "pure consciousness" through the reduction: "The 
author sees the infmite open country of the true philosophy, the "promised land" on which he himself 
will never set foot. This confidence may wake a smile, but let each see for himself whether it has not 
some ground in the fragments laid before him as phenomenology in its beginnings. Gladly would he 
hope that those who come after him will take up these first adventures, carry them steadily forward, 
yes, and improve also their great deficiencies, defects of incompleteness which cannot indeed be 
avoided in the beginning of scientific work7 (Ideas, 29) It is this incompleteness that becomes the 
theme of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology. 
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the incompleteness of the reduction... is not an obstacle to the reduction, it is the 
reduction itself, the rediscovery of vertical being" (VI, 178). The impossibility of 
complete reduction, then, should not be taken as a dead end, a sign of failure or 
,, 48 indeterminacy; rather, it should be perceived as "a means to an end . Merleau 
Ponty's dialectical thought serves as a constant opening onto the underlying ground 
which makes experience possible, never allowing us to lose sight of the "wonder in 
the face of the world" which is the key to all creativity. 'Thenomenology does not 
problem solve.... [p]henomenological questions are meaning questions. "49 The 
emphasis of the philosopher's Modernist lesson, then, is not on result but on the how 
of the result, not on "the reflection of a pre-existing truth! 'but on "the act of 
bringing truth into being. " (PP, xx). It never allows us to lose sight of the "first 
philosophy" embedded in daily life: the invisible, pre-reflective dimension of 
experience in which all our visible acts, expressions and relationships are grounded. 
In what follows, I will highlight how Stevens, Woolf and Stein bring to light 
the fleshy opening or in between where Merleau-Ponty's hyperdialectic occurs. In 
different ways the three writers open onto the invisible inhabiting the visible and 
onto the mute perception -a "zone of silence" (CE 2,236), as Woolf calls it - upon 
which our written and spoken language rests. 
48 Manen, Researching Lived Experience, 185. 
49 Ibid., 23. 
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IV. The Ckzannian Composition: Part and Whole 
The literary Modernists whose works I explore in this study are not often considered 
together in literary critiCiSM. 50 Woolf s works are traditionally examined within 
critical frames of feminism or psycho-analysis. Much recent criticism has 
approached Stein's obscure texts in terms of their anticipation of Post-Modernist 
disruption of language, and literary studies of Stevens are often concerned with the 
poet's promotion of an imagination/reality dichotomy. My choice to bring together 
the writings of a British novelist and essayist and two very different American poets 
comes out of a desire to highlight deep concerns that their writings share with the 
primordial dimension of experience, which is also the domain of phenomenological 
speculation. As I will clarify in the following chapters, phenomenological 
approaches to the work of Woolf and Stevens in particular have been demonstrated 
in single author studies but no attempts have heretofore been made to draw together 
the aesthetic concerns of literary Modernism through phenomenology. My 
examinations do not indicate that the phenomenological features in the works of 
Woolf, Stein and Stevens are found in their works only. The type of examination I 
am proposing could have been applied to others. The fact that throughout this study I 
call attention to the aesthetic concerns of Paul Uzanne as well as the work of Proust, 
50 Recently published works that do explore other overlooked affinities between the work of 
Stein or Woolf and Stevens include Sara J. Ford's Gertrude Stein and Wallace Stevens: The 
Performance qfModern Consciousness (New York: Routledge, 2002). Examining both the poetry and 
the plays of the two poets, Ford focuses on the literal and physical space of the theatre, thus 
demonstrating how these writers in similar manners "stage the modem subject" (xiii). In another 
recent study Douglas Mao offers a socio-economic/philosophical examination of Stevens and 
Woolf s concerns with the material object in the world. See Douglas Mao, Solid Objects: Modernism 
and the Test ofProduction (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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Joyce, the mid-twentieth century artist Joseph Cornell and contemporary poet John 
Ashbery underlines my desire to unfold what I see as a continuum of the Modernist 
attention to the Husserlian "thing itself, " reflecting these artists' shared concerns 
with the pre-reflective, intentional experience of the subjective perceiver as the 
ground of objectivity and factuality. In an examination of the "realisrn7' of 
Modernism, Danish critic Tania Orum perceptively remarks that "the modernist forin 
of writing could be described as a form of phenomenological reduction, " which, she 
notes, attempts to return to the foundation for human perceptions and expressions 
51 
prior to objective points of view and scientific notions. It is this aspect of the 
Modernist text that I wish to bring to the fore. I hope to clarify how the meaning of 
the phenomenological reduction "merges into the general effort of modem thought! ' 
(PP, xxi), in the words of Merleau-Ponty, and offers a clue to the nature of 
Modernist aesthetics at large. 
I have pointed out that the Modernist "new knowledge of reality" (CP, 534), 
shedding light on the immediacy of perception, stands in stark contrast to nineteenth 
century Realism, which presented the human relationship to the world as one of 
mirroring. What should also be noted is that the new realism of Modernism, which 
concerns itself with the pre-reflective moment of pure perception - the moment of 
"the thing itself' - should not be understood as equivalent to the Romantic moment 
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of vision, expressing a "reconcilement of the external with the internal. To the 
Romantic poet, poetry was an "imitatress of nature"53 and nature was seen as a 
51 Tania Orun-4 "Modernismens realisme, " in Gensyn men realismen, ed. Jorgen Holmgaard 
(Medusa: Center for kstetik og Logik, 1996), 216-217. The translation of the quoted passage from 
this article is mine. 
52 Coleridge as cited in M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the 
Critical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 13 1. 
53 Ibid. 
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"divine" ctSOU1.9954 The poetic moment of vision, which could only be reached 
through "a loss of distinction between self and external scene, " was therefore a 
divine moment of spiritual transcendence. "I live not myself, " Byron said, "but I 
,, 55 become Portion of that around me. For the Modernist writer, however, the twin 
processes of creative production and the outer world of change are not fed by some 
divine presence. As the following chapters will show, the Modernist artist moves 
away from mysticism or divinity. The works by Woolf, Stein and Stevens that I 
explore "press away from mysticism, " in the words of Stevens, "toward that ultimate 
good sense which we term civilisation" (NA, 116). The Modernist text, like the 
phenomenological world, "requires a living philosophy, " reflecting the "living 
experience" of a constantly changing and "incomplete world. tt56 Once again 
borrowing from Stevens, it "has to be living, to learn the speech of the place. / It has 
to face the men of the time and to meet / The women of the time" (CP, 240). 
As phenomenology is oflen interpreted as an idealist philosophy, which 
rejects the external world, and, in the words of one Stevens scholar, "abdicates point 
of view or inclusive position, in favour of microscopic observation and exclusive 
vision, ', 57 it might seem odd that I draw on this philosophy to describe the 
Modernist's secular approach to creativity. Once again it must be stressed that the 
brackets of the reduction do not close off the world, leaving the subject in an ideal 
world of retreat. In reduction, "I do not turn my back on the world to retreat into an 
54 William Wordsworth, The Complete Poetical Works of William Wordsworth (London: 
Macmillam and Co., 1903), 32 1. 
55 Byron as cited in Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, 347n77. 
56 Yvanka. Raynova, "Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Turning Point and the Ethics of 
Responsibility, " transl. William L. McBride, in Merleau-Ponty's Later Works and Their Practical 
Implications, ed. Duana H. Davis (New York: Humanity Books, 2001), 231 
57 Alan Perlis, Wallace Stevens: A World of Transforming Shapes (London: Associated 
University Presses, 1976), 78. 
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unworldly and, therefore, uninteresting special field of theoretical study. On the 
contrary, this alone enables me to explore the world radically. "58 Phenomenology, in 
other words, exposes intentional consciousness as the ground of objectivity and 
factuality, thus stressing the correlation between the internal and the external, the 
essential and the factual. 
It should be clear from what has been discussed so far that the epoche 
grounds speculation in the pre-reflective and pre-theoretical dimension of 
experience, recalling the "inexhaustible infinity of a priori" which Jean Wahl 
mentions in his letter to Stevens, which, I claim, is ever-present as the source of 
creative production in the work of Woolf, Stein and Stevens. I have drawn upon 
Beckett's statement that the Modem artist should "state the space" between him and 
the objects, and noted that phenomenology, through the method of reduction and the 
opening of intentionality, opens onto that space. I have stressed that intentionalty 
signifies the implicit relation between consciousness embodied (Husserl) or body as 
consciousness (Merleau-Ponty) and world. This implicit relation will be a guiding 
theme in my examinations of the works of Woolf, Stein and Stevens. 
Husserl's Ideas were published about 1913, during the summer of which 
Stein was writing Tender Buttons. It was also during this summer that Picasso 
painted her portrait and, as Stein explains in "A Transatlantic Interview, " the two of 
them were "obsessed by words of 
equal value" ("rI, " 17) - an obsession which came from Uzanne's mode of 
composition: 
Uzanne conceived the idea that in composition one thing was as 
important as another thing. Each part is as important as the whole, 
58 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 158. 
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and that impressed me enormously, and it impressed me so much that 
I began to write Three Lives under this influence and this idea of 
composition. . . ("TI, " 15)59 
Similarly, phenomenology ascribes equal value to the part and the whole. As 
Maurice Natanson remarks, "At every point... phenomenology honors the integrity 
of the aspect and the whole, the unit and the horizon in which it is viewed, the 
concrete and the universe in which it comes into clarity.,, 60 In my discussions of the 
writings of Woolf, Stein and Stevens's, it is my purpose to shed light on this 
phenomenological whole-part structure, which stresses interaction and interrelation 
over opposition between mind and world, unit and horizon, the single "marle', 
"button" and "note" and the harmony of the entire Modernist composition. 
'Thenomenology is accessible only through a phenomenological method" 
(PP, viii), Merleau-Ponty writes. Just as intentionality can only be understood 
through the method of reduction, so can the movements of a phenomenological text 
only be grasped through the reduction, that is to say, through a "bracketine' of our 
conventional ways of seeing. In the words of Max van Manen, the reduction is "not 
only a research method, it is also a phenomenological attitude that must be adopted 
by anyone who wishes to participate in the questions that a certain project pursues. 
In other words, phenomenological meaning and understanding has to be produced 
constantly anew by the writers and the readers of phenomenological texts. '261 
59 Clearly Picasso was also under the influence of Uzanne. Referring to him as the "one and 
only master!, " he said "Don! t you think I looked at his pictures? I spent years studying them.. 
Uzanne!... he was like our father. It was he who protected us. " See Judith Wechsler, Uzanne in 
Perspective (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975), 18. 
60 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 205. 
61 Manen, http: H www. phenomenologyonline. com/inquiry/10. hhnl. 
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Whereas Stein praised Cezanne for conceiving that in composition "Each part 
is as important as the whole, " Woolf would speak of wanting to "give the moment 
whole" (Diary 3,209). What gives the artwork its "whole'is, I will argue, dependent 
on the "spaces between' ' subject and object, seer and seen, which is also the space 
between reader and text. The necessary participation of the reader in the creation of 
the "whole" text is a common strategy of the phenomenological "reception-theory" 
that Wolfgang Iser developed in the 1970s. In "The Reading Process: A 
Phenomenological Approach, " Iser in fact draws upon Woolf s study of Jane Austen 
when describing the phenomenological interaction between text and reader. That 
which forms the "aesthetic experience" of the literary text, he argues, is based upon 
an "involvement in and observation of the illusion" that the fictional produces. 62 It is 
exactly this paradox of simultaneous involvement and observation, interrelation and 
separation that I wish to take finther by drawing upon the epochi and Merleau- 
Ponty's related concepts of "flesY' and "hyperdialectic. " My concerns with the 
reader of the text bring us back to Mieke Bal's metaphor of the "navel, " that "fine 
detail" -a nail and a hole - in the Vermeer painting, which "hits the viewer" and, 
like the reduction, re-awakens a sense of wonder, stimulating him/her to reflect on, 
and participate in, making the art work: "In attracting attention to the actual work 
that representing involves as well as to the work of reading or viewing, the nail and 
the hole are traces of the work of art, in all senses of that word. " In this sense, Bal 
stresses, "the text is an occasion for, not the cause of meaning. 9ý63 Meaning unfolds 
through the direct phenomenological interaction with the artwork in question. 
62 Wolfgang Iser, "I'lle Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach, " in Modern 
Criticism and Theory, ed. David Lodge (London and New York: Longman, 1988), 212-13. 
63 Bal, "Dispersing the Image, " 87,84,77,74. 
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Bal's navel metaphor, which is related to the concept of conception or 
creative birth, should not be confused with the Freudian notion of the "navel of the 
dream, " a "spot" in every dream which is the "point of contact with the unknown. "64 
Neither should its "trace of the mothee'be taken as an emphasis on a pre-creative 
feminine space, or on femininity as "the very navel ofpsychoanalysis, " as Shoshana 
Felman sees it, opening up "the question of woman as resistance" or of "female 
difference. " 65 Bal's "navel" metaphor is not a gesture toward the difference between 
the unknown and the known or feminine and masculine spaces. On the contrary, the 
navel, she argues, is essentially "democratic": it is a "token of autonomy of the 
subject, male and female alike. " The "navel mode, " Bal stresses, "proclaims an 
interaction, not an opposition between discourse and image. , 66 This aspect of 
democracy, recalling Stein's emphasis on the "equal balance" of Uzanne's 
composition, will, I hope, add to our understanding of both the interaction and 
interrelation between the part and the whole in the works of Woolf, Stein and 
Stevens and of the perpetual genesis of the Modernist art work. Apart from being a 
knot between our inside perceptions and outer facts, part and whole, seer and seen, 
viewer/reader and painting/text, the navel, I suggest, is a sign of simultaneous 
dependence on and detachment from the original ground of our being, the "ground of 
pure pre-conceptual experience" (Ideas, 27). My phenomenological take on the 
generative dimension of Bal's navel - the nail and hole on the wall - tries to give "a 
direct description of our experience as it is, without taking account of its 
psychological origire'(PP, viii). The navel is a "starting-point and basis, " in 
64 Shoshana Felman, What Does a Woman Want?: Reading and Sexual Difference 
(Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 114. 
65 Ibid., 112,120,115. 
66 Ibid., 83,87. 
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Husserl's terminology, an entry-point for aesthetic production and a connection with 
the ground of pre-conceptual experience. 
Each of the following three chapters will take shape within the frameworks of 
other Woolf, Stein and Stevens scholarship. While my discussion takes its bearings 
primarily from the speculations of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, consideration is 
given to related aesthetic concerns of Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles 
Deleuze. In the light of Bal's attention to the nail and hole on the wall in Vermeer's 
painting, I set out with a reading of Woolf s "A Mark on the Wall. " In Chapter One, 
I show how Woolf "state[s] the space, " to use Beckett's terminology, between 
subject and object (a mark on a wall), thus laying bare the space of creative 
production itself - the space of the creator's blank page, as it were - and revealing 
the intentionality of consciousness as the source of this production. From Woolf's 
ponderings upon the "Mark, " I move to Lily Briscoe's doubts about making her first 
"mark" on a blank canvas in To the Lighthouse. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty's 
"Uzanne's Doubt, " I hope to shed light on a heretofore overlooked aspect of 
primordial doubt central to Lily's creative process, thereby offering a clue to 
Woolf s own aesthetic concerns. My readings of "The Mark on the Wall" and Lily's 
process serve as paradigms for the Modernist artist as practical phenomenologist, 
thus setting the parameters for the rest of my study. Woolf's work evidences the 
change of relations between man and the world, which, she argued, took place 
"about the year 1910, " in that it draws attention to the usually unperceived spaces 
between things. As Lily Briscoe puts it in To the Lighthouse, "The question was of 
some relation between those masses" (L, 200). In Woolf's The Waves, in particular, 
six voices interrelate, transform, and at times disappear into each other, 
approximating Merleau-Ponty's notions of "flesh, " an "intermundane space ... where 
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our gazes cross and our perceptions overlap" (VI, 48). The second half of Chapter 
One is devoted to close readings of Yhe Waves which are, once again, set against 
Merleau-Ponty's thought as well as Cezanne's visual art. My phenomenological 
approach to Woolf s work, which takes form within the context of other Woolf 
scholarship, is based on the premise that a radical "change of standpoint, " as Husserl 
called it, is central to her concerns with aesthetic production. In calling attention to 
the perpetual inter-change between subject and object, mind and world, reader and 
work, instead of their distinction or opposition, I will take issue with previous 
phenomenological, aesthetic, feminist and psychological approaches to Woolf s 
work, which stress a gap between these poles. 67 
Much recent criticism has described Gertrude Stein's writings as essentially 
Post-Modem impenetrable word play, highlighting a groundless gap between 
signified and signifier, leading to fragmentation of meaning, indeterminacy and 
isolation of the subject. Drawing upon phenomenology, which grounds all 
speculation in the pre-reflective dimension of experience, thus highlighting not 
groundlessness but an openness to the world, in Chapter Three, I hope to shed new 
light on Stein's aesthetic concerns in Tender Buttons. This experimental collection 
of prose poems, the title of which implies the "tenderness" of the radical 
transformations that took place in Modernist culture, requires a radical change of 
attitude in order to be read. Tender Buttons leads us away from the particularities of 
our fact-world - its "Objects", "Food" and "Rooms" - and back to their constitutive 
67 In arguing for the inter-change between poles in Woolf, I join forces with critics such as 
Pamela L. Caughie who "enact[s] a way of thinking about and responding to narrative discourse that 
considers different ways of relating things rather than the distinction between two things. " See 
Virginia Woolf & Postmodernism: Literature in Quest and Question of ftsetr(Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1991), xii. Anna Snaith has also argued for the dialectical relationship of 
private and public in Woolf's work as opposed to their opposition. See Virginia Woolf. - Public and 
Private Negotiations (London: Macmillan Press, 2000). For a similar view, see Tamar Katz, 
"Modernism, Subjectivity and Narrative Form: Abstraction in The Waves, " Narrative Columbus 3, 
no. 3 (October 1995): 232-251. 
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essence; away from habitual ways of seeing and back to a pre-reflective experience 
of the "thing, " when this still appears as what Stein calls a "fine substance strangely" 
68 (TB, 4). In Stein's poetic "composition, " the marginal and central, the usually 
invisible and visible aspects of perceptual experience are given equal balance: "each 
part of (the] composition [is] as important as the whole. " Taking my bearings from 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's speculations, I hope to clarify how meaning does not 
frame Steins text from the outside but is made and re-made from within through the 
phenomenological act of reading itself. In the final part of the chapter, I demonstrate 
how Merleau-Ponty's notion of "hyperdialectic, " which is based on the impossibility 
of complete reduction, allows us to articulate more clearly the dialectical tensions of 
this work. 
A common assumption in Stevensian criticism is that Stevens's early poetry - 
Hannonium (1923) and Ideas of Order (193 1) - portrays a division between the 
poet's creation and the world, leading to isolation or self-enclosure. Unlike Woolfian 
and Steinian criticism, there has always been what one might call a 
phenomenological camp in Stevens studies. Disturbingly, many of these 
phenomenological approaches do not explore sufficiently the meaning of the 
phenomenological reduction, hence missing the point of the intentionality of 
consciousness, "the main phenomenological theme" (Ideas, 241). Whereas such 
critics stress the division of mind and world after the reduction, the result of this 
procedure is, in fact, a clearer view of their implicit relation. For Stevens "the theory 
of poetry is the theory of life" (OP, 178; CP, 486), thus "[o]ne poem proves another 
and the whole" (CP, 441). Poetry, in other words, is always in an implicit relation to 
the whole frame within which it comes into being, recalling the concept of 
68 "Objects, " "Food" and "Rooms" are the titles of the three parts that constitute Tender 
Buttons. 
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intentionality: "Poetry is not the same thing as the imagination taken alone. Nothing 
is itself taken alone. Things are because of interrelations and interactions" (OP, 163). 
In approaching Stevens's work through the thought of both Husserl and Merleau- 
Ponty, in Chapter Four I suggest that the intentional relation of mind and world is 
central to both Stevens's early and late poetry, thus automatically ruling out the 
sharp division between an early Stevens, who separates or isolates mind from world, 
and a late Stevens, who, according to several critics, re-engages with the world. 
What emerges from these introductions, then, is that previous interpretations 
of the three writers' works have, through various approaches, stressed the opposition 
between subject and object, artwork and world. In drawing upon Husserl's and 
Merleau-Ponty's speculations over the reduction, I take issue with the view of 
Modernist art as concerned with a split between artistic creation and objective 
reality, seeing the art work as "anxiously alienated from the external world and 
themselves. " What I hope to highlight is how the very different writings of Woolf, 
Stein and Stevens promote not a separation of mind and world but, rather, a 
grounding of thought in pre-reflective intentionality. All endeavour to describe how 
the meaning of the object-world is experienced and constituted through acts of 
perception. These writers, I argue, stress not a gap between private and public 
realms, subjective creation and external reality but their necessary co-operation and 
interdependence. The phenomenological mode of "bracketing" opens onto the world 
and brings to light a space of exchange between inside and outside, essence and fact, 
perception and expression. In different ways, Woolf, Stein and Stevens open up the 
"unapproachable" territory between the pre-reflective and the reflective, thus 
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exposing the space of creative production itself, poised in between the primal 
"mark, " "note' or "buttoW' and the final word. 69 
69 For this insight I am indebted to Kevin Hart: "poetry is an experience of language, " he 
writes, "it is an experience of the gap between the reflective and the pre-reflective. " See Hart, "The 
Experience of Poetry, " 292. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE "PATTERN" BEHIND THE "COTTON WOOL": 
VIRGINIA WOOLF'S "ESSENTIAL THING" 
[I]t is a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a 
pattern; that we -I mean all human beings - are connected with this; that 
the whole world is a work ofart, that we are parts ofthe work ofart ... we 
are the words; we are the music, we are the thing itseýV 
-Virginia Woolf, MB (72) 
[O]ur body is comparable to a work ofart. It is a nexus ofliving meanings, 
not the lawfor a certain number ofcovariant terms. 
-Maurice Merleau-Ponty, PP (15 1) 
1. Virginia Woolf and Phenomenolol! v 
Virginia Woolf s diaries are pervaded by speculations on the division between direct 
experience of the visible world and the written word. In a 1928 entry she writes: 
The look of things has a great power over me. Even now, I have to 
watch the rooks beating up against the wind, which is high, and still I 
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say to myself instinctively "What's the phrase for that? ". .. But what a 
little I can get down into my pen of what is so vivid to my eyes 
(Diary 3,19 1. ) 
64-[O]nce one takes a pen & writes, " ponders Woolf elsewhere, "[h]ow difficult not 
to go on making 'reality' this & that, whereas it is one thing" (Diary 3,196). What 
we usually call "reality" is "real" only because we learned to see it that way. In 
"Modem Fiction, " she famously criticises her Edwardian antagonists Bennett, Wells 
and Galsworthy for being "materialisf'(CD, 6): "they write of unimportant things.. 
they spend immense skill and immense industry making the trivial and the 
transitory appear the true and the enduring" (CD, 7). But Woolf wonders, "Is life like 
this? " and "Must novels be like this? " (CD, 8). If only one could suspend the 
conventional forms of depicting the real, Woolf seems to argue, and return to the 
"one thing" that reality is before it is processed by some trivial objectivism, before 
we even learned to pin it down in the "this & thaf' of language. "(I] f we escape a 
little from the common sitting room, " Woolf writes in A Room of One's Own, to 
realise "that our relation is to the world of reality and not only to the world of men 
and women7'(RO, 112). What I wish to show in this chapter is that Woolf's work 
promotes this "reality" as that which is given to us in immediate experience without 
being obstructed by the habits of the mundane world - "the world of men and 
women" -, offering a perhaps surprising image of the writer as neither a mystic, 
concerned with what one critic has called "a kind of exalted subjectivity, " 1 nor 
concemed. with depth psychology, as 
I Frank McConnell, "'Death Among the Apple Trees': The Waves and the World of Things, " 
Bucknell Review 16 (December 1968): 25. Other critics who characterise Woolf s writing as 
"mysticar, include Madeline Moore, who refers to Woolfs moments of "mystical unity, " Stella 
McNichol, who calls The Waves a "mystical work, " and Cyril Conolly who describes The Waves as 
"one of the books which comes nearest to stating the mystery of life. " See Moore, "Nature and 
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others have argued, but as a practical phenomenologist. 2 
A number of critical studies have pointed out similarities between 
phenomenology and Woolf s work. In Virginia Wooý( Yhe Inward Voyage (1970), 
Harvena, Richter remarks: "[Woolf s] approach to certain philosophical and 
psychological problems was far ahead of her time. One may be reminded of Bergson, 
,, 3 William James, and Freud in reading her novels. Despite the fact that Woolf did 
not read Bergson, his philosophy "was very much 'in the air, "' Richter notes and 
adds: "[a]n argument for the influence of Edmund Husscrl could just as readily be 
posed. Both philosophers reflect changing attitudes toward the concept of time. 'A 
As already pointed out, this is not a study of influence but an examination of 
the kinship of method and concern between phenomenology and the Modernist 
aesthetics of Woolf, Stein and Stevens. My phenomenological approach to Woolf's 
work, which draws upon the work of both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, is based on 
the premise that the shift of attitude that in phenomenology bears the name of epochi 
is central to her thoughts about creativity. Connections between Woolf and Merleau- 
Ponty have heretofore been noted by Mark Hussey, who, in The Singing of the Real 
World: The Philosophy of Virginia Wboy's Fiction (1986), uses Merleau-Ponty's 
Community: A Study of Cyclical Reality in The Waves, " in Virginia Woolf. - Reevaluation and 
Continuity, ed. Ralph Freedman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 222); McNichol, 
Virginia Wooyand the Poetry offiction, London: Routledge, 1980), 118; and Conolly, Enemies of 
Promise (New York: Macmillan Company, 1949), 49. 
2 Among critics who stress Woolf s concerns with cognitive or post-Freudian psychology are 
Robert Humphrey, Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1959), 14; and Jean 0. Love, Worlds in Consciousness: Mythopoetic Thought in the Novels of 
Virginia Wooýf (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970), 200, xi. Also see 
Emily Dalgamo, Virginia Woolfand the Visible World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). Dalgamo offers a reading of the visible and invisible in Woolf by drawing upon psychoanalytic 
theory, in particular that of Lacan. 
3 Harvena Richter, Virginia Woo6r- The Inward Voyage (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970), 245. 
Ibid., 39 n. 24 
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phenomenology of perception, alongside the philosophies of Sartre and R. D. Laing, 
as a point of departure for examining the role of the body in Woolf s work. 5 "Ibe 
ontological importance of writing to Woolf cannot be overestimated, " Hussey 
stresses, "she believed writing to be her life. "6 The phenomenological quality of this 
ontology has been highlighted from a Heideggerian perspective by Suzette Henke in 
"Virginia Woolfs Yhe Waves: A Phenomenological Reading, ,7 and, more recently, 
Carole Rodier has offered a chronological examination of Woolf's novels by 
drawing upon the thinking of Merleau-Ponty, Bachelard, Gilbert Durand, and Jean- 
Pierre Richard .8 The only critical study that has heretofore attempted an in-depth 
exploration of the kinship between Husserlian phenomenology and Woolf's 
philosophical concems is M. L. Wadikar's Journey Towards the Centre ofBeing: 
Virginia Woolfand Dorothy Richardson (1980). Although Wadikar, like Richter, 
points out that "[i]t is not... easy to establish any direct influence of Husserl on the 
two novelists, " he aims to explore the "curious resemblance" between their 
speculations by offering a "detailed examination of Husserl's position" and using 
this to shed light on Woolf and Richardson's work. 9 Unfortunately, Wadikar's 
examination of the novelists' "journey[s] towards the centre of being" in light of how 
consciousness, according to Husserl, "' effectuates' ideas or 'essences, "' is far from 
5 Mark Hussey, The Singing of the Real World., The Philosophy of Virginia Wooýrs Fiction 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1986), xv and 3. 
Ibid., 59. 
7 Suzette A. Henke, "Virginia Woolfs The Waves: A Phenomenological Reading, " 
Neophilologus 73, no. 3 (July 1989): 461-472. 
8 Carole Rodier, L'Univers imaginaire de Virginia Wootf (Paris: Editions du Temps, 200 1). 
9 M. L. Wadikar, Journey Towards the Centre of Being. - Virginia Wool(and Dorothy 
Richardson (Meerut, India: Anu Prakashan, 1980), 3-4. 
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detailed because he does not explore the epocU, the most radical and essential of 
Husserl's procedures. 10 'Thenomenology is accessible only through a 
phenomenological method" (PP, viii), stresses Merleau-Ponty, implying that the 
movements of a phenomenological text can only be grasped through the method of 
epochi. 
In "Nature and Community: A Study of Cyclical Reality in The Waves " 
(1980), Madeline Moore also briefly refers to phenomenology but leaves 
unexamined the statement: "It was not Woolf s purpose in The Waves to overcome 
the phenomenological opposition between subject and object, but rather to dramatize 
that conflict. "" Moore's term "phenomenological opposition" has the unfortunate 
effect of making her reader believe that phenomenological thought involves a 
separation of subject and object. We are presented with a similar idea in Patricia 
Ondek Laurence's The Reading ofSilence: Virginia Wboýfin the English Tradition 
(1991). When commenting upon Woolf s usage of brackets in the "Time Passes" 
section in To the Lighthouse, Laurence refers to Husserl's phenomenological concept 
of "bracketing" but contradicts this with Woolf s concerns: "If for Edmund Husserl, 
the phenomenologist, objects exist independently of ourselves in the external world, 
and anything beyond our immediate experience is "bracketed" - then for Woolf it is 
12 Woolf the opposite. " she argues, offers a "unique treatment of the outward and the 
inward" as the ... march of events' is relegated to brackets (with the exception of Yhe 
10 Ibid., 3. 
11 Moore "Nature and Community, " 222,220. 
12 Patricia Ondek Laurence, The Reading ofSilence: Virginia Wootrin the English Tradition 
(Stanford, Califomia: Stanford University Press, 199 1), 110. 
47 
,, 13 Waves) while the inner discourse of characters is centre stage. Ironically, in 
claiming that "objects" in Husserlian thought are independent in the "external world" 
and thus detached from the subject, Laurence charges the goal of the epoche with a 
disregard of the external world of facts whereas nothing is disregarded or denied in 
Husserl's method. On the contrary, the point of the reduction is to place ordinary, 
daily events within brackets in order to shift one's attention away from them and re- 
direct it towards the pre-predicative dimension of experience, which is "always. .. in 
advance" (Crisis 2,110), thus providing the ground of our human acts and 
expressions. This is exactly what Woolf attempts by using square brackets in "Time 
Passes": 
The spring without a leaf to toss, bare and bright like a virgin fierce in 
her chastity, scornful in her purity, was laid out on fields wide-eyed 
and watchful and entirely careless of what was done or thought by the 
beholders. 
[Prue Rarnsay, leaning on her father's arm, was given in 
marriage that May. What, people said, could have been more fitting? 
And, they added, how beautiful she looked! ]. (L, 179) 
Through the act of "bracketing, " phenomenological epochg lays bare the world's 
essential structure, exposing the world in its pre-givenness and the implicit relation 
of consciousness to it (intentionality). Woolf s usage of normal brackets in the 
"Time Passes" section also suggests an epochal shift of attitude, leading us away 
from objectivity and factuality and calls attention to what Laurence terms the 
characters' "inner discourse, " that is to say their immediate consciousness or 
13 Ibid. Critics who, like myself, stress parallels between the epochi and Woolf s aesthetic 
concerns include Henke, "Virginia Woolf s The Waves, " 467; and Mao, Solid Objects, 228. 
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perception of things. Lily Briscoe, for instance, is intensely conscious of what Woolf 
in a diary entry calls "the singing of the real world"(Diary 3,260), the ever-present, 
repetitive song of the sea, which, borrowing from Husserl, is "prior to any theorizing 
reflection" (Ideas, 78): 
Messages of peace breathed from the sea to the shore ... Lily laid her 
head on the pillow in the clear still room and heard the sea. Through 
the open window the voice of the beauty of the world came 
murmuring, too softly to hear exactly what it said - but what mattered 
if the meaning were plain? - entreating the sleepers (the house was 
full again; Mrs Beckwith was staying there, also Mr Carmichael), if 
they would not actually come down to the beach itself at least to lift 
the blind and look. They would see then night flowing down in 
purple; his head crowned; his sceptre jewelled; and how in his eyes a 
child might look. And if they still faltered (Lily was tired out with 
travelling and slept almost at once; but Mr Carmichael read a book by 
candlelight), if they still said no, that it was vapour this splendour of 
his, and the dew had more power than he, and they preferred sleeping; 
gcntly thcn without complaint, or argumcnt, the voicc would sing its 
song. (L, 193) 
Unlike Laurence, then, I suggest that Husserl and Woolf's modes of "bracketing" 
share a kinship of both method and concern. Neither Husserl's nor Woolf's 
"brackets" close off subjective experience from the external world; rather, they open 
onto the world, attempting to bring to light the condition that underlies experience 
and makes it possible. A feature of this condition is the intentionality of 
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consciousness, the fact that consciousness is always, already in an implicit relation to 
the real. Both suggest, or so I argue, that our mundane fact-world ariscs from an 
intending subjectivity. 
It is important to note that nothing is denied or changed in epochJ, and that 
the object-world is not at any point separated from the subject. In fact Husscrl 
stresses: "We do not abandon the thesis we have adopted, we make no change in our 
conviction... we set it as it were 'out ofaction', we 'disconnect it ', 'brackct it '. It 
still remains there like the bracketed in the bracket, like the disconnected outside the 
connexional systenf'(1deas, 108). All Husserl meant to accomplish through the 
mode of "bracketing, " in other words, was a "change of standpoint" (ldcas, IS), 
which would "abstain fromý'(CM, 19) but not disregard the ordinary. "(T]he world 
experienced in this reflectively grasped life, " stresses Husserl, "goes on appearing, as 
it appeared before; the only difference is that 1, as reflecting philosophically, no 
longer keep in effect (no longer accept) the natural believing in existence involved in 
experiencing the world - though that believing too is still there" (CM, 19-20). What 
the reduction seeks to highlight is the intentionality of consciousness, tile fact that 
consciousness is always consciousness of. As Anthony Stcinbeck strcsscs, 
"intentionality is not a thing, but a relation ... ncvcrthcIcss, dcscribing intcntionality 
in terms of 'subjective' and 'objective' correlates can be misicading i rthcy arc takcn 
as independent entities! " We remember that this intentionality of consciousncss can 
only be opened up through the reduction. The cpocM is the key to intentionality, to 
the fact that consciousness is always already related to the real, hcncc it cannot 
14 Anthony J. Steinbeck, "McrIcau-Ponty, I lusserl, and Saturated Intentionality, " in 
Rereading Merleau-Ponty: Essays Beyond the Continental-Anal)-tical Divide. eds La%%Tcnce I lass and 
Dorothea 01kowski (New York: I lurnanity Books, 2000), 55. 
50 
possibly demonstrate the "opposition" between, or independence of, the subject and 
the object: "[t]he tenn 'object' is for us always a name for the essential connections 
of consciousnesS.,, 15 The phenomena with which the phenomenologist is concerned 
are always the objects of intentional acts. The intentional object only exists together 
with the subject side of the intentional structure, creating the "intentional 
unity"(1deas, 13 1). To get back to the "the Thing itself' (Ideas, 66), in Husserl's words, 
meant to provide an exact description of primordial phenomena as they would appear 
to an intending subjectivity. 
Thus, the phenomenological reduction, the guiding engine of 
phenomenology, should be regarded as a "a new kind of practical outlook" (Crisis 1, 
169), that is to say, a shift of attitude, which uncovers the world's essential structure, 
overlooked by what Husserl called the "objective sciences. " When he insisted on 
getting "Back to the things themselves, " he meant to uncover this primordial bond 
between the subject and his/her world. In this chapter I propose that Woolf, not 
merely in "Time Passes" but throughout her work, challenges us to such a shift of 
attitude, re-directing our attention to what she in "Modem Fiction" calls "life, spirit, 
truth or reality, this the essential thing, " (CD, 7)), that is, the natural, and unspoken 
order of things, which has always been there before we could even reflect on it; 
before we even learned to pin it down in the "this & that" of mundane life and 
conventional language. It is this essential order that Lily Briscoe tries to grasp 
through painting in To the Lighthouse: "Phrases came. Visions came... But what she 
wished to get hold of was the veryjar on the nerves, the thing itseýfbefore it has been 
made anything" (L, 260; italics mine). Through her recurrent ponderings upon "the 
15 David Bell, Edmund Husserl (London: Routledge, 1990), 198. 
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thing itself' (L, 260; MB, 72,87) or "the essential thing" (CD, 7; MB, 78), Woolf 
seeks to present a more truthful description of the way things are presented to us in 
direct experience. Her writings reflect her perpetual struggle to translate into words 
what is inherently mute and yet, in the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "continues 
to envelop language" (VI, 176): ". .. life is a luminous halo, " Woolf tells us 
in 
"Modem Fiction, " "a semitransparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of 
consciousness to the end" (CD, 8). 
In what follows, I hope to indicate that Woolf s notions of "the thing itself' 
(MB, 72,87) or "the essential thing" (MB, 78) can best be approached as signifying 
the intentionality of consciousness. Just as intentionality is the "starting-point and 
basis" (Ideas, 245) of phenomenological investigation, so does the epochal shift of 
attitude, which I claim lies at the core of Woolf s aesthetic speculations, highlight the 
pre-reflective intentional unity of perceiving subject and object-world as the 
46starting-point and basis" for creativity. Phenomenology, I will argue, offers a tool to 
articulate further what Peter Abbs, in his stimulating article "From Babble to 
Rhapsody: On the Nature of Creativity, " refers to as the "astonishing act of 
development and transformation" in Woolf "which testifies to an inherent kind of 
creativity, moving from nature to culture, form instinct to reflection, from the 
immediate and ephemeral to the mediated and symbolized. "16 
In structure, the rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. In the 
following section, I set out by showing how Woolf s short story "The Mark on the 
Wall" (1924) "state[s] the space, " to use Beckett's terminology, between the creative 
16 Peter Abbs, "From Babble to Rhapsody: On the Nature of Creativity, " The British Journal 
ofAesthetics 3 1, No. 4 (October 1991): 29 1. 
52 
subject and the object (a mark on a wall), thus laying bare the space of creative 
production itself - the creator's blank page, as it were - and revealing the 
intentionality of consciousness as the source of this production. In section three, I use 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of Cezanne's paintingas it appears in "CLanne's 
Doubt" to shed light on a heretofore overlooked aspect of primordial doubt central to 
Lily's creative process, thereby offering a clue to Woolf s own aesthetic concerns. In 
"The Waves: A 'Gigantic Conversation... (section IV), I draw upon Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of "flesW'- his phenomenon of reciprocal contact between perceiving subjects 
- to articulate more clearly the "unsubstantial territory" (W, 11) that Woolf tries to 
bring into words in Yhe Waves. I have mentioned the fact that the incompleteness of 
the reduction is given a dialectical placement in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy: it is a 
continual point of departure and point of return for his philosophical concerns and 
explains his thought's underlying pattern of separation and interrelation, of distance 
and closeness. In the fifth section, a comparative analysis of Paul Uzanne's painting 
The Large Bathers (1906) and Woolf s Yhe Waves shows that similar dialectical 
tensions between subject and world, part and whole can be detected in the painter's 
and writer's Modernist compositions. In summing up the fundamentals of the 
chapter, in the final section, I hope to shed new light on the patterns of perpetual 
beginning that pervade Woolf s texts. 
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11 "The Mark on the Wall": A Point of Departure 
Many of Woolf s essays and short stories reflect a concern with the immediacy of 
perceptual experience. In "Modem Fiction, " she writes: 
life, it seems, is very far from being "like this". Examine for a 
moment the ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a 
myriad impressions trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the 
sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of 
innumerable atoms; and as they fall, as they shape themselves into the 
life of Monday or Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old. . 
. (CD, 8) 
Woolf s "atoms" of experience can be taken as a reaction to the Modernist 
"breakdown of the object, " in Beckett's words, the "atornisation" of a transforming 
culture to which Albert Einstein was applying his law of mass-energy equivalence. 
In a recent article, Wayne Narey in fact argues that Woolf "[w]ith 'The Mark on the 
Wall'. .. offers an artistic manifesto of an emerging concept of time and perspective, 
a manifesto, ... perhaps influenced by the theories of Albert Einstein and 
his new 
views of the universe. "17 An argument for the influence of new phenomenological 
theories about the relation between man and his world could similarly be advanced. 
The "myriad impressions, " which Woolf describes as "an incessant shower of 
innumerable atoms, " could also be taken as the immediate data of consciousness, 
rendering what Husserl would term a "flow of perceptual patterns as they pass from 
one into the other. " (Ideas, 13 1). 
17 Wayne Narey, "Virginia Woolf s 'The Mark on the Wall': An Einsteinian View of Art, " 
Studies in Short Fiction 29 (26 March 2001): 35. 
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"Everything begins with the reduction, " Kevin Hart writes, implying that 
Husserl's concept of phenomenological reduction - that initial state of wonder in the 
face of the world, releasing in the perceiving subject some primary impulse - is the 
central point of departure (and return) in every creative process! 81 want to show that 
Woolf s "marle' in "The Mark on the Wall" calls attention to this initial state of 
perception, suggesting that it is the "expressive operation of the body, begun by the 
smallest perception which is amplified into painting and arV' (Signs, 70). This will 
bring us back to Mieke Bal's metaphor of the "navel", that fine visual detail in the 
object, which "hits the viewer, " re-awakens a profound sense of wonder and 
amazement, and stimulates him/her to reflect on, and participate in making the art 
work. Likewise, in Woolf s "The Mark on the Wall, " a "mark"on a wall on which 
the narrator fixes her eye serves as the actual "point" of departure for both the 
narrator and the reader's creative processes. Woolfs focus is not on the result but on 
the creative process itself and the mind's reflections on how to translate immediate 
experience into words. "But by writing I don't reach anything, " she wrote in her 
diary, "All I mean to make is a note of a curious state of mind" (D, 133). 1 will show 
how, through a shift of attitude equivalent to that of the reduction, we are challenged 
to reflect on our own act of perception as the story's "swarm[ing]" (SS, 53) 
consciousness "states the space" between itself and the mark on an imaginary 
journey of writing. 
From what I have said already, it should be clear that the phenomenological 
key to our understanding of the presence of things lies in the intentional nature of 
consciousness. But we cannot go there unless we go through the eidetic reduction, 
18 Ibid, 285. 
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that is to say, by shifting our attention from factuality and objectivity in all its forms 
to the essential dimension of experience. "Phenomenology is the study of essences, " 
Merleau-Ponty points out, and "[flooking for the world's essence... is looking for 
what it is as a fact for us, before any thematization" (PP, vii, xv). Central to the 
eidetic reduction lies a form of thought experiment that Husserl called "imaginary 
variation7 or "free variation, " the point of which is, as Judith Butler explains, "not to 
fix the actuality of the object, but to render its actuality into a possibility, " revealing 
the object's essence as it appears to us in immediate, pre-objective experience, "the 
strangeness of quiddity, that it is rather than not. "19 
"Life is, soberly and accurately, the oddest affair, " Woolf wrote in a diary 
entry, "has in it the essence of reality" (Diary 3,113; italics mine). An emphasis on 
the essential rather than the factual pervades her work. In To the Lighthouse, Lily 
realises that the essence of Mrs. Ramsay can only be grasped when adding up the 
many "free variations" of her, the many aspects of this object-as-intended: "One 
wanted fifty pairs of eyes to see with... Fifty pairs of eyes were not enough to get 
round that one woman with" (L, 266). In Jacob's Room, Jacob is, like Percival in The 
Waves, an "eyelesepresence whose "essence" is built up in all its possible 
manifestations through the eyes of others. 20 While "Fannys idea of Jacob was more 
statuesque, noble and eyeless than ever" (JR, 238), Julia Eliot thinks of him as "the 
silent young man" (JR, 95) and Clara Durrant finds him "unworldly"(JR, 94). In 
offering us various possibilities as to what Jacob might be, the omniscient narrator 
19 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xii. For a clarificatying explanation of Husserl's 
"free variation", see Joseph J. Kockehnans, Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology (West Lafayette, 
Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1994), 139-143. 
20 In her diary Woolf describes The Waves as "an abstract, mystical eyeless book! ' (Diary 3, 
203) 
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stresses: "the young man in the chair is all of these things. " He is both "the most real, 
the most solid, the best known to us, " and yet "the moment after we know nothing 
about him. "(JR, 96). When Sasha Latham in the short story "A Suming Up" is 
"thinking of [Mr. Pritchard] in the abstract" (HH, 145), she is, in fact, thinking of 
him as an essence, as "something immaterial, and unseizable, which existed and 
flourished and made itself felt independently of his words" (HH, 144-145). This is 
the art of the phenomenological creator, teasing the essential from the factual, the 
possible from the actual. 
Husserl's method of reduction suspends the "natural attitude" - common 
sense and pre-conceived notions - and directs our attention to a pre-theoretical, 
"primordial form of apprehension, ', 21 uncovering the "essence" of things, lying on 
the other side of our concrete fact-world. Similarly, in her autobiographical essay "A 
Sketch of the Past, " Woolf shifts our attention away from the common "world of 
men and women"(RO, 112), laying bare the essence of her Modernist philosophy: 
From this I reach what I might call a philosophy; at any rate it is 
a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton wool is hidden a 
pattern; that we -I mean all human beings - are connected with 
this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of 
the work of art. Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about 
this vast mass that we call the world. But there is no 
Shakespeare, there is no Beethoven; certainly and emphatically 
21 Joseph Kockehnans, Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology (West Lafayette, India: Purdue 
University Press, 1994), 127. 
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there is no God; we are the words; we are the music; we are the 
thing itself (MB, 72). 
Just as phenomenology exposes the world's essential structure obscured by 
habituality, so does Woolf uncover the essential "hidden... pattern" beneath the 
46cotton wool" of daily living. Just as intentionality of either consciousness (Husserl) 
or the body (Merleau-Ponty) is the "starting-point and basis" for phenomenological 
investigation, so does Woolf reveal "the thing itself' as the foundation for creative 
production. Because of the ceaseless activity of consciousness, which constantly 
catches the "atoms... as they fall, " every single moment for Woolf is a creative 
moment. Woolf s insight anticipates Merleau-Ponty: ". .. our body is comparable to 
a work of art. It is a nexus of living meanings, not the law for a certain number of 
covariant terms. " (PP, 150-15 1). As the world is "a work of art, " the experience of 
being is essentially a process of creativity. What I wish to argue, then, is that for 
Woolf, the "thing itself' stands for the implicit relation between the perceiving 
subject and world, between the part of and the whole work of art. 
In "The Mark on the Wall, " Woolf sets a black mark on a wall into relief by 
transforming its actuality into "pure possibility. " The possible grows out of the way 
in which the narrator intends this object: 
How readily our thoughts swarm upon a new object, lifting it a little 
way, as ants carry a blade or straw so feverishly, and then leave it 
If that mark was made by a nail, it can't have been for a picture, it 
must have been for a miniature - the miniature of a lady with white 
powdered curls, powder-dusted cheeks, and lips like carnations 
(SS, 53) 
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"[O]ur thoughts swarm upon the object' 'just as we in everyday life swarm upon "the 
atoms... as they fall. " The swarming mind proceeds by offering the reader a flow of 
imaginary variations as to what the mark might be. It might be a "nail... for a 
miniature - the miniature for a lady with white powdered curls" (SS, 53) or "the 
mark... may even be caused by some round black substance such as a small round 
leaf, left over from summer" (SS, 55). Thus, the object intended, the mark, is 
gradually constituted through various acts of the mind. Anticipating a statement 
made by Rhoda in The Waves, Woolf s story makes us see as if "the walls of the 
mind [have] become transparent, " laying bare the blank space of the artist's page, as 
it were, as it is "[b]uilt up with ... many strokes" (W, 19 1). In an inconclusive 
manner, stressing perpetual possibility and amazement, Woolf s swarming mind 
continues to provide us with glimpses from daily life, miniature lectures on the novel 
form, Shakespeare and childhood memories. "I want to think quietly, " the narrator 
meditates, "to slip easily from one thing to the other" (SS, 55). The swarming mind 
moves from one thought to the next without ever pinning down any point "as one 
rushes past in a train, " rendering a flow of consciousness which reflects the "rapidity 
of life, the perpetual waste and repair" (SS, 54). Woolf, then, attempts a Husserlian 
"imaginary variation" of sorts as she 
proceeds by offering anecdotes from ordinary life... seiz[ing] on the 
brief passage as a way of exemplifying consciousness as it flashes up 
to illuminate its world. And the proliferation of such moments attests 
to the impossibility of a full or final exemplification of this process. 22 
22 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xi. 
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I will save myself and my reader from going into a detailed analysis of the 
different imaginary variations of the mark. Whether it seems to be a nail at one point, 
a hole, a rose leaf or a snail at others is in fact not at all important. What is it, then, 
that the swarming nature of Woolfs narrator seeks to know? The point of her 
imaginary variations in this story is not to hit a final "marle' or to make a "point, " as 
it were, of the actual object, but rather to "restor[e] wonder to the object, " in the 
words of Judith Butler, to uncover "the thatness of the thing.... that it is possible at 
all. 9923 Like Slater's pins in the short story "Moments of Being. Slater's Pins have No 
, ý24 Points, " Woolfs creative j ourney has "no points. By writing the creator behind the 
swarming mind does not "reach anything"; "[a]ll [it] mean[s] to make is a note of a 
curious state of mind" (Diary 3,113). Thus, like Husserl, Woolf "makes the 
intentional act of consciousness itself an object for consciousness; the result of this is 
to reveal that consciousness is the source of the meaning of the world. "25 
At the end of the story, the narrator offers a final variation of the mark: "Ah, 
the mark on the wall! It was a snail. " Avrom Fleishman has argued that "The Mark 
on the Wall" has "a controlled linear fonn, " a form which offers a "progressive 
de . 1inition of a term": "When the key term is so simple a thing as a mark... the form 
of the story is, as it were, a making of something out of nothing. "26 But, "something" 
is never fully made out of the mark; rather, what Woolf s story amounts to is a 
heightening of our sense of doubt as to what the mark really is. Having offered 
23 Ibid., 
24 For this "poinf'I am indebted to Avrom Fleishman, "Forms of the Woolfian Short Story, " 
in Virginia Wboy., Reevaluation and Continuity, 69-70. 
25 Cerena Pondrom, "Kafka and Phenomenology: Joseph K's Search for Information, " 
Wisconsin Studiesfor Contemporary Literature 5, no. I (Winter 1967): 90. 
26 Fleishman, "Forms of the Woolfian Short Story, " 54,5 6. 
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various possibilities as to what the mark could be, the finality of the mind's last 
remark cannot but be doubtful. In "A Conflict of Closure in Virginia Woolf s 'The 
Mark on the Wall, "' Marc D. Cyr calls attention to this aspect of doubt: "The mark 
on the wall might be a snail, but... it might not, and this doubt breaks the expected 
sequence. Mary Carmichael, Woolf tells us, 'has every right' to do this if she does so 
'not for the sake of breaking but for the sake of creating'. .. and I think the same 
right may be granted the narrator in 'The Mark on the Wall, " whose conclusion 
offers not closure, but opening. ý27 It is this same sense of doubt, stressing opening 
rather than a dead end, which is laid bare through the shift of attitude that in 
phenomenology bears the name of reduction. 
To clarify this point, in his Ideas, Husserl writes: "The attempt to doubt 
everything has its place in the realm of our perfect freedom... the attempt to doubt 
any object of awareness in respect of its being actually there necessarily conditions a 
certain suspension (Aujhebung) of the thesis; and it isprecisely this that interests us" 
(Ideas, 107-108). In order to reach the realm of "doubt, " the phenomenologist 
attempts the epoche: "We do not abandon the thesis we have adopted, we make no 
change in our conviction... And yet the thesis undergoes a modification - whilst 
remaining in itself what it is, we set it as it were 'out ofaction, we 'disconnect it, 
'bracket it' " (Ideas, 108). In his study of Husserl, Maurice Natanson clarifies 
Husserl's reduction by pointing out that our taken for granted attitude to life - the 
"thesis" of Husserl's "natural standpoint" (Ideas, 107-111) - has suspended our 
27 Marc D. Cyr, "A Conflict of Closure in Virginia Woolf's 'The Mark on the Wall, ", Studies 
in Short Fiction 33, no. 2 (1996): 204. For a different analysis which makes a similar point see 
Stephen J. Miko stimulating article "Reflections on The Waves, " Criticism 30, pt. 1, (1988): 63-90. 
The Waves, Miko writes, is "peculiarly involved with not-resolving, as I think Virginia Woolf's whole 
career was, because of her most fundamental doubts (and her resolute honesty about them7' (69). 1 will 
return to this aspect of "fundamental doubt, " interpreting it as a version of phenomenological 
primordial doubt in the next section of this chapter. 
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abilities to doubt and wonder in the face of the object. The phenomenological 
reduction, however, suspends the certainties and actualities that rule everyday life, 
thus leading the perceiver back to the dimension of "primordial doubt or wonder., 28 
In "The Mark on the Wall, " the journey towards "the essential thing" unfolds 
through glimpses from familiarity - daily life, literature, and childhood memories - 
but the narrator's perpetual emphasis on "the inaccuracy of thought' ' (SS, 54) always 
casts doubt on this familiarity. The swarming mind seeks essence - unities of 
meaning - rather than fact: "I want to sink deeper and deeper away from the surface, 
with its hard separate facts" (SS, 55). These facts include "leading articles, cabinet 
ministers -a whole class of things which as a child one thought the thing itself, the 
standard thing, the real thing" (SS, 56), recalling the "ill-fitting vestments" (CD, 7) of 
the Realists that Woolf criticises in "Modem Fiction. " Now, many years later, the 
mind realises that the "real thing" lies beneath the "hard" (SS, 55) surface of 
factuality: 
the less we honour [learned men] as our superstitions dwindle 
one could imagine a very pleasant world ... A world without 
professors or specialists, or house-keepers with the profiles of 
policemen, a world which one could slice with one's thought as a fish 
slices the water with his fin, gazing the stems of the water-lilies 
How peaceful it is down here, rooted in the centre of the world 
now that I have fixed my eyes upon it, I feel that I have grasped a 
plank in the sea ... Here is something definite, something real. 
(SS, 58-59) 
28 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 54. 
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Thus we move from factuality to a state of what Bernard in The Waves calls 
perceiving merely" (W, 239), a state in which the object is immediately present to 
the subject, anticipating both Mrs. Ramsay's looking at the lighthouse in To the 
Lighthouse "until she became the things looked at - that light for example" (L, 68) 
and Louis's entwining with a stalk in The Waves until the two become one intentional 
unity: "I hold the stalk in my hand. I am the stalk. My roots go down to the depths of 
the world" (W, 7). Likewise, in "The Mark on the Wall, " we sink with the swarming 
mind deeper and deeper into a state of primordial perception until the mind thinks 
not merely of how "Wood is a pleasant thing to think about" (SS, 59), but of being 
wood: "I like to speak of the tree itself. first the close dry sensation of being wood; 
then the grinding of the stomi. .. I like to think of it, too, on a winter's night standing 
in the empty fields" (SS, 60). What the swarming mind suggests, in other words, is 
that below the familiar "cotton wool" of everyday life - and of Realist fiction - there 
is a hidden "pattern", to use Woolf s idea from "A Sketch of the Past, " with which 
we are all connected. "How peaceful it is down here, " the mind exclaims, "rooted in 
the centre of the world" (SS, 59). Having suspended "the surface, with its hard 
separate facts" (SS, 55), the "real" (SS, 59) is exposed as a purer consciousness ofthe 
object prior to factuality and certainty, that it so say, when facts are still doubtful. 
Doubt in this sense is not to be confused with a dead end but should be taken as a 
sign of openness, of "the freedom inherent in our openness to Being. 929 
What I am claiming, then, is that Woolf s "A Mark on the Wall" exemplifies 
the operation of the reduction in that it uncovers the primordial doubt of the creating 
subject. The emphasis on doubt, which is triggered by the opening sentence: 
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"Perhaps it was in the middle of January in the present year that I first looked and 
saw the mark on the wall, " (SS, 53; italics mine), prevents us from ever getting a 
final version of what the mark really is: "as for that mark, I'm not sure about it, I 
dodt believe it was made by a nail after all" (SS, 52) . 
30 "rhe inaccuracy of thought! " 
the mind exclaims, but only to continue doubting: "What a scraping paring affair it is 
to be sure! " (SS, 54). The doubtfulness as to what Woolf s mark is anticipates 
Bernard's characterisation of both art and life in The Waves as "[a]n imperfect 
phrase" (W, 181). Woolf s swarming mind is representative of what Stevens in "The 
Poems of Our Climate" terms "the never-resting mind" for whom "[t]he imperfect is 
our paradise" (CP, 194). As noted by James Hafley, Stevens's poems offer "a superb 
analogue for Virginia Woolf's method": "the condition of imperfection is the ideal 
because it permits that license to re-create. , 31 In Stevens's poetry, recurrent images 
of "snow, " barrenness and winter are representative of the beginning of the poet's 
creative process: "Clear water in a brilliant bowl, / Pink and white carnations. The 
light / In the room more like snowy air, / Reflecting snow" (CP, 382). A similar 
emphasis on pure appearance over meaning, captured by the clarity of Stevens's 
"brilliant bowl, " light, and snow, is captured in the opening scene of "A Mark on the 
Wall": 'Terhaps is was in the middle of January.. that I first looked up and saw the 
mark on the wall... the steady film of yellow light upon the page of my book; the 
three chrysanthemums in the round glass bowl on the mantel piece. Yes, it must have 
been the winter time. " (SS, 53). Woolf, like Stevens, displays the cycle of creativity 
29 Allen S. Weiss, "Merlcau-Pontys Interpretation of Husserls Phenomenological 
Reduction, " Philosophy Today 27, (1983): 347. 
30 Marc D. Cyr makes a similar point: "The first paragraph of the story raises the initial 
doubt though it doesn't come into focus until the end. " "A Conflict of Closure, " 197. 
31 James Hafley, "Virginia Woolf s Narrators and the Art of Life Itself, " in Virginia Woolf- 
Reevaluation and Continuity, 36. 
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as a world that her narrators or protagonists can walk through. It has its seasons and 
its cycles of lives; it will always begin again from a "primordial form of 
apprehension, " which is wintry, cold but clear. The artist, in other words, remains a 
"perpetual beginner" in phenomenological terms: he/she will always return to his/her 
own starting-point. 
Not only does Woolf s "marle' indicate the "starting-point and basis" of the 
artist's process, it also triggers our process of reading. Woolf s story, describing how 
consciousness meets the object in immediate experience, requires of us an attentive 
awareness of the text as this comes into being. In arguing this, I not only take my 
bearings from Merleau. -Ponty's claim that phenomenology requires of us an 
"awareness" and "will" to "seize the meaning of the world as that meaning comes 
into being" (PP, xxi), but also from Mieke Bal's metaphor of the textual "navel. " 
Like the "nail" and the "hole" that Bal spots on the wall in Vermeer's painting, the 
"mark" that triggers Woolf's story functions as the "navel" of creative production, 
making us aware of the story's unfolding before our eyes, stressing that "we are parts 
of the work of art... we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself' 
(MB, 72). As Bal puts it: "Tbe work no longer stands alone: the viewer must now 
acknowledge that she makes it work; the surface is no longer still but tells a story of 
its and her making. " 32 
Like Bal's "navel, " Woolf s "mark7points in two directions at once and this 
doubleness, takes issue with the statement by Avrorn Fleishman referred to earlier, 
suggesting that the form of Woolf s story is a "controlled linear form. " On the one 
hand, the mark triggers a perceptual process of perpetual opening, but, on the other 
32 Bal, "Dispersing the Image, " 77. 
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hand, it never allows us to lose sight of the condition of creativity itself, of the 
artist's primordial doubt when making the first "mark. " Like Stein's "buttons, " 
Woolf s "mark, " then, is a metaphor for the division of experience that 
phenomenology brings to light: "not only are we dealing with what is given but also 
with what is presupposed in order for the giving to occur. ', 33 That which is 
"presupposed" is exactly the Husserlian notion of an "enormous... a priori in our 
minds" which Jean Wahl refers to in the mentioned letter to Stevens to which the 
subject is always, already implicitly related. 
Having reached the end of "A Mark on the Wall, " the creative cycle begins 
and ends but only to begin again. Just as "the eternal renewal, the incessant rise and 
fall and fall and rise again" (W, 247) of Bernard's phrases in The Waves are set 
against a never-ending horizon of breaking waves, so does the swarming mind in 
"The Mark on the Wall" speak of "[t]his train of thought"(SS, 59) as "the perpetual 
waste and repaie, (SS, 54), locating this against a horizon where "[e]verything's 
moving, falling, slipping, vanishing" (SS, 60). What Theodore A. Toadvine Jr. 
claims about Merleau-Ponty's speculations in the essay "C6zanne's Doubt" sheds a 
clarifying light on the doubtful end of Woolf s story of the mark: "17he difficulties of 
expression are the difficulties of the first word... The source of Uzanne's 
uncertainty lies in this contingency: nothing guarantees that the work will hit its 
,, 34 mark, since only creation can tcach where the mark lies. 
33 Hart, "The Experience of Poetry, " 288. 
34 Theodore A. Toadvine Jr., "Me Art of Doubting: Merleau-Ponty and Cizanne, " 
Philosophy Today 41 (1997): 547. 
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111. Lily Briscoe's Primordial Doubt in To the Lkhthouse 
Woolrs struggle to make meaningful what is inherently mute; to pin down in words 
the pre-communicative "essential thing" often drove her to illness: "But what a little 
I can get down into my pen of what is so vivid to my eyes, and not only to my eyes; 
also to some nervous fibre, or fanlike membrane in my species" (D, 13 1. ) In a 1906 
letter written to his son, Uzanne's speculations on his inability to fully grasp, in 
paint, his direct experience of the visible world, is, oddly enough, strikingly similar: 
I must tell you that as a painter I am becoming more clear-sighted 
before nature, but that with me the realization of my sensations is 
always painful. I cannot attain the intensity that is unfolded before my 
eyes. I have not the magnificent richness that animates nature. 35 
The writer and painter, then, seem to share a fundamental doubt about translating the 
pre-reflective dimension of experience. This is what Merleau-Ponty's notion of 
'Uzanne's Doubf 'stands for. The doubts of the artist's expression are "those of the 
first word" ("Doubt, " 19), of making the first "mark. " 
To recapitulate, for Merleau-Ponty, the concept of reduction -a bracketing of 
our habitual assumptions about the world - leads to what he in Phenomenology of 
Perception tenns a "[b]ar[ing][ofl all the roots, " uncovering the intentional nature of 
the body as a "direct and primitive contact with the world" (PP, vii). We have seen 
that Merleau-Ponty found in Cezanne a paradigm for the reduction: "C6zanne's 
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painting suspends... habits of thought and reveals the base of inhuman nature upon 
which man has installed himself' ("Doubt, " 16). The reduction, then, is a shift of 
attitude, which sheds light on creative production, bringing to light the painter's 
primordial doubts in a "process of expressing" ("Doubt, " 17). 
A return to primordial doubt is, as shown in our analysis of "A Mark on 
the Wall, " a return to pre-reflective intentionality (the "thing itself ), to creative 
freedom, openness and possibility. In Merleau-Ponty's essay, primordial 
doubt serves as the starting point for a way of seeing without presuppositions - 
Merleau-Ponty calls it "the lived perspective, that which we actually perceive" 
("Doubt, " 14) -, which works to unfold the work of art as "the impression of an 
emerging order, an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes. " 
("Doubt, " 14). Due to the suspension of the familiar and geometrically "correct" 
perspective, the "lived perspective, " in Uzanne's paintings, evokes a "feeling of 
strangeness" ("Doubt, " 18), but this "strangeness" is, in the words of Judith Butler, 
"exposed as the condition of possibility of the ordinary. ', 36 The strange, wonderful 
and doubtful is, in other words, exposed as the universal basis for our familiar ways 
of seeing. 
The key to Cezanne's "lyncism" ("Doubt, " 18), then, lies in the primordial 
bond between the subject and the object-world. According to Merleau-Ponty, his 
paintings demonstrate how the body (as consciousness) is rooted in the natural 
world's creative cycle, hence the sense of primordial doubt or wonder that pervades 
his work corresponds with "the continual rebirth of existence" ("Doubt, " 18). 
35 Paul Uzanne, Letters, 327. 
36 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xv. 
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"Wonder in the face of the world, " (PP, xxi), Merleau-Ponty tells us elsewhere, is 
"the best formulation of the reduction7 (PP, xiii). 
In what follows, I draw upon Merleau-Ponty's aesthetics of Cezanne's 
painting to clarify a heretofore-overlooked aspect of primordial doubt essential to 
Lily Briscoe's creative process in To the Lighthouse. I am not the first to point out 
that Lily's process of painting is a key to Woolf's thoughts about creativity. 
37 
Neither am I the first to call attention to a kinship of method and concern between 
Woolf and/or Lily Briscoe and Cezanne's aesthetic inquiries. George Smith claims: 
"What critics have failed to notice. .. is that Lily's way of seeing Mrs. Ramsay 
is 
Uzanne's way of seeing. " Smith notes that Woolf considered Roger Fry's work on 
Cezanne "among the finest... on art ever written, " hence "Lily's style of perception 
matches not only Cezanne's, but Fry's analysis of Cezanne as well. "38 
Lily's way of seeing Mrs Ramsay is one that yearns to encompass her entire 
essence: "One wanted fifty pairs of eyes to see with... Fifty pairs of eyes were not 
enough to get round that one woman with" (L, 266). In a 1939 passage from her 
autobiographical Moments ofBeing, Woolf takes a break from the "drudgery" of 
writing Roger Fry's autobiography and expresses similar thoughts regarding the 
essence of her own mother: "if one could give a sense of my mother's personality 
one would have to be an artist. It would be as difficult to do that, as it should be 
37 Michael Rosenthal, for instance, claims, "Lily's non-representational canvas suggests a 
metaphoric version of Woolf s non-realistic fiction. " See Rosenthal, Virginia Wootf(London and 
Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 113; Patricia Ondek Laurence writes that "the strokes and 
pauses of Lily Briscoe's paintbrush in To the Lighthouse establish a metaphor of the relationship 
among thought, writing and silence, " in The Reading ofSilence, 117. For other readings of Lily's 
creative journey, see Alice van Buren Kelley, The Novels of Virginia Woojr. Fact and Vision 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 114-143; and Naremore, The World Without a 
Setr, 144-150. 
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done, as to paint a Uzanne' (MB, 85). In this light, George Smith has a point in 
claiming that "Lily's way of seeing Mrs Ramsay is Cezanne's way of seeing. " It is 
also true that Woolf s interest in the work of Uzanne might have been influenced by 
Roger Fry, whose autobiography she was writing and who, in 1910 and 1912, had 
organised the two first major Post-Impressionist exhibitions in London, covering 
works by Cezanne, Gauguin, Van Gogh, Matisse and Picasso. 
39 
Fry had emphasised how Cezanne's works represented the "new spirif 'of 
Modernism in terms of its aim towards the "making" of "significant formS, 940 _a 
thought which is explored further in Clive Bell's 1914 study Art: "CLanne's life is a 
continuous effort to capture and express the significance of form, " Bell points out, 
"Everything can be seen as pure form. "41 According to the formalism of Bell and 
Fry, what mattered to Cezanne was, 
What philosophers used to call "the thing in itself, " what now I 
imagine they call "the essential reality. " For after all, what is a rose? 
What is a tree, a dog, a wall, a boat?... Imagine a boat in complete 
isolation, detach it from man and his urgent activities and fabulous 
history, what is it that remains ... What pure form and that which, 
38 George Smith, "Woolf, Uzanne and the Nachtrdglichkeit of Feminist Modernism" in 
Rereading Modernism: New Directions in Feminist Criticism, ed. Lisa Rado (New York, London: 
Garland, 1994), 77. 
39 For discussions about the reception of Uzanne in England and by the Bloomsbury group 
in particular see Beverly H. Twitchell, C&anne and Formalism in Bloomsbury (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: LTMI Research Press, 1983); and Weber Horst, Cizanne and Literature: An Essay in 
Cultural History (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitatsverlag, 199 1). 
40 Medina, C&anne and Modernism, 1. For a fiirther insight regarding Fry's interpretation of 
Uzanne, see his works C&anne: A Study offfis Development (New York: Macrnillan, 1927); and 
Vision and Design (London: Chatto & Windus, 1920). 
" Clive Bell, Art, (London: Arrow Books, 1914), " 187,190. 
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lying behind pure forms, gives it its significance. It was for this 
Uzanne felt the emotion he spent his life expressing. 42 
Bell's reference, in this passage, to "the essential reality" recalls Woolf s quest for 
"life, spirit, truth or reality, this, the essential thing" (CD, 7), but whereas Bell 
employs a formalist perspective, I see Woolf s speculations regarding "the essential 
thing, " which she also refers to as "the thing itself' (L, 260), as more 
phenomenological than formalist. Galen A. Johnson stresses the difference between 
phenomenology and formalism when claiming that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
of Cezanne's painting "should be classified together with the antifornialist C6zannc 
interpretations. " Whereas formalist approaches to Uzanne, "particularly ... Roger 
Fry's landmark formalist study published in 1927, " "focused on Uzanne's design, 
pure form, and use of line and planes on the two-dimensional surface, " Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenology places emphasis on the "prescientific perceptual experience 
of the natural world in his landscapes and still lifes., A3 It is this pre-scientific or pre- 
reflective perceptual experience - the experience of the "thing itself' - that Woolf 
also struggled to pin down in words. Lily's way of seeing underscores this: "Phrases 
came. Visions came... But what she wished to get hold of was the veryjar on the 
nerves, the thing itself before it has been made anything" (L, 260). 
To elaborate my point, a closer look at Bell's statement reveals a subtle 
difference between Bell's notion of "the thing in itself' and Woolf's 
phenomenological understanding of the "thing itself. " Bell's reference to "[w]hat 
philosophers used to call 'the thing in itself " brings to mind the Kantian notion of 
42 Ibid., 190. 
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"the thing in itself' (the "Ding an Sich'), signifying what Kant termed the 
noumenon, which, as opposed to the phenomenon, exists "not as an object of our 
sensuous intuition" but refers to the thing or event as it is "in itself, " independent of 
human experience, 44 or, as Bell puts it, "detach[ed]. .. from man. " The Kantian 
"thing in itself, " then, is "unknown and unknowable" to human beings 45 _a position 
which Husserl rejects: "It is... a fundamental error to suppose that perception 
fails to come into contact with the thing itself. We are told that the thing in itself and 
its itselffiess is not given to us... But this view is nonsensical" (Ideas, 135-136). 
Unlike Kant's "thing in itself, " Husserl's "thing itself' lays bare the world as 
phenomenon, that is to say, in terms of how consciousness experiences it. For 
Husserl, "things" can only exist as the phenomena or essences that are given to the 
subject in immediate experience: "Locating the object as thing or as intended 
phenomenon depends on the perspective of the inquircr. "46 
A common assumption in Woolfian criticism is that her speculations about 
"the thing itself' involve, at times, a Kantian understanding of the nounemon. 
According to Andrea L. Harris, "When Woolf says 'the thing itself, ' she means, 
literally, the thing -a concrete object in the world. In other texts by Woolf, 'the thing 
itself may be read as referring to noumena rather than phenomena. For example, 
Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse reflects upon 'this other thing, this truth, this 
43 Galen A. Johnson, 'Thenomenology and Painting: T6zanne's Doubt,, " The Merleau- 
Ponty. 4esthetics Reader, ed. Michael B. Smith (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1993), 6-7. 
44 Kaný Critique ofPure Reason, 186. 
45 R. P. Singh, A Critical Examination ofImmanuel Kant's Philosophy (New Delhi: 
Intellectual Publishing House, 1987), S. 
46 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 14. 
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reality, which suddenly laid hands on her, emerged stark at the back of appearances 
and commanded her attention"' 47 
Unlike Harris, I locate Woolf and "the thing itself 'within what I see as a 
Modernist attention to the Husserlian "thing itself, " uncovering the perceiver's 
primary consciousness of the thing seen, "the scholastic quidditas, the whatness of a 
thing, " as Joyce's Stephen Dedalus calls it. 48 Whenever she speaks of "the thing 
itself' or"the essential thing, " she never refers just to the material object in the 
world: the meaning of the "thing" always depends on an intending subjectivity. The 
"other thing, this truth, this reality, " which Lily Briscoe reflects on, is, or so I argue, 
equivalent to the "pattern, " which, as we were told "A Sketch of the Past, " is 
"hidden behind the cotton wool of daily life" (MB, 72). This pattern exposes the 
world not as a Kantian nournenon, that is, some higher reality, unknown to human 
beings, but as phenomenon. What emerges to Lily "at the back of appearances" is the 
essential structure of the world obscured by the habits of daily life. What suddenly 
stands out is the structure of this world as a "work of art" of which the perceiving 
subject is an integal part: "we are parts of the work of art... we are the music; we 
are the thing itsetf'(MB, 72; italics mine). What I propose, then, is that the "thing 
itself' in Woolf s work signifies not an independent thing in the world but the 
intentional relation between the world and the human being. 
47 Andrea L. Harris, "'Bare Things': Rehuming to the Senses in Virginia Woolf's Yhe 
Waves, " LIT 7 (1997): 340,348n. Another critic who highlights Woolf's concern with the Kantian 
"thing in itself' is Igor Webb, "'Things in Themselves': Virginia Woolf's The Waves, " Modern 
Fiction Studies 17 (Winter 1971-72): 570-3. Woolf's concern with the material object in the world, 
the "thing, " has, more recently, been examined from a socio-economic/philosophical perspective in 
Mao, Solid Objects, and in Bill Brown, "Ibe Secret Life of Things (Virginia Woolf and the Matter of 
Modernism, " (Virginia Woolf and the Matter of Modernism), " ModernisndModernity 6, no. 2 (April, 
1999): 1-28. 
48 James Joyce, A Portrait ofthe Artist as a Young Man (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 
70. 
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With this phenomenological definition of "the thing itself' in mind, we are 
now ready to clarify the way in which Lily's final creative journey, in To the 
Lighthouse, demonstrates a kinship of method with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
of Uzanne's painting. 
In the final chapter of To the Lighthouse, Lily is standing outside "on the 
edge of the lawn" (L, 230; italics mine). This "edge" suggests that she is on a 
threshold of perception, moving into and yet self-consciously away from the world 
that she observes, standing inside and yet outside her own position. This is also 
"C6zanne's enigma": "Man absent from but entirely within the landscape. "49 Lily's 
position also suggests that she is on the edge of feeling the presence of the now 
absent Mrs. Ramsay. Herjourney on this final morning of the book, which is in fact 
a fresh beginning, is about coming to terms with the space caused by Mrs. Ramsay's 
death, a space that is mirrored in the blankness of her canvas. The "blankness of her 
mind" (L, 197) corresponds with "the problem of space" (L, 23 1) of the canvas in 
front of her. It keeps obstructing her view "with its uncompromising white stare" (L, 
212). 
A common assumption in recent criticism is, as Suzette Henke has also 
pointed out, that Woolf s intangible spaces or silences are signs of her 
"mysticism. "50 More philosophical approaches are offered by Patricia Ondek 
Laurence, who examines "the feeling of 'emptiness' that suggests the non-being 
49 Deleuze and Guattari, "at is Philosophy?, 169. 
50 For critical studies which describe Woolf as a "mystic, " see section I. of this chapter, n. l. 
Other aspects of Woolf s "mysticisne' are examined in Naremore, The World Without a Sejr; and 
Louise Poresky, The Elusive Seo" Psyche and Spirit in Virginia Wootrs Novels (Newark: University 
of Delaware Press, 198 1), both of which Suzette Henke refers to in her Heideggerian argument against 
a mystical Woolf. See Henke, "Virginia Woolfs The Waves: A Phenomenological Reading, "461. 
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from which 'being' arises and constructs spaces in [Woolf s] novels. " The "sense of 
strangeness" conveyed through these spaces is, Laurence claims, "about the being in 
the world or the silence before creativity. ', 51 Similarly, Mark Hussey speaks of a 
"preverbal space from which human being arises, " which he relates "to the modes of 
art in Woolf s aesthetics. 9952 What we have learned about the phenomenological 
reduction and its placement as a creative engine in the work of Merleau-Ponty will 
prove useful in examining more closely the pre-constructive spaces that both 
Laurence and Hussey refer to. 
The way in which Lily Briscoe tries to come to terms with her feeling of 
blankness, mirrored by the white space in front of her, is by going through what 
resembles the epochg, a bracketing of the world that she knows, initially making her 
feel as if she is "cut off from other people, able only to go on watching, asking, 
wondering" (L, 198), which, however, opens up a world of possibilities: "She bad no 
attachments here, she felt, no relations with it, anything might happen" (L, 198). 
After feeling that "the usual link that usually bound things together had been cut (L, 
198), Lily experiences what Merleau-Ponty would call a "direct and primitive 
contact with the world" (PP) and is momentarily overwhelmed by a feeling of doubt: 
Always... before she exchanged the fluidity of life for the 
concentration of painting she had a few moments of nakedness when 
she seemed like an unborn soul, a soul reft of body, hesitating on 
510ndek Laurence, The Reading ofSilence, 119. 
52 Hussey, The Singing of the Real World, 38-39. For another approach to Woolf s "spaces, " 
see Diana Filby Gillespie, The Sister's Art: The Writing and Painting of Virginia Wooýfand Vanessa 
Bell (NewYork: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 8-9 and 268-269. Gillespie draws insightful 
parallels between "silences" and "spaces" in the literature of Woolf and the paintings of Vanessa Bell. 
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some windy pinnacle and exposed without protection to all the blasts 
of doubt. (L, 214-215; italics mine) 
The sense of "nakedness" and of being "an unborn soul" is a metaphor for Lily's pre- 
communicative visions and primal doubts about making her first mark on the 
"hideously difficult white space" (L, 216). As seen in our analysis of "A Mark on the 
Wall, " the creative nlind! s suspension of the "hard facts" of habituality lays bare the 
creating artist's doubts about his starting-point, about where and how to make her first 
"marle'. Hence Lilys feeling that "the urgency of the moment always missed its mark! ' 
(L, 240) and that "there was all the difference in the world between this planning airily 
away from the canvas, and actually taking the brush and making the first mark7: "But. . 
Where to begin?... at what point to make the first mark? " (L, 213). 
Lily's sense of nakedness and primal uncertainty serve as a fresh point of 
departure -a phenomenological beginning - of her creative j ourney: "she could not 
shake herself free from the sense that everything this morning was happening for the 
first time, perhaps for the last time" (L, 261). She wonders what it would be like to 
get back to a level of pre-objectivity at which the object could be immediately 
present to her: "One wanted, she thought, dipping her brush deliberately, to be on a 
level with ordinary experience to feel simply that's a chair, that's a table" (L, 272). In 
Yhe Waves Bernard has a similar experience: "How much better is silence; the 
coffee-cup, the table... Let me sit here for ever with bare things, this coffee-cup, this 
knife, this fork, things in themselves, myself being myself. " (W, 246). 
Both Lily and Bernard want to capture how phenomena appear to them as 
they are prior to any form ofjudgement, "before habits had spun themselves across 
the surface" (L, 258); before habits and preconceptions have coloured their acts and 
expressions. Mark Hussey notes that feminist studies have described Woolf's 
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concern with this pre-objective dimension of experience - "the idea in Woolf s 
fiction of a preverbal space from which human being arises" - as a "Wild zone, " a 
usually invisible and suppressed female territory, which Woolf seeks to make 
visible. 53 Andrea L Harris underpins the idea of such a female zone when describing 
the "bare things... things in themselves" that Bernard speaks of as a "feminine 
terrain of things in themselves. " Rhoda too, Harris claims, "seeks the 'little 
language' as opposed to the masculine language of stories as a means to attaining the 
'thing in itself 3,9954 
In contrast with feminist readings of Woolf, such as Harris's, I would rather 
agree with Marilyn Kurtz: "Woolfs concerns are larger than social or feminine; they 
are all-encompassing and limitless... [Woolf] is concerned with ontology, with the 
nature of being not just a woman, not even just a human being, but a part of the flux 
qs55 
of existence in the endless, timeless universe. The language of the "bare things" 
that Bernard, like Lily and Woolf herself, seeks to uncover is not so much a feminine 
language as the phenomenology of "the thing itself" Woolf, paradoxically, attempts 
to emulate the pre-communicative life of consciousness: that primary experience of 
the visible world before our usual modes of discourse have concealed it. Much like 
Gertrude Stein, she tries "to express things seen not as one knows them but as they 
are when one sees them without remembering having looked at them" (Picasso, 15). 
According to Merleau-Ponty, language has a silent centre, a "core of primary 
meaning round which the acts of naming and expression take shape" (PP xv) to 
53 Hussey, The Singing of the Real World, 3 8-39,39. 
54 Harris, "'Bare Things, "' 339. 
55 Marilyn Kurtz, Virginia Woojr- Reflections and Reverberations (New York: Peter Lang, 
1990), 7. 
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which he, significantly, refers as "the life of the bare things" (VI, 125). Our distinct 
and clear expressions arise from these primordial "bare things, " which brings us back 
to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of Cezanne's painting: "C6zanne tried to paint 
the expression first and foremost, and that is why he never caught it. He gradually 
leamed that expression is the language of the thing itsetfand springsfrom its 
confikuration. " (PP, 322). Just as Cezanne, on his j ourney from the blank canvas to 
his final painting, tried to express his pre-objective experience of the thing, so does 
Lily yearn to grab hold of the pre-communicative dimension of experience, "before 
habits had spun themselves across the surface": "it was not knowledge but unity she 
desired... nothing that could be written in any language known to men" (L, 258,70). 
Just as Uzanne's phenomenological suspension of habit would lead him 
back to an "unfamiliar world in which one is uncomfortable and which forbids all 
human effusiveness" C'Doubt" 16), Lily is drawn into an unfamiliar space where she 
has, momentarily, "lost consciousness of outer things and her name and her 
personality" (L, 216) and where "[t]he house, the place, the morning, all seemed 
strangers to her" (L, 198): 
It was all in keeping with this silence, this emptiness, and the 
unreality of the early morning hour. It was a way things had 
sometimes, she thought, lingering for a moment and looking at the 
long glittering windows and the plume of blue smoke; they became 
unreal. So, coming back from aJ oumey, or after an illness, before 
habits had spun themselves across the surface, one felt that same 
unreality, which was so startling; felt something emerge. Life was 
most vivid then... One need not speak at all. One glided, one shook 
one's sails... between things, beyond things. (L, 258) 
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"[T]here is a zone of silence in the middle of every art. The artists themselves live in 
if'(CE2,236), Woolf claims in the essay "Walter Sickert. " Likewise, it is from an 
unfamiliar feeling of "silence" and "emptiness" that "[flife [is] most vivid" to Lily-, 
it is here that she feels "something emerge. " Her performance of the epoche, in other 
words, is a paradoxical exercise. The taken for granted dimension of experience is 
suddenly "expose[d]" to Lily, "as the condition of possibility of the ordinary, ', 56 in 
Judith Butler's terms, hence it seems strange and overwhelms Lily with a sense of 
"unreality. " In a similar manner, the "zone of silence" within which Lily suddenly 
finds herself stands out as the "condition of possibility" of her artistic creation. 
The silent, "white space" of the canvas, which is always at the centre of 
Lily's world, brings us back to an earlier passage in To the Lighthouse where Mrs. 
Ramsay finds herself in "the still space that lies about the heart of things" (L, 142), 
and to Mrs Dalloway, in which Clarissa senses "an emptiness about the heart of life; 
an attic room. " (MD, 39). Yhe Waves is also structured around a blank and silent 
centre in the form of Percival. 57 Like practical phenomenologists, Woolfs creative 
selves perpetually experience a Husserlian "bracketing" of the familiar "cotton wool 
of daily life" (MB, 72) and are faced with "moments of being"(MB, 78) where this 
silence or primordial blankness stands out. These sudden illuminating moments, 
, Woolf points out in Moments ofBeing, are "a revelation of some order; it is a token 
of some real thing behind appearances" (MB, 72), which should not be taken as 
moments of "mystical unity, ', 58 as suggested by one critic, but as moments of 
phenomenological insight, uncovering the essence of experience. Maurice Natanson 
56 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xv. 
57 1 will return to the implications of Percival later in this chapter. 
58 Moore, "Nature and Conununity, " 222. 
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describes this in the following way: "If the greatest part of daily life is experienced in 
naYve terms and taken for granted as real, there are moments, at least, when the 
individual is aware that he is experiencing something in a particular manner. ', 59 What 
Woolf s silences signify, then, are not revelations of the mysteries of life but a 
discovery of the "essential thing, " a laying open of the essential structure of reality, 
the "hidden pattern" behind the "cotton wool": "some common feeling, " Lily says, 
"which held the whole together. " (L, 259). 
The way in which the world is rendered strange to Lily is connected with a 
lyrical feeling of some deeper connection with the world: "the whole world seemed 
to have dissolved... into a pool of thought, a deep basin of reality" (L, 241). In the 
words of Merleau-Ponty: "The landscape thinks itself in Lily"; "[she] is its 
consciousness" ("Doubt, " 17). In fact, the whole world seems to transform into a 
field of intentional relations: "the cliffs looked as if they were conscious of the ships, 
and the ships looked as if they were conscious of the cliffs" (L, 246). Just as 
Uzannes's work, according to Merleau-Ponty, echoes "the continual rebirth of 
existence" C'Doubt" 18), reflecting the subject as a carnal being in this world of 
repetition, so does Lily claim: "one had constantly a sense of repetition - of one thing 
fallen where another had fallen" (L, 268). Thus Lily, this practical phenomenologist 
and "perpetual beginner, " "pitch[es] herself finnly again before her easel, " telling 
herself to "[g]et that and start afresh, get that and start afresh" (L, 261). 
When Lily Briscoe asks Andrew what his father's books arc about, he replies: 
"Subject and object and the nature of reality" (L, 33). This "nature of reality" is the 
"space" that, in the terminology of Beckett, "intervenes" between the Modernist 
59 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 2 1. 
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artist and the world of objects and which can only be stated through the act of 
creation itself Just as Merleau-Pontys C6zanne sought to bring to vision the 
primordial world passed through on his journey from the blank canvas towards a 
clear vision of his motif, so does Lily, while "tunnelling her way into her picture" (L, 
234), pass through this nature of reality, a pre-reflective and pre-communicative zone 
of silence and nakedness, but only to come out at the end of the tunnel and to see the 
light of the lighthouse, "laying down her brush in extreme fatigue" and exclaiming, 
"I have had my vision" (L, 28 1). 
IV. The Waves: A "Gigantic Conversation" 
By drawing upon both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's speculations on the reduction, in 
my examination so far, I hope to have identified in Woolf's work an interpretation of 
the same phenomenological phenomenon, calling attention to the notions of 
primordial doubt and wonder, and shedding light on the creative subject as a 
practical phenomenologist, a phenomenological "perpetual beginner. " 
The efforts of Merleau-Ponty's thought are centred upon "[b]ar[ing7 all the 
roots" (VI, 169), thus "reachieving, " through the reduction, "a direct and primitive 
contact with the world" (PP, vii). From this primal and primitive contact arise not 
only our acts of expression but also our relations with other subjects. The reduction, 
then, is not only fundamental to Merleau-Ponty's aesthetic concerns but it also 
functions as the engine of the philosopher's later concept of "flesh": "my body is 
made of the same flesh as the world... this flesh of my body is shared by the world, 
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the world rej7ects if' (VI, 249). 1 have already suggested that Woolf s work evidences 
the change of relations between man and world, which, she argued, took place "about 
the year 1910, " in that it draws attention to the spaces between things. "The 
question, " Lily Briscoe stresses, "was of some relation between those masses" (L, 
200). In what follows I hope to articulate more clearly, through Merleau-Ponty's 
thoughts about "flesh, " Woolf s configuration of the relationship between perceiving 
body and world in The Waves. 
In The World Without a Setf- Virginia Wootfand the Novel (1973), James 
Naremore argues that Woolf, in her novels, "tries to evolve a technique which will 
allow her to present the 'luminous halo' of experience, even the 'tremor of 
susceptibility' in the self, without neglecting what is 'outside... and beyond'. " 
Drawing on the work of Harvena Richter, who "has suggested that we set aside the 
conventional terminology and 'approach the question of voice, ' which, in Virginia 
Woolf, 'is at once conscious and unconscious, personal and impersonal, individual 
and collective, "' Naremore attempts "to indicate how the narrator of Mrs. Woolf's 
novels modulates between these extremes until it becomes the voice of everyone and 
no one, " but stresses: "It is probably impossible to find a term that would accurately 
characterize this voice. ', 60 
The particular "voice" that Naremore refers to is most apparent in 71e Waves. 
Woolf struggled with the book's closure. "[Hlow to... press it into one, " she 
wondered, "it might be a 'gigantic conversation"' (Diary 3,285). The final version 
of The Waves never presents us with "conversation" in the usual sense of the term. 
Like waves in a sea, the words of the six central voices are at once dispersed and yet 
gathered in Bernard's closing soliloquy, bringing to light an intersubjective world 
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where voices "melt into each other with phrases ... are edged with mist.. .. [and] 
make an unsubstantial territory" (W, 11). In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau- 
Ponty provides us with a term for this "unsubstantial territory": "flesh" (1a chair). 
"Ibe flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance, " he writes, but rather a 
"general thing, " a phenomenon of reciprocal contact between perceiving subjects 
(VI, 139). Our "operative language" (VI, 153) Merleau-Ponty suggests, is inscribed in 
this world of flesh. 
The Waves is, without doubt, Woolf s most phenomenological work. Using 
aspects of Heidegger's phenomenology, Suzette Henke has already demonstrated that 
the ontology of The Waves is "more phenomenological than mystical, " thus arguing 
against previous scholars such as Naremore, Louise Poresky and Madeline Moore, 
who place emphasis on the "mystical" dimension in Woolf's writing. 61 Mark Hussey, 
on the other hand, echoes Arthur Koestler's claim that The Waves is a "masterpiec[e] 
,, 62 at dead ends, when arguing for the "aesthetic failure" of the work, suggesting that 
it is an example of "antireading"(86-87): "The Waves is hostile to reading, and yet, it 
has nearly always been read as a complete, harmonious work of art. It is, though, a 
,, 63 product of crisis and reflects this in its fonn. Unlike Woolf's other novels, The 
Waves, Hussey argues, "does not allow for the participation of the reader, but 
continually dictates through a highly self-conscious construct. "64 James Phelan, 
however, offers yet another reading of Woolf's novel: "Woolf has offered us a most 
60 James Naremore, The World Without a Sej( , 75. 
61 Henke, "Virginia Woolfs The Waves: A Phenomenological Reading, " 461472; 
62 Arthur Koestler, The Yogi and the Commissar (London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1945), 3 1. 
63 Hussey, The Singing ofthe Real World, 86-87. 
64 Ibid., 86. 
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unusual kind of engagement with her characters. We are asked not -only to be 
simultaneously and overtly aware of their mimetic, thematic, and synthetic 
composition but also to refrain from making judgments of them or to develop 
attachments to them of the kind we develop towards Lizzy Bennet, attachments that 
,, 65 would make us expect and desire certain outcomes for them. What Phelan implies 
is that we, the readers, must suspend all preconceptions and expectations that we 
would usually employ in a literary text in order to engage with Woolf s work. We 
must, in other words, adopt the shift of attitude of phenomenological reduction. 
My wish to shed a new light on Woolf s work through the reduction is based 
on Kevin Hart's statement: "[Husserl's] broodings over the reduction speak .. 
vividly of something central to art. ', 66 Taking my bearings from Merleau-Ponty's 
reworking of Husserl's reduction, I propose a twofold change in our approach to The 
Waves. One is to provide, through Merleau-Ponty's notion of "flesh, " a terminology 
for the "voice" in Woolf s work that Naremore lacks. The other is to show that the 
reduction "speak[s] vividly of something central" to Woolf's aesthetic concerns, that 
it functions as the engine of the creative and wave-like patterns that hold The Waves 
together, thus offering an entirely different reading of this work as Woolf's strongest 
aesthetic statement. 
Not only is The Waves the most phenomenological of Woolf's longer works, 
it is also the most poetic and insubstantial in terms of its language and genre. Woolf 
called it a "play-poem, "' "[a]way from fact; free, yet concentrated, prose yet poetry; a 
novel and a play. " (Diary 3,139). The brackets used in the "rime Passes" section of 
65 James Phelan, "Character and Judgment in Narrative and in lyric: Toward an 
Understanding of the Audience's engagement in The Waves, " Style 24, pt. 3 (1990): 418-19. 
66 Hart, "The Experience of Poetry, " 286. 
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To the Lighthouse are still there but implicitly, presenting us with a much denser 
vision which "saturate[s] every atom" in order to "eliminate all waste, deadness, 
superfluity-, to give the moment whole, whatever it includes. Say the moment is a 
combination of thought, sensation, the voice of the sea7' (Diary 3,209). A similar 
attempt to pin down the "voice" of the totality of things pervades Merleau-Ponty's 
thinking. Consider the following passage from The Visible and the Invisible: 
In a sense the whole of philosophy, Husserl says, consists in restoring 
a power to signify, a birth of meaning, or a wild meaning, an 
expression of experience by experience, which in particular clarifies 
the special domain of language. And in a sense, as Valfty said, 
language is everything, since it is the voice of no one, since it is the 
very voice of things, the waves and the forests. (VI, 155) 
Merleau-Ponty's "voice of no one .. the very voice of things, the waves and the 
forests" (VI, 155), bringing to light a more primordial "wild meaning" from which 
our clear and meaningftil language arises, sits well with Woolf s; aim to reveal in one 
"momenf' the totality of the spoken and the unspoken, a "combination of thought, 
sensation, the voice of the sea, " which would, eventually, shape itself as a "gigantic 
conversation. " 
Whereas the word conversation is often associated with purely linguistic 
interchange, the "gigantic conversation" that Woolf seeks to "press into one" has 
overtones of something more primordial, something of pre-semantic insubstantiality, 
existing prior to our usual form of communication. "The world is always 'already 
there' before reflection begins" (PP, vii), Merleau-Ponty writes in his 
Phenomenology ofPerception. It is "already there" in the shape of what Husserl 
called "the misty horizon that can never be completely outlined [but which] remains 
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necessarily there" (Ideas, 102). Husserl's "misty horizon" figures the infinity and 
continuity of the world. It is "misty" because it exists before reflection and can never 
be fully grasped in words, and yet it is the "horizon, " that is to say, the very 
background against which all our expressions stand out. We never lose sight of this 
misty horizon in Woolf s The Waves: it is there at the periphery of the six speakers' 
perceptions. "We are edged with mist, " says Bernard, the book's most dominating 
voice. "[w]e make an unsubstantial territory" (W, 11). While still thinking about 
writing The Moths, which was the working title of The Waves (Diary 3,150,190), 
Woolf pondered on how to "go down step by step into that queer regioif '(Diary, 
239), "queer" because unfamiliar and yet the ground of creativity. It is against this 
misty and "queer"horizon that all creative acts, including that of writing stand out: 
"One sees a fin passing far out, " wrote Woolf elsewhere, suggesting that first and 
pre-semantic impulse of creativity: "What image can I reach to convey what I 
mean? " she wrote: "Really there is none. " (Diary 1,113). 
Yhe Waves presents us with three separate and yet interconnected cycles of 
creation: that of nature, that of the human being and that of the creating artist, a "lady 
[who] sits between two long windows, writing" (W, 12) to whom Bernard repeatedly 
67 
refers. This writing figure, a hidden and yet active force inside the text, never allows 
us to lose sight of the source from which the work that we are reading stems. The 
book's six inter-locking voices have often been referred to as "selves" or aspects of one 
whole self or creative mind. 68 It has also been pointed out that Woolf did not think of 
67 The writing lady re-appears on pp. 102,20 1, and 224. 
68 For instance, Jean Guiguet claims that the six voices are "originally merged in one single 
voice - the thinker, "and James Narernore argues that "The speeches often seem like one pervasive 
voice with six personalities. " See Guiguet, Virginia Wboy'and Her Works, trans. Jean Stewart 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1965), 285; and Naremore, The World Without a Seýf, 152. 
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these voices as "characters" in the usual sense of the word. 69 What I would like to 
suggest is that Bernard, Lily, Susan, Rhoda, Neville and Louis are six "essences" in the 
phenomenological sense of the term. 
It should be clear from what has already been discussed that essences are 
"aspects or qualities of objects-as-intended. "70 To be intended is to be built up 
through acts of the mind. Recalling our interpretation of "The Mark on the Wall, " in 
the course of "imaginary variatioe' - the thought experiment related to the eidetic 
reduction - the object is intended in all its possible manifestations. In "The Leaning 
Tower, " Woolf writes about the writer's encounter with the object as exactly such a 
process of variation: "A writer is a person who sits at a desk and keeps his eye fixed, 
as intently as he can, upon a certain object... A writer has to keep his eye upon a 
model that moves, that changes, upon an object that is not one object but 
innumerable objects" (WE, 159). In a similar manner, or so I argue, the voices of 
Bernard, Lily, Susan, Rhoda, Neville and Louis in Yhe Waves are one swarming 
mind's (that of the "lady writing) imaginary variations on one "model. " Just as the 
writing lady's eye is "upon" her "model" from within the book, so are the eyes of the 
six essences directed towards specific objects. 
As pointed out, the phenomenal feature central to experience exposed 
through the reduction is that consciousness by its very nature is always directed 
toward some object. This fact that every act of the mind implies an object thought of 
bears the name of "intentionality. " People do not exist in and for themselves but only 
69 Michael Rosenthal writes: "Woolf did not conceive of these voices as adding up in any 
way to literary "characters" and quotes the following passage from her diary: "What I now think 
(about The Waves) is that I can give in a very few strokes the essentials of a person's character (A 
Writer's Diary, 157). " See Rosenthal, Virginia Woolf, 145. 
7ONatanson, Edmund Husserl, 14. 
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in and through intentional relations; through thoughts, memories, and perceptions of. 
Thus, there are two inter-related terms at work here: horizon and intentionality. 
Intentionality concerns our consciousness or perceptions of things and at its 
periphery lies the misty horizon of continuity. 
The monologue-like soliloquies which make up Woolf s The Waves can be 
characterised as intentional acts, continuous streams of fresh perceptions ofthings. 
Like the birds in the book's third interlude, Woolfs six perceivers are "aware, awake, 
intensely conscious ofone thing, one object in particula? ' (W, 59. ): 
'I see a ring, ' said Bernard, 'hanging above me. It quivers 
and hangs in a loop of light. ' 
'I see a slab of pale yellow, ' said Susan, 'spreading away 
until it meets a purple stripe. ' 
'I hear a sound, ' said Rhoda, 'cheep, chirp; cheep 
chirp; going up and down. ' 
'I see a globe, ' said Neville, 'hanging down in a drop 
against the enormous flanks of some hill. ' 
'I see a crimson tassel, ' said Jinny, 'twisted with gold 
threads. ' 
'I hear something stwnping, ' said Louis. 'A great 
beast's foot is chained. It stamps, and stamps, and stamps. ' (W, 5) 
Thus, through the eyes of Woolf s perceivers we "see. .. fine substance[s] 
strangely" (TB, 4), to borrow from Gertrude Stein, but only to uncover this 
strangeness as "the condition of possibility of the ordinary. '71 From the outset of 
Woolfs "play-poem, " we plunge into a strange, abstract universe of pure sensory 
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perceptions. Presenting us with what the omniscient narrator in the book's second 
intcrludc calls "a mosaic of singlc sparks not yet formed into onc wholc" (W, 21), 
these perceptions suggest an openness to the world before opinions are fully formed 
and could be indicative of both early childhood and the primary phase of creative 
production. Both human awareness and creative awareness begin with first 
perceptions. 
These first perceptions manifest themselves against the cyclical pattern of a 
horizon in the interludes: the rising and setting of the sun, the singing of birds, and 
the breaking of the waves. Woolf s diary tells us that she imagined these perceptions 
to appear as "islands of light - islands in the stream that I am trying to convey, life 
itself going oif '(Diary 3,229). What the six speakers perceive is conditioned by the 
ongoing stream of life against which they see it. That which Louis calls "the central 
rhythm... the common mainspring, " which he watches "expand, contract; and then 
expand again" (W, 76) - an image of what Natanson terms the "a priori repetition 
which is axial to everyday reality"72 _ is exposed not only through the cyclical 
pattern of nature, described in the interludes, but also through the speakers' repetitive 
streams of fresh perceptions, embracing the ever-new. Susan is the one who most 
clearly finds a sense of being within the cycles of nature, the meadows and the fields: 
"I think I am the field, I am the barn, I am the trees... I am the seasons ... January, 
May, November; the mud, the mist, the dawn. (W, 78-79). 
The interaction between the six speakers' streams of single perceptions and the 
continual change of the misty horizon, within which they exist, takes on the shape of 
some "gigantic conversation, " a conversation which goes beneath and beyond our 
71 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xv. 
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ordinary forms of communication and becomes a "combination of thought, 
sensation, the voice of the sea7 (Diary 3,209). It is "gigantic" in that it points to the 
Husserlian horizon of continuity, which exists before we can even reflect on or speak 
about it. It is thus too huge to be fully pinned down in words and yet is it the ever- 
present ground of expression. 73 1 can best condense this "gigantic" idea by what 
Wallace Stevens in the poem "A Primitive Like an Orb" speaks of as "a shapeless 
giant ... .. A giant on the horizon, glistening" 
(CP, 442). Stevens's "giant"is 
"shapeless" because it refers to the unsubstantial shape of pre-semantic experience, 
the first creative impulse, which, like Woolf s "fin passing far out, " has not yet been 
fully crystallised: it is "on the horizon, glistening" (CP, 442). In The Waves Bernard 
echoes Woolf s thoughts when noting: "A fin turns" in a "waste of waters" (W, 157). 
Signifying the primal creative impulse which he "shall in time to come uncover and 
coax into words" (W, 157), this "bare visual impression is unattached to any line of 
reason, it springs up as one might see a fin of a porpoise on the horizon" (W, 157). 
Bernard's "Little Language" 
As mentioned earlier, unlike Husserl, Merleau-Ponty assigns intentionality to the 
"flesh" of the body. It is the body which first experiences the world, not the mind. 
Just as our visible perceptions are conditioned by a pre-existing but unperceived 
ground or "horizon, " our ability to express our thoughts is conditioned by an 
unspoken, bodily communication with the world: a "mute perception" (VI, 155) or 
72 Natanson, The Erotic Bird, 15. 
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"wild meaning" (VI, 155) of pre-reflective experience. Just as "the visible itself has 
an invisible inner framework! ' (VI, 215-216), language has a silent centre, a "core of 
primary meaning round which the acts of naming and expression take shape" (PP, 
xv). Although our clear perceptions and expressions presuppose this invisible /mute 
dimension of experience, we do not perceive it in daily life as it already exists within 
being. 74 Merleau-Ponty's phenomenon of 'Wesh of the world' (VI, 248) is anchored 
in this unperceived "separation (6cart)" (VI, 216) within being itself, thus 
articulating the space of exchange in between the visible and invisible dimensions of 
experience, in between speech and "mute perception, " and in between the seen and 
the seer: "[T]he thickness of flesh between the seer ... is not an obstacle between 
them, 'it is their means of communication" (VI, 135). The structure of "fleslf' is 
therefore described as a "chiasm" (VI, 264), indicating an event that is neither 
dichotomous nor unitary but something in between. "FlesW' is a "general thing, 
midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea" (VI, 139). All bodies 
have in the same way an intentional bond with the world. We are all part of our 
comnlon world of "flesW' as active/passive beings: "visible-seer(s]" (VI, 260,262). 
We are at once seeing/touching subjects and seenAouchcd things, at once distanced 
from and intertwined with the world. "Flesh, " in other words, calls attention to our 
difference and similarity: "Vision alone makes us learn that beings are different, 
73 For this insight I am indebted to Judith Butler's phenomenological approach to Stevens's 
poetry.. See Butler, introduction to 7he Erotic Bird, xiv. 
74 For a clarifying examination of Merleau-Ponty's concept, see Jerrold Seigel, "A Unique 
way of Existing: Merleau-Ponty and the Subject, " 475476. For other useful explanations, see John 
Carvalho, "Folds in the Flesh: Merleau-Ponty/Foucault, " in Rereading Merleau-Ponty: Essays Beyond 
the Contintental-Analytical Divide, eds. Lawrence Hass and Dorothea Olkowski (New York: 
Humanity Books, 2000), 293-312, and Brendan Prendeville "Merleau-Ponty, Realism and Painting: 
Psychophysical Space and the Space of Exchange, " Art History 22, no. 3 (September 1999): 364-88. 
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'exterior, ' foreign to one another, are yet absolutely together, are 'simultaneity. "' 
(Primacy, 187). 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenon of flesh allows us to articulate more clearly the 
paradox of experience that Woolf struggled to "press into one" in Yhe Waves. The 
book's "gigantic conversationý' reaches its zenith in Bernard's final summing up. 
Here Bernard's voice and those of the other five merge, creating one "gigantic" 
voice, indicating that the flesh of the single body is at once shared and reflected by 
the world: "Who am I? I have been talking of Bernard, Neville, Jinny, Rhoda and 
Louis. Am I all of them? Am I one and distinct? I do not know" (W, 227-228). How 
can it be, Woolf seems to suggest, that we are conscious of other people, who are, 
simultaneously, conscious of us? Her six speakers are, on the one hand, part of the 
surging "stream" of "life itself going on, " but are, on the other hand, above it, 
looking down from their dry "islands of light, " stressing at once their difference and 
similarity, their distance and intertwining: "At the moment when I am most 
disparate, " says Bernard, "I am also integrated" (W, 62). 
Woolf s diary reveals that she was fascinated with Proust's writing. "The 
thing about Proust, " she writes in a 1925 entry, "is his combination of the utmost 
sensibility with the utmost tenacity.. He is as tough as catgut & as evanescent as a 
butterfly's bloom. And he will I suppose both influence me & make me out of 
temper with every sentence of my own" (Diary 3,7). 75 Merleau-Ponty was equally 
impressed with Proust's capacity to capture the unseizable within the solid: "No one 
has gone further than Proust in fixing the relations between the visible and the 
75 Hermione Lee has also pointed out that Woolf "wanted to feel what Proust felt and to see if 
she couldn! t turn this world into something likeA La Recherche. " See Lee, Virginia Wootf, (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1996), 468. 
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invisible, in describing an idea that is not the contrary of the sensible, that is its 
lining and its depth" (VI, 149). Proust most clearly highlights this idea when in 
Swann's Way he refers to music as the "little phrase" and Merleau-Ponty draws 
upon this notion when elaborating his own phenomenon of flesh. Like the "little 
phrase, " flesh is a "generar' notion, like ... the notions of light, of sound, of relief, of 
physical voluptuousness... (VI, 139,149) which we cannot quite "get at 
immediately and lay hands on" (VI, 150). In our "operative language, " Merleau- 
Ponty writes, "sense and sound are in the same relationship as in the 'little phrase 
(VI, 153). The full meaning of language lies not merely in our spoken words but in 
the mute perception or silent language inhabiting these words: "language is 
everything... it is the voice of no one.... the very voice of things, the waves and the 
forest" (VI, 155). 
Proust's concerns with the unrepresentable seems to have influenced the 
gigantic project of The Waves in particular. When "[s]um[ming] up... the meaning 
of [his] life'( W, 199) to provide us, the readers, with a final story, Bernard claims 
that he is "tired of phrases that come down beautifully with all their feet on the 
ground" (W, 199). "[D]istrust[ing] neat designs of life that are drawn upon half- 
sheets of note-paper, " he "long[s] for" (W, 199) a different kind of language, which 
is not of our usual conversational kind: 
some little language that lovers use, broken words, inarticulate words, 
like the shuffling of feet on the pavement. I begin to seek some design 
more in accordance with those moments of humiliation and triumph 
that come now and then undeniably (W, 199; italics mine) 
Just as Proust's "little phrase" catches the invisible lining of the visible, the sense 
within the sound, so does Bernard's "little language" highlight the unseizable and 
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immaterial hidden within the "neat designs" of our conventional language. This 
"little language" refers to the "brokeif' and "inarticulate" but it is not the opposite of 
what is "whole" and articulate; rather, it is that invisible/mute element which 
inhabits our visible world and words. What Bernard longs to express is a more direct 
experience of the "thing iself 'without the obstructions of beautiful, neat phrases -a 
"poetry [which] rediscovers what articulates itself within us, unbeknownst to us" (VI, 
76 208). 
"It is Percival who inspires poetry" (W, 30), Bernard tells us elsewhere in The 
Waves. The mute and "eyeless" figure of Percival, who is brought into existence 
purely through the others' perception of him, is not really a character but a metaphor 
for "the thing itself, " the "core of primary meaning" (PP, xv), to use Merleau- 
Ponty's term, in which the acts and the expressions of the others are anchored. When 
Percival arrives at his own farewell dinner, he instantly inspires one gigantic 
moment, and, adding a sense of wholeness to the world of broken objects, makes 
visible the common ground of the six beings, the "flesh of the world, " the "voice of 
no one.... The very voice of things, the waves and the forest' ' (VI, 155): 
'Now once more, ' said Louis, '.. Do not move, do not go. Hold it 
for ever. ' 
'Let us hold it for one moment, ' said Jinny; 'love, hatred, by whatever 
name we call it. . Torests and far countries on the other side of the 
76 Patrick McGee also argues that Bernard's "little language" stands for the unseizable but in 
a different way: "the little language is the discourse of the Other, " which "signifies something beyond. 
.. at which all language aims. " Unlike my suggestion that the pre-semantic dimension of experience, 
which I see as exposed throughout Woolf s work, offers a clue to her phenomenological concerns with 
creative production, McGee uses his notion of the "Other" to point out a "compatibility" between 
Woolf and Lacanian theory, claiming that Woolf "reaches toward the unrepresentable... the locus of 
the signifier before it is captured by the symbolic rule of patriarchy. " See McGee, "Woolf s Other: 
The University in Her Eye, " Novel 23 (Spring 1990): 244,230,245. 
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world, ' said Rhoda, 'are in it;. .. 'Happiness is in it, ' said Neville, 
'and the quiet of ordinary things. .. . 'Week-days are in it, ' said 
Susan, 'Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday ... What is to come is in it, ' 
said Bemard.... (W, 118-19) 
In accordance with Merleau-Ponty's speculations, the repeated "it" in this passage is 
"not matter ... not mind ... not substance" but one of those unsubstantial 
f6general" notions like ... the notions of light, of sound, of relief, of physical 
voluptuousness.. (VI, 139,149): "love" is in it, "[h]appiness is in it, " "[w]eek-days 
are in it. " "It" directs our attention to the "gigantic" horizon of experience that 
cannot be completely expressed, and yet it is the ever-present ground of our acts, 
relations and expressions. "It" refers exactly to that we cannot "get at 
immediately and lay hands on" but which is, nevertheless, "the common tissue of 
which we are made" (VI, 150,203). 
In this light, let us finish this section by considering the opening of Woolfs 
short story "A Haunted House": 
Whatever hour you woke there was a door shutting. From room to 
room they went, hand in hand, lifting here, opening there, making 
sure -a ghostly couple. 
"Here we left it, " she said. And he added, "Oh, but here too! " 
It's upstairs, " she munnured. "And in the garden, " he whispered. 
"Quietly, " they said, "or we shall wake them. " 
But it wasift that you woke us. Oh, no. "Ibe3ýre looking for it; 
they're drawing the curtain, " one might say and so read on a page or 
two. "Now theyve found it, " one would be certain, stopping the 
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pencil on the margin. And then, tired of reading, one might rise and 
see for oneself, the house all empty, the doors standing open 
(HH, 3; italics mine) 
As Woolf with A Haunted House was sowing the seeds of the "Time Passes" section 
in To the Lighthouse, the method and concern in these works is similar. 77 Just as the 
repeated "if' in the short story points to the pre-reflective dimension of experience 
and, like phenomenology, exposes this as the ground of expression, so is the silent, 
empty, "eyeless" house, "beholding nothing" (L, 183) in "rime Passes" exposed as 
the ever-present condition round which the people in the house nonnally operate. As 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, in her reading of "Time Passes, " Patricia 
Ondek Laurence refers to Husserl's phenomenological method of "bracketing" but 
contradicts this with Woolf s "treatment of the outward and the inward": "If for 
Edmund Husserl, the phenomenologist, objects exist independently of ourselves in 
the external world, and anything beyond our immediate experience is 'bracketed' - 
,, 78 then for Woolf it is the opposite. In stressing that objects, according to Husserl, 
are independent in the "external world" and thus detached from the subject, Laurence 
seems to charge the method of bracketing with a division of the subject and the 
object, whereas such a division is not the point of Husserl's procedure. What he 
meant to achieve through "bracketing" was a "mere change of standpoint" (Ideas, 
15), highlighting the intentionality of consciousness and identifying this as the source 
of objectivity. Husserl, then, stresses not the independence of the object but explores 
the object in its relation to the intending subject. Douglas Mao contradicts Laurence 
77 As Hermione Lee puts it, "A Haunted House foreshadows "the questing airs in the 'Time 
Passes' Section of To the Lighthouse. " See Lee, Virginia Wbo6r, 318. 
78 Laurence, The Reading ofSilence, I 10. 
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and shares my view when arguing that "Woolf's attempt to give 'an empty house, no 
people's characters" in the "Time Passes" of To the Lighthouse is tantamount to an 
"epochj of sorts. 9979 In agreement with Mao, I suggest that Woolf s procedure in "A 
Haunted House, " is, in fact, analogous to the mode of operation of the epochi. 
Once again, then, Woolf s procedure is tantamount to the operation of the 
epochi, shifting our attention back to the"thing itself" "A Haunted House7'presents 
us with a phenomenological "bracketing7 of conventional "neat designs" of 
representation, exposing "it" or "life, spirit, truth or reality, this, the essential thing" 
(CD, 7), the more primordial dimension of experience that is the condition of 
expression and creativity alike. This is implied in the fact that the narrator stops her 
pencil upon thinking "Now they've found it. " "It" marks that primary perception, the 
"fin passing far out, " which Woolf struggled to "get down into [her] pen" (Diary 3, 
19 1) and out on her page, thus calling our attention to creative production itself, 
laying bare the space between the first, pre-semantic perception and the articulation 
of the "thing itself" 
Like the 'ýnist", edging the 'ýmsubstantial territory" of Yhe Waves, the 
repeated "if' in "A Haunted House, " then, represents what we are always, already 
haunted and somehow fi-amed by: "we are always already in... [and] of if' (VI, 
248); it is "not what I think, but what I livc through" (PP, xvi-xvii). This "cssential 
thing" corresponds with the "gigantie' region that Woolf never stopped questioning 
and struggled to grasp in words -a giant which lays at once the foundation for and is 
the integument of our acts of consciousness: "life is a luminous halo, a 
79 Mao, Solid Objects, 228. 
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semitransparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the 
end" (CD, 8). 
Interrelation and Separation: Dialectical Tensions in Ckanne's The 
Larre Bathers and WoolPs The Waves 
Various critics have approached Woolf s exploration of human consciousness in The 
Waves from a psychological perspective. In Worlds in Consciousness: Mythopoetic 
Thought in the Novels of Virginia Wootf (1970), Jean 0. Love remarks that The 
Waves is the only of Woolf's works in which "truly reflective consciousness" and 
"dialectic" is present and locates the concept of "primordial consciousness" within 
what she calls a "mythopoetic" style, approaching this "by means of a theoretical 
system derived from developmental cognitive psychology. "80 In a similar manner, 
Robert Humphrey combines Woolf s work with typical psychological concerns, 
calling The Waves "a presentation of the purest psychological analysis in 
,, 81 literature. Jean Guiguet too emphasizes the "interior monologue" of Woolf s 
speakers, claiming that "everything is turned inward" in The Waves, suspending the 
"external elements" of an "objective universe" that appeared in Mrs. Dalloway and 
To the Lighthouse. 82 More recently, Mark Hussey has argued that what he sees as the 
"aesthetic failure' of The Waves "is partly due to its inwardnesS.,, 83 
so Love, Worlds in Consciousness, 200, xi. 
81 Humphrey, Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel, 14. 
82 Guigueý Virginia WooýCand Her Works, 379. 
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It seems to me, however, that the expressions of Woolf s six voices have 
more to do with the phenomenology of immediate perception than depth psychology, 
more with the phenomenological relation between perceiver and world than with the 
purely inward thoughts of each perceiver. It looks as if Woolf's voices turn inward 
only to discover that they cannot escape being pulled out by a world within which 
they are already immersed as carnal beings. 
The radical changes of "human relations" (WE, 7 1) which took place during 
the Modernist period were marked by what Stephen Kern has described as "both a 
greater interpenetration and a greater separation7 between "dialectically related 
pairs" such as the individual and the public, difference and similarity. 84 Similarly, in 
The Waves, Woolf applies equal importance to internal and external elements. Inside 
and outside, essence and fact both interpenetrate and separate, creating a constantly 
rippling whole very much like waves in a sea. This viewpoint is not unlike that of 
Anna Snaith, who in her recent study about the "Public and Private Negotiations" in 
Woolf s works argues that Woolf s specific "technique" of discourse "neither unites 
or separates the public and private realms; rather, it places them in a dialectical 
,, 85 relation. Similarly, Tamar Katz has stressed that the speakers in Yhe Waves are "at 
once distanced from and formed by culture" and that Yhe Waves as "an epitome of 
,, 86 modernism, " is "bound" to this fonn of "doubleness. Unlike these critics, 
133 Hussey, The Singing ofthe Real World, 82,87,8 8. 
84 Kem, The Culture of Time and Space, 191. 
85 Snaith, Virginia Wooy' Public andPWvate Negotiations, 69. 
86 Katz "Modernism, Subjectivity, and Narrative Form: Abstraction in The Waves, " 235, 
248. Pamela L. Caughie offers a point not unlike Katz's when claiming that Woolf "enact[s] a way of 
thinking about and responding to narrative discourse that considers different ways of relating things 
rather than the distinction between two things. " See Caughie, Virginia Wooýf & Postmodernism, xii. 
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however, my project interprets Woolf s configuration of this dialectic and duality in 
a philosophical context, locating her thought within a continuum of what I claim is a 
Modernist attention to the Husserlian "thing itself' (Ideas, 66), uncovering the 
paradoxical relation between the individual and the world through the reduction: 
"How is it that I am both a subject experiencing the world and an object within the 
world? "87 
Offering a comparative analysis of Uzanne's painting The Large Bathers 
(1906; Figure 1) and Woolf s "play-poem" The Waves, in what follows I have tried 
to indicate how Uzanne and Woolf through different media evidence the above 
88 
mentioned dialectical tensions between Modem man and his world. When Uzanne 
in a letter to his son wrote: "it is all a question of putting in as much interrelation as 
possible, " he spoke of incorporating, in his art, not only the "interrelation" between 
himself and his object-world, but also the "interrelation" between objects . 
89 He 
explained this to Joachim Gasquet: "Those glasses and plates are talking to each 
other, endlessly exchanging secrets ... They do not stop living ... They spread 
imperceptibly around each other, through intimate reflections, as we do through 
glances and words. " 90 Virginia Woolf first spotted the unusual liveliness of 
Uzanne's objects when in April 1918 she first laid eyes on one of his still lifes with 
apples. In a diary entry she wrote: "There are 6 apples in the Uzanne picture. What 
97 Mark Kingswell, "Husserl's Sense of Wonder, " The Philosophical Forum 3 1, no. I 
(Spring 2000): 102,99. For another illuminating explanation of this paradoxical relation between 
subject and object-world, see Brough, "Art and Artworld. " 
8' Uzanne painted three different versions of The Large Bathers, two of which are in the 
Barnes Collection, Pennsylvania, and the National Gallery, London, respectively. In my discussion I 
will be referring to the last 1906 version, which is now in the Philadelphia Museum of Art. 
89 Paul Cizanne, Cizanne's Letters, 323. 
90 Cahn, Paul Cizanne, 71. 
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can 6 apples not be? I began to wonder. Theres their relationship to each other, & 
their colour, & their solidity" (Diary 1,140). 91 In her own work, Woolf too suggests 
that there are no things in themselves but only phenomena constituted through 
specific relations. The six voices in The Waves interrelate, transform, and at times 
disappear into each other, approximating to what Merleau-Ponty terms 
"Pintermonde, " revealing our common world of "flesh, " an "intermundane space 
where our gazes cross and our perceptions overlap" (VI, 48). In once again using 
Merleau-Ponty's speculations as a tool to articulate the dialectical tensions between 
subject and world, part and whole, perceiver and perceived, I hope to clarify the 
phenomomenological nature of Uzanne's and Woolf's aesthetic concerns. 
Landscapes ofReduction: Part and fMole 
We have seen that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology seeks to uncover the genesis of 
perception - he calls it "the lived perspective, that which we actually perceive" 
("Doubt, " 14) - and to describe how this experience bears on the formation of 
linguistic and conceptual meaning. I would like to demonstrate how both Uzanne 
and Woolf sought to lay bare this tension between perception and conception; both 
wanted to trace the genesis and the process of creative production. 
For Merleau-Ponty the roots of our habitual world are found in primordial 
ideas, not of how phenomena appear to pure consciousness, as Husserl set out to 
show, but of how they appear to the embodied subject. Only by enacting the 
91 In a 1918 letter Woolf reflected on the same apples: "They are really very superb. The 
longer one looks the larger and heavier and greener and redder they become" (Woolf, Letters, 230). 
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reduction, by "bracketing" what we, according to habit, believe to be real, can we 
return to a zero-point of perception, to what the philosopher calls "re-achieving a 
direct and primitive contact with the world" (PP, vii). Merleau-Ponty found in 
Uzanne's painting an example of the reduction. "C6zanne's painting suspends 
habits of thought, " he writes in "CLanne's Doubt, " "and reveals the base of 
inhuman nature upon which man has installed himself' C'Doubt, " 16). When 
clarifying how Cezanne's canvasses suspend the familiar, uncovering our "wild" and 
primitive ground of existence, the philosopher must have had in mind The Large 
Bathers: 
Nature itself is stripped of the attributes which make it ready for 
animistic communions: there is no wind in the landscape, no 
movement in the Lac d'Annecy; the frozen objects hesitate as at the 
beginning of the world. It is an unfamiliar world ... ("Doubt, " 16) 
Now consider the following passage from the first holograph draft of The Waves: 
this is the beginning ... birds have sung and; & the ... spiders webs 
have been lit by starlight ... The blank ... of profound night has cleared 
little by little. On this white space first the trees have shown, 
ponderous with mist. And then the sea, moving, has shown truly 
distinct from the fields. (HD, 6) 
This early draft shows us Woolf s thoughts about a "fresh philosophy" (HD, 758), or 
what in "On Being III" she calls a "new language ... more primitive, more sensual, 
more obscene, " a fresh language which stems from a place which is as unfamiliar 
and frozen as Uzanne's stripped landscape: "There is a virgin forest in each; a 
snowfield where even the print of birds' feet is unknown7' (CD, 45,46). The 
untroddcn and cold landscapes of Woolf and C6zannc arc landscapes of reduction, 
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laying bare the preliminary phase of creative production. A "new" and "more 
primitive" language presupposes the reduction: a "stripped, " "white space, " a blank 
page or zero-point. Each by means of a different medium, the painter and writer 
sought to re-create a language of "the beginning, " using paint and words to 
communicate the pre-communicative, which is, nevertheless, the source of creativity. 
As Cezanne was, in his own words, "germinating" ("Doubt, " 17) with his 
obj ect-world, he traced the growth of his own creation. In Still Life With Apples 
(1893 -94; Figure 2), he gives form to a slanting table, vessels and ftuit that do not 
seem accurately elliptical. The surface is characteristically distorted: the famous 
apples seem too solid to balance on the tilting plate; they almost roll out of the 
picture surface and yet we cannot reach them. The tilting and unusually lively objects 
bring into focus the immediate nature of perceptual experience before our knowledge 
of gravity and geometry begins to order it. Challenging our usual way of looking, the 
painting enacts the reduction, returning us to the "lived perspective" C'Doubt, " 14) 
from which Uzanne painted: "I paint as I see as I feel, " he said. 92 
Like his apples and vessels, Uzanne's people are stripped of the 
characteristics of the ordinary. The figures in the portraits Portrait ofMme Cizanne 
in a Red Dress (1890-94; Figure 3), Old Woman with a Rosary (c. 1896; Figure 4), 
Woman with a Coffee-Pot (c. 1893-95; Figure 5), and Boy with Skull (1896-98; 
Figure 6) appear to stare into nothingness in a dream-like manner. The gazes of these 
strange people are stiffened; their lips are tightened; their expressions are completely 
Uzanne as quoted in Stephen F. Eisenman, Nineteenth Century Art. A Critical History 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1994), 343. 
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arrested. These figures, too, "hesitate as at the beginning of the world" CDoubt, " 
16), a "pre-world" (PP, 322), which is still silent and timelesS. 93 
"(T)ime shall be utterly obliterated, " Woolf wrote in a diary entry on The 
Waves. Like Uzanne, she was concerned with the process of creative production: "I 
want to watch & see how the idea at first occurs. I want to trace my own process" 
(Diary 3,118,113). Throughout Woolf's work, the pre-communicative dimension of 
experience - "a zone of silence" - is ever-present as the source of this first idea. "The 
artists themselves live in if' (CE 2,23 6), she claims. The six essences that constitute 
The Waves certainly "live in it. " Like Cezanne's strange fruit and inanimate people, 
the voices of Bernard, Rhoda, Louis, Neville, Susan and Jinny operate on the basis of 
the reduction. Woolf has realized her "new... more primitive" language through a 
series of "suspended present tense'994 soliloquies, realising the "new... more 
primitive" language that she spoke of in "On Being Ill. " This form of speech 
suspends the habitual, puts out of play usual references to time and place and 
registers only the immediate, creating an ongoing stream of fresh zero-points: "I 
flutter. I ripple. I stream like a plant in the river" (W, 83). In Woolf s 
phenomenological pre-world "the normal is abolished" (W, 97), exposing a stranger, 
more primordial viewpoint as the condition for expression and creative production 
alike. What is attempted, in other words, is an epocM Through a phenomenological 
shift of standpoint, Woolf leads us away from factuality and objectivity - that which 
93 Meyer Schapiro makes a point not unlike that of Merleau-Ponty when claiming that 
Uzanne's fi-uit and vessels imply a "still unordered world. " The fruit, he argues, "is not yet fully part 
of human life. " See Schapiro, "Me Apples of Uzanne: An Essay on the Meaning of Still Life, " in 
Modern Art: Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. (New York: George Braziller, 1978), 25. 
94 For this terminology I am indebted to Stephen J. Miko, who perceptively remarks that the 
"suspended present tense" of Woolf s six voices "seems to reduce existence to a moment perpetually, to 
collapse both past and future without giving up consciousness of both past and future. " See Miko , "Reflections on The Waves, " 69. 
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she in "A Mark on the Wall" calls "the surface, with its hard separate facte' (SS, 5 5) 
- and back to the primal ground of experience. She suspends our preconceptions 
about what a novel ought to look like to recover a more original image of "reality, this, 
the essential thing" (CD, 7) obscured by"the cotton wool of daily life" (MB, 72). 
We have seen that Gertrude Stein once praised Uzanne for showing that "in 
composition ... [e]ach part is as important as the whole. " We have also seen that 
phenomenology applies a similarly equal importance to the part and the whole. The 
"reduction is ironically a protest against reductionism, " stresses Max van Manen. 95 
Rather than reducing our vision to an introspective and partial one, thus rejecting the 
ordinary, it refers to a mere change of outlook. The method of reduction should not 
be taken as a rejection of the world as we know it, but as a fresh starting-point from 
which to see the depth of our involvement with it. In phenomenology, then, the part 
is highlighted but only to provide a clear view of its relationship with the whole 
frame within which it exists, which includes other things and other people. 
At every point this equal balance between part and whole, single unit and 
frame, can be detected within the frames of The Large Bathers and Yhe Waves. 
Whereas the aim of the Impressionists (Monet, Seurat, Renoir) had been to grasp the 
immediacy of the fleeting impression, Paul Uzanne wished "to make of 
Impressionism something solid, like the art in the museums, " that is to say, to find a 
balance between the broken and the solid, the fleeting and the tangible. 96 Likewise 
Woolf s writing demonstrates a fine balance between pairs of opposites. Just as Lily 
Briscoe in To the Lighthouse senses that the "feathery and evanescent' 'surface of her 
95 See Manen, http: H www. phenomenologyonline. com/inquiry/lO. htrrA. 
96 Uzanne as quoted in Eisemnan, Nineteenth Century Art, 345. 
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painting is "clamped together with bolts of iron7' (L, 23 1), so does Louis in Yhe 
Waves see through the impressionistic "mist' 'edging his surface world of moments 
to reach "some hardness at the centre" (W, 26). 
In Uzanne's The Large Bathers, the natural setting of sky, water and slanting 
trees create the painting's framework, and in Woolf s The Waves, the soliloquizing 
voices are framed and balanced by the rising and setting of the sun, the continual 
breaking of the waves, and the singing of birds. These fraineworks indicate the 
cyclical pattern of nature: perpetual difference within a horizon of similarity, 
accentuating at once the aspect and the whole, surface and depth, feathery 
evanescence and iron, impressionistic mist and solidity. 
Cezanne's concern with "putting in as much interrelation as possible" turns 
our attention not to things in themselves but to the spaces between them: the spaces 
between vessels and fruit, bodies and trees, clouds and sky. Woolf s Mrs Dalloway 
and To the Lighthouse demonstrate similar concerns, anticipating a theme that would 
come to "saturate" The Waves completely (Diary 1,209). In Mrs. Dalloway Clarissa 
ponders on the "the ebb and flow of things": 
here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, she 
being part, she was positive, of the trees at home; of the house there, 
ugly, rambling, all to bits and pieces as it was, part of the people she 
had never met; being laid out like a mist between the people she knew 
best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees lift the 
mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself. 
(MD, 10.11; italics mine) 
The "mist betweeW' things that Clarissa refers to can, I think, be described as another 
example of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenon of "flesh, " that unperceived and misty 
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divergence within being from which self, other and world arise in mutual and 
reciprocal relations: "this flesh of my body is shared by the world" (VI, 249). The 
"mist" links the prosperous Clarissa with the poor and poetic Septimus, in the eyes 
of whom all conventional interests are "bracketed, " leaving the world exposed as 
phenomenon, making him see clearly that "the whole world is a work of art; that we 
are parts of the work of art" (MB, 72). Septimus's attention is centred only on the 
"mist betweeW' things: 
leaves were alive; trees were alive ... The sparrows fluttering, rising, 
and falling in jagged fountains were part of the pattern; the white and 
blue, barred with black branches. Sounds made harmonies with 
premeditation; the spaces between them were as significant as the 
sounds. (MD, 28) 
The fact that Septimus sees clearly the essential "pattern" of things connects him 
directly with Woolf s "pattern, " which is "hidden behind the cotton wool of daily 
life" (MB, 72). Woolf s "patterre' finds its philosophical counterpart in Merleau- 
Ponty's "invisible inner framework" (VI, 215) of the visible. Wholeness of this 
pattern depends on the "spaces between" things, that is to say, the relations between 
the visible and the invisible, sound and silence, speech and the "mute perception" 
(VI, 155) of the perceiving body. In To the Lighthouse Lily Briscoe, a painter and, 
like Uzanne, a practical phenomenologist, underscores this idea: "The question was 
of some relation between those masses" (L, 200). 
This invisible "pattern" of our existence, the betweenness of things, is 
brought into focus in The Large Bathers and The Waves. Uzanne's nude bathers are, 
even more so than his earlier people, strange and abstract figures. The brown hair and 
far from sensual but rather plant-like shapes of these slanting women, each of whom 
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seems enclosed within a space of her own, mirror the equally brown and slanting tree 
97 
trunks that fi-ame their space. The scene accentuates at once separation and 
interrelation between the natural and the human. Cezanne's plant-like women remind 
us of that moment in Yhe Waves when Louis intertwines with and becomes 
inseparable from the object he intends: "I hold a stalk in my hand. I am the stalk. My 
roots go down to the depths of the world, through earth dry with brick ... I am all 
fibre" (W, 7). Similar phenomenological moments of entwining occur in To the 
Lighthouse and Mrs Dalloway. Whereas Mrs Ramsay "often found herself sitting, 
and looking with her work in her hands until she became the things looked at - that 
light for example, " (L, 68), Septimus does not meditate on becoming the tree towards 
which his eyes are directed, he already is the tree: "when the branch stretched he, too, 
made that statement" (MD, 28). In other words, be is "the words; ... the music; ... 
the thing itself' (MB, 72). 
In his reading of The Large Bathers, T. J. Clark draws particular attention to 
what he calls the "double figure" at the right side of the painting: the bodies of two 
women merge and seem to disappear into each other; it looks as though the one's 
shoulders become the other's buttocks and vice versa. 98 Like Bernard in The Waves, 
these interweaving figures seem to wonder: "Who am I? ... Am I all of them? Am 
I 
one and distinct? I do not know" (W, 240-41). Again Merleau-Ponty beautifully 
articulates these concerns with mutuality and reversibility: 
97For this insight I am indebted to Uhike Becks-Malomy's comnient that the "The figures are 
also aligned in the same way as the trees. .. The women are self-absorbed; they exist only for 
themselves. " See Becks-Malorny, Paul Cgzanne 1839-1906: Pioneer ofModernism, trans. Phil 
Goddard in association with First Edition Translations Ltd. (Kf)ln: Taschen, 2001), 88. 
98 T. J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodesfrom a History ofModernism. (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1999), 157. 
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The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is seen. That 
which looks at all things can also look at itself and recognize, in what 
it sees, the "other side" of its power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it 
touches itself touching; it is visible and sensitive for itself. ... Visible 
and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is caught up in the 
fabric of the world and its cohesion is that of a thing. ... the world is 
made of the same stuff as the body. (Primacy, 162-163) 
The reversibility of the seeing and the seen takes place within what Merleau-Ponty 
terms the "interworld (Vintermonde), " exposing our common world of "flesh, " an 
"intermundane space... where our gazes cross and our perceptions overlap. " (VI, 
48). Within this crossover space, the perceiving and the perceived, the subjective and 
the objective intertwine, marking both difference and similarity. It is here that vessels 
and fruit "exchang[e] secrets, " as C6zanne pointed out, and where nude bodies seem 
more plant-like than human. 99 The body, Merleau-Ponty tells us, has a twofold being 
that locates it at once apart from other sensible beings as a seeing/touching subject 
and among them as a seen/touched "thing"; it is at once distanced from and 
intertwined with experience. Thus, the whole world is a mutually intended world of 
seeing/seen, touching/touched bodies. We are all caught up in the "flesh of the 
world" as active/passive beings: "visible-seer[s]" (VI, 260,262). This is also 
"Cezanne's enigma! ': "Man absent from but entirely within the landscape"100 and 
what I have called the paradox of the "eye/I. " The individual is at once a seeing 
"eye, " projecting his/her vision into the world but is, at the same time a passive "1, " a 
99 For a careful examination of this "exchange" of space, see Prendeville, "Merleau-Ponty, 
Realism and Painting. " 
100 Deleuze and Guaffari, Hat is Philosophy?, 169. 
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component within a horizon of continuity. By reflecting and imposing meaning upon 
the world, we separate ourselves from it, and yet we are integral parts of the same 
world. 
This paradox of the "eye/I" is, or so I argue, key to the wave-like movements 
of Yhe Waves. Although each of the book's six speakers repeatedly tries to impose 
imaginative order upon a world of flux - "We... stride not into chaos, but into a 
world that our own force can subjugate and make part of the illumined and 
everlasting road" (W, 120) -, they are all integral parts of the same world and "made 
of the same stuff': "we melt into each other with phrases. We are edged with mist. " 
(W, 11). Thus, as "life comes; life goes" (W, 145), Woolfs six free variations of the 
artist's mind - that of the "lady writing" (W, 12) - vacillate between interrelation and 
separation; between the need for community and the need to be private selves. While 
"[o]utside the undifferentiated forces roar, " the six essences contract like waves and 
look "inside [where] [they] are very private, very explicit" (W, 213), but only to be 
pulled back into the upsurge of the visible world. Hence the play-poem's continual 
wave-like movements of reduction and expansion: 
The mind grows rings; the identity becomes robust; pain is absorbed 
in growth. Opening and shutting, shutting and opening, with 
increasing hum and sturdiness, the haste and fever of youth are drawn 
into service until the whole being seems to expand in and out like the 
mainspring of a clock. (W, 215) 
To sum up, Uzanne's bathing bodies - the double figure in particular - and 
the perpetually "shutting and opening" body of Woolf's six figures lay bare a 
paradox of experience, which is central to the creative artist. The world that the artist 
tries to arrest in language or paint is, simultaneously, the frame of continuity and 
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change within which he/she is rooted as a carnal being. Thus the tensions between 
bodies and frameworks in Yhe Large Bathers and The Waves, bringing about a 
balanced shifting between part and whole, surface and depth, the fleeting and the 
tangible, attempting to "make of Impressionism something solid. " 
As pointed out by critics, when looking carefully, the middle of Cezanne's 
The Large Bathers reveals the face of a woman. 101 Her eyes are hidden in the sky, 
the water's edge forms her mouth, and the slanting trees constitute her hair. While 
mirroring the mirror-relation between bodies and trees, the sky too approaches the 
human, once again stressing the mutuality of body and world. Once this face is 
spotted it returns our gaze, drawing us into the painting and yet pushing us away, 
giving us the feeling of being "visible-seers. " In a similar manner, Woolf s The 
Waves makes us aware of our self-reflexivity. Our being conscious of the "lady 
between the two long windows, writing" (W, 12), a figure of the writer as a hidden 
and yet active force inside the text, calls attention to "that which we actually 
perceive" ("Doubt, " 14), making us reflect on our own activity of reading. Thus, 
Merleau-Ponty's "intermundane space ... where our gazes cross and our perceptions 
overlap" is also the space at which our eyes are directed: the picture surface and the 
page of the book. In other words, in our experience of looking or reading, we too 
experience the reduction. Uzanne's face in the sky and Woolf s hidden lady 
"bracket" the expected and bring into focus the particular phenomena to which we 
are oriented. As Woolf writes in ... The Moment: Summer's Nighf': "One becomes 
aware that we are spectators and also passive participants in a pageanf'(CE 2,293). 
101 Sidney Geist calls C6zanne's hidden finages such as the face in the sky "cryptomorphs. " 
See Geist, Interpreting Cizanne (Harvard University Press, 1988), 1-2. For another insightful 
discussion of C6zanne's hidden irnages, see Joyce Medina, Cizanne and Modernism: The Poetics of 
Painting (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995). 
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As readers we are, at once, active "spectators, " projecting our own visions into the 
work, and "passive participants, " components within a horizon; parts of the whole 
work of art. 
If, as Stein wrote about Uzanne's mode of composition, "[e]ach part is as 
important as the whole, " then, the viewer or reader's viewpoint is an integral part of 
the composition's landscape. Woolf reminds us of this in "How Should One Read a 
BooW': "[d]o not dictate to your author, try to become him. Be his fellow-worker and 
accomplice" (CD, 60). Writer/Painter, reader/viewer and text/painting: each is an 
essential part of the artwork's making and re-making. Hence Bernard in The Waves: 
"to be myself (I note) I need the illumination of other people's eyes" (W, 95); "1 am 
made and remade continually. Different people draw different words from me" (TW, 
109). Not only does he refer to the eyes of Louis, Neville, Susan, Jinny, and Rhoda, 
with whom he is "many-sided" (W, 95) but also to the eyes of his readers. Just as 
Uzanne, during the process of painting, was "germinating" ("Doubt", 17) with his 
landscape, we are, "germinating" with the painting and book, as it were. By making 
the transition from the aspect to the whole, from the "mist" edging the surface of 
these works to the "bolts of iron" beneath, we help "make of Impressionism 
something solid. " 
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VI. The Creative Evej: Be2innin2 A2ain 
What emerges from my discussion in the previous section is that Woolf s "play- 
poem" The Waves is neither a work of "at dead ends" (Koestler), nor a product of 
"aesthetic failure, " which "does not allow for the participation of the reader" 
(Hussey). What I hope to have clarified is that the speakers' and readers' constant 
enactment of the reduction lies central to the wave-like movements of Woolf's work. 
The reader's participation is never rejected; rather, the reader and the read, like the 
part and the whole of Stein's Uzannian composition, are placed in a dialectical 
relation. 
"Everything begins with the reduction, " Kevin Hart writes, "but never so that 
it escapes the trial of beginning again and again. "102 Here Hart takes his bearings 
from Merleau-Ponty: "The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is 
the impossibility of a complete reduction. " (PP, xiv) and yet the philosopher 
stresses: "the unfinished nature of phenomenology and the inchoative atmosphere 
which has surrounded it are not to be taken as a sign of failure' (PP, xxi); rather, "it 
is as painstaking as the work of Balzac, Proust, Val6ry or Uzanne - by reason of the 
same kind of attentiveness and wonder, the same demand for awareness, the same 
will to seize the meaning of the world or of history as that meaning comes into being 
fDD 
k, vx-, xxi). The impossibility of reduction, leading to the phenomenologist's perpetual 
beginning should not be taken as a sign of futility but as a constant reminder of the 
pre-reflective dimension of experience - the "first philosophy" embedded within 
daily life - from which meaning and relations arise. This incompleteness is given a 
102 Hart, "ne Experience of Poetry, " 289. 
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dialectical placement in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy: it is a continual point of 
departure and point of return for his phenomenological and aesthetic concerns and 
explains his thinkines underlying pattern of separation and interrelation, distance 
and closeness. 
It should be clear from what I have already demonstrated that similar 
dialectical concerns pervade Woolf s writings. Her intention with The Waves was "to 
give the moment whole, whatever it includes. " (Diary 3,209). Using the epochi as 
my guiding tool, I have shown that what "give(s] the moment whole" in her work is 
her awareness of the totality of the visible and the invisible, the "voice" of the 
spoken and unspoken dimensions of experience. Knowing that the reduction is "not 
only a research method, " as Max van Manen taught us, but that "it is also a 
phenomenological attitude that must be adopted by anyone who wishes to participate 
in the questions that a certain project pursues, "103 I have also clarified the way in 
which the reader's participation is a necessary part of the whole of Woolf's 
Modernist composition. 
The sense of wholeness Woolf desires, however, never lasts. Her "moments 
of being, " disentangled from behind the bracketed "cotton wool" of daily life, 
revealing how "we are the music, we are the thing itself' always break - "There - 
snap" (CE 2,296) - and teach us a phenomenological lesson, which Merleau-Ponty 
articulates beautifully: 
If the thing itself were reached, it would be from that moment 
arrayed before us and stripped of its mystery. It would cease to 
exist as a thing at the very moment when we thought to possess 
103 See Manen, http: fl www. phenomenologyonline. conVinquiry/lO. htil. 
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it. What makes the "reality" of the thing is therefore precisely 
what snatches it from our grasp. 
(P. P, 233) 
This is the "fate of perception. "104 As soon as the invisible and unsayable - that 
which Jean Wahl in his letter to Stevens speaks of as the "a priori. .. the 
unapproachable" - has been expressed in language, the perceiver's initial state of 
wonder at the object, the "thing itself, " will have vanished. I would like to finish this 
chapter by showing that this impossibility of complete reduction offers a clue to the 
scnsc of inconclusivcncss and rc-bcginning that Woolf s works givc us. 
In The Waves, Bernard, Woolfs surrogate writing self, creates his own 
separate order through phrases, imaginary "rings" of unity, recalling the "ring" of his 
first perception. However, he is aware that his phrases are make-believe, fictive 
"bubbles" (W, 94), which are bound to snap. Just as the swarming mind in "The 
Mark on the Wall" speaks of language as an "old game of self-preservation" (SS, 59), 
Bernard knows that his phrases are a mere shelter, a "perpetual illusion" (W, 214), 
which can never completely grasp "the thing itself. " Neville underscores this when 
exclaiming: "Speech is false" (W, 113). Despite the fact that each of Woolf's creative 
beings attempts to order the perceived, "there is no stability in this world" (W, 96), 
for "[o]ne cannot live outside the machine for more perhaps than half an hour" (W, 
127), this "machine" being "the stream ... of life itself, " always "going oif'(Diary 
3,229), to which the subject is always, already related. 
Bernard longs for a "little language" exactly because he cannot grasp in 
words the essential truth, the "thing itself, " that he is looking for: "I have made up 
104 1 have borrowed the term "fate of perception7 from Geoff Ward, Statutes ofLibeny: The 
New York School ofPoets (London: The Macmillan Press, 1993), 15 6 
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thousands of stories; I have filled innumerable note-books with phrases to be used 
when I have found the true story, the one story to which all these phrases refer. But I 
have never yet found that story" (W, 156). Although he yearns to express a more 
primordial vision of the world, such expression, paradoxically, relies on the virtues 
of a language that is always, already a belated version of this vision: ... But how 
describe the world seen without a self? " asks Bemard (W, 239); how to describe the 
world as it is met with in immediate experience before it is processed by the self s 
critical objectivism? "There are no words, " Bernard answers (W, 239). There is, in 
other words, no point at which full reduction can be achieved. Hence, Bernard's final 
"summing up" remains "[a]n imperfect phrase" (W, 18 1). 
Central to the dialectical tensions between reduction and expansion, 
separation and interrelation in Yhe Waves lies the silent figure of Percival. This 
absent and yet always present figure is what Wallace Stevens would call "the central 
poem... the poem of the whole, / The poem of the composition of the whole" (CP, 
442); he "is and... / Is not and, therefore, is" (CP, 440). He is a metaphor for the 
essence of experience - the "thing itself'-, which can never be completely gasped in 
words but nevertheless remains the foundation for expression. It is 
through the death of Percival that Bernard rediscovers a more original vision of the 
"thing itself. " At the time of Percival's death, Bernard's own child is bom, making 
him sense the "two sides of [his] body" and wonder: ... Which is happiness? '. .. 
'Which is pain?... (W, 219). This double feeling adds to our understanding of the 
creative pattern of "perpetual beginning" that I am arguing for. It is relevant to my 
concern with the generative dimension of the creator's "marW' as a "navel, " a fissure 
which simultaneously joins and divides, at once signifying a bond with the "ground 
of pure pre-conceptual experience" (Ideas, 27) and a new opening for creativity. 
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Percival's death primarily leaves Bernard with a feeling of doubt, which 
brings us back to Lily's doubts about making her first "mark" after Mrs. Ramsay's 
death. Like Lily Briscoe's sense of "nakedness" when faced with the blank stare of 
her canvas, Bernard is overwhehned by a lack of creative ideas: "Nothing came, 
nothing. I cried then with a sudden conviction of complete desertion. Now there is 
nothing. No fin breaks the waste of this immeasurable sea7'(W, 237). This experience 
of doubt and despair, however, is combined with an experience of wonder and joy, 
making "the landscape return to [Bernard] ... but with this. difference" (W, 239). 
Recalling the opening of 'The Mark on the Wall, " which is set in "the middle of 
January" (SS, 53) and the "snowfield" of "On Being 11" (CD, 46), Bernard now 
moves about in a fresh "wintry landscape" (W, 238), a "new world, never trodden, " 
and "is unable to speak save in a child's words of one syllable" (W, 239). Much like 
the speaker in Stevens's "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon, " Bernard "[is] the world in 
which he walk[s]" and "fli]nd[s] [him]self more truly and more strange" (CP, 65). 
Once again the cycle of creativity is displayed as a world that the protagonist can 
walk through. Just as the death of Mrs. Rainsay triggered Lily's epoche, leading to 
the clarity of her creative vision, so does the combined experience of death and birth 
leave Bernard feeling like a latter-day Adam in a new world, overwhelming him by 
phenomenological wonder "as on the first day of creation" (W, 220). Recalling the 
wonder in the face of objects that pervade the children's first perceptions in the 
opening scene of Woolf's "play-poem, " Bernard's vision briefly coincides with that 
of his latent child-self, conveying a sense of a new beginning: "So I went out. I saw 
the first morning he would never see - the sparrows were like toys dangled from a 
string by a child. To see without attachment, from the outside, and to realize their 
beauty in itself - how strartge! " (W, 220). Habituality is put out of play and the world 
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is exposed as phenomenon: "strangeness is exposed as the condition of possibility of 
the ordinary. "105 As the phrase maker's usual "shelter from phrases" (W, 239) are 
"bracketed, " he is now "perceiving merely" (W, 239) and has become what in "Street 
Haunting: A London Adventure" Woolf calls "a central oyster of perceptiveness, an 
enormous eycý'(CD, 71). Once again, the forrn of doubt that Woolf presents us with, 
then, "has its place in the realm of our perfect freedom" (Ideas, 107): doubt is not a 
dead end but a sign of openness to the world, leading to a new beginning, a "[d]awn. 
.. some sort of renewal... Another general awakening! 
' (W, 247). Like a practical 
phenomenologist, Woolf s creative mind is a "perpetual beginnee'(PP, xiv) who 
always returns to hisAher starting-point and always begins again from a zero-point of 
perception. 
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In a similar manner, we are presented with a new opening at the end of 
Woolf s short story "An Unwritten Novel. " Just a split second after this story's 
narrator realises, like Bernard, that there are in fact no stories, that "Life's bare as a 
bone, " the visible world "floats [her] afresh! " (SS, 36). The "white light"that 
illuminates the "carnations" and "chrysanthemums" (SS, 36) of this short story's end 
scene recalls the "chrysanthemums, " and the "light upon the page" (SS, 53) that 
opened "The Mark on the Wall. " Once again, the light and whiteness recall the 
creator's "never-resting mind, " to borrow from Stevens, and the blankness of the 
writer's fresh page. 
105 J. Butler, introduction to Yhe Erotic Bird, xv. 
106 For this point I am indebted to Jerrold Seigel who describes the "perpetual beginning" 
central to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as "a constant questioning and return to its own starting 
point. " See Seigel, "A Unique Way of Existing, " 479. 
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It is often from behind a window that the double vision of Woolf's creative 
selves unfolds, where the swarming mind moves into and yet self-consciously 
withdraws from its object. In the holograph drafts of Yhe Waves, the six children 
more than once see "a lady writing between two windows at a table" (HD, 16; italics 
mine). This window is indicative not only of the space between the creating artist 
and the world of broken objects -a space which is stated through the creative process 
- but also of the fine line between the "eye" and the "I, " the slanted stroke in the 
46eye/l, " as it were. The paradox of the eye/I pervades Woolf's work. While looking 
down upon the world "from an upper window, " the narrator in "A Room of One's 
Own" wonders how the human mind can both "separate itself from the people in the 
street, " and "think with other people... as, for instance, in a crowd. "(RO, 96). This 
brings us back to a moment in Mrs Dalloway where Clarissa "slice[s] like a knife 
through everything" but is "at the same time... outside, looking on" (MD, 10). It is 
also from behind a window that Mrs. Ramsay in To the Lighthouse moves into and 
yet self-consciously away from her object, the rhythmic, flashing light of the 
lighthouse, constantly sending signals from the island to the mainland through the 
"stream" of "life itself going on! '(Diary 3,228). The six essences in The Waves are, 
on the one hand, part of this surging stream, but are, on the other hand, above it, 
looking down from their dry "islands of lighf '(Diary 3,229). Just as the moth in the 
essay "The Death of the Moth, " which flutters about at "the bottom of the window- 
pane" (CD, 180) but fails to fly across it, symbolises the creative eye/I's 
simultaneous withdrawal from and connection with the world beyond its window, so 
do Woolfs moth-like essences fly about in endless circles of perpetual beginning, They 
"expand, contract and then expand again" (W, 76), perpetually oscillating between 
moving towards and withdrawing from the world. This movement of withdrawal and 
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return is, moreover, conveyed by their suspended present tense soliloquies, pulling 
us, the reader, in and then pushing us out. Much Like Lily Briscoe we are challenged 
to "[g]et that and start afresh, get that and start afresh" (L, 261) and become 
"perpetual beginners. " Just as Stein, in Toetry and Grammar, "' stresses that "writing 
should go on7CTG, " 130), implying that creative production is a part of the whole, 
that it corresponds with the continuity of the world within which we exist, so does 
Woolf point out in "Modem Fictioif ': ". .. all that we can do is keep on moving, now a 
little in this direction, now in that... It need scarcely be said that we make no claim to 
stand, even momentarily, upon the vantage ground" (CD, 5). 
What emerges from my discussion, then, is that the impossibility of the 
complete reduction, that is to say, the impossibility of fully grasping what Woolf 
calls "the thing itself' or "the essential thing, " should not to be taken as a "product of 
crisis" or a sign of futility. Rather, it offers a key to what I see as a phenomenological 
cycle of re-beginning, which never allows the reader to lose sight of the condition 
which underlies expression. Just as phenomenological beginning is co-present with 
the original instincts of the perceiving subject, so are beginnings in Woolf co-present 
with the primal perceptions of the creative mind. Beginnings are full of promise and 
the creator's only hope in a world of broken objects -a world of what Bernard calls 
"odds and ends, sticks and straws, detestable little bits of wreckage, flotsam and 
jetsam, floating on the oily surface" (W, 225). As Patrick McGee perceptively 
remarks, "Bernard's discourse is the fin of Yhe Waves: to exploit the bilingual pun in 
fin, it is lefin - the end, the aim, the conclusion! "07 - an end which can, however, 
never offer closure but only a new opening. In order to find anew the meaning of a 
107 McGee, "Woolf s Other, " 242. 
120 
Modem world of rupture, this Modernist artist must get back to "the thing itself, " 
"the absolute ground of pure pre-conceptual experience" (Ideas, 27). Thus Bernard 
attempts to "state the space" between himself and the object, to "ne[t] [it] under with 
a sudden phrase" (W, 225), like a "fin7 can be netted in "a waste of waters" (W, 157): 
Fight! FightV. .. it is the effort and the struggle, it is the perpetual warfare, it is the 
shattering and piecing together - this is the daily battle, defeat or victory, the 
absorbing pursuit" (W, 225). Setting this fight against "the eternal renewal, the 
incessant rise and fall and fall and rise again! '(W, 247)" of a horizon of continuity, 
which is too "gigantic" to be fully "coax[ed] into words" (W, 175), Woolf directly 
expresses the rejection of finality and returns to her own point of departure - her own 
struggle to express the pre-linguistic "fin... far out. " 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE "SPLENDOUW'BENEATH THE CRACKS: 
GERTRUDE STEIN'S TENDER BUTTONS 
[Tjhis problem remained, how to express not the things seen in association 
but the things really seen, not the things interpreted but the things really 
known at the time ofknowing them. 
--Gertrude Stein, Picasso (36) 
1. The Dialectic of Tender Buttons 
Gertrude Stein may be regarded as one of the most innovative and obscure Modernist 
writers. At the core of Tender Buttons (1914), her most experimental work, lies a 
dialectical tension between meaning and non-meaning, order and disorder, sense and 
non-sense, the opacity of which some of the earliest critical studies of Stein 
described as both "an eloquent mistake" and "the ravings of a lunatic, " resisting 
interpretation! "That which is not recognizable is designated meaningless, " Nicola 
Pitchford explains in a more recent article, "a text unlike others is disliked. ý92 
I John Malcolm Brinnin and Max Eastman as quoted in Richard Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in 
Pieces (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 125. B. F. Skinner is another early critic who 
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The most common assumption in recent criticism is that Stein's opacity 
anticipates Post-Modem uncertainty, fragmentation of meaning and displacement of 
identity. In his 1974 essay "Gertrude Stein as Post-Modernist: The Rhetoric of 
Tender Buttons, " Neil Schmitz claims that the "stuttering discourse of [Stein's] 
experimental portraite' anticipates the "continuous present" used by the sixties 
writers Alain Robbe-Grillet and William Burroughs, which would "releas[e] their 
subject from the unities of plot and character, " and John BartIfs "Beckett-like 
soliloquies" of "agonized isolation, " respectively. He thus sets "the elusiveness of 
[Stein's] style" within a context of "contemporary narrative" that he labels "Post- 
,, 3 Modem. Similarly, in Yhe Poetics oflndeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage (1981), 
Maýorie Perloff places Tender Buttons in a category different from Modernism. 
Locating SteiWs obscurities within a genre of what she, using John Ashberiys 
terminology, calls the "Other Tradition" and defining this as "the mode of 
undecidability in twentieth century poetry, " spanning from Arthur Rimbaud to John 
Cage, Perloff argues: "Gertrude Stein's syntax enacts the gradually changing 
presence of human consciousness, the instability of emotion and thought. The gap 
between signifier and signified is repeatedly emphasized, a gap that leaves room for 
continuous 
claimed that Tender Buttons, which, in his eyes, was the outcome of Stein's experiments with 
automatic writing, was resistant to interpretation. See Skinner, "Has Gertrude Stein a Secret?, " 
Atlantic Monthly 153 (January 1934): 50-57; Carl van Vechten describes the typical resistance in 
Stein reception: "[Tender Buttons] was widely quoted and ridiculed by friends and enemies in the 
American Press. " See van Vechten, introductory comment to Tender Buttons, in Selected Writings of 
Gertrude Stein (New York: The Modem Library, 1962), 460. More recently David Lodge has claimed 
that Tender Buttons is an "inscrutable" piece of work, which stays outside of "the realm of meaningful 
communication, to an extent rare in Modernisrn. " Lodge as quoted in Nicola Pitchford, "Unlikely 
Modemisrn, Unlikely Postmodernism: Stein! s Tender Buttons, " American Literary History 11.4 
(Winter 1999): 652. 
2 Pitchford, "Unlikely Modernism, Unlikely Postmodernisrn, " 652. 
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verbal play. "4 In A Different Language: Stein's Experimental Writing (1983), 
Marianne DeKoven approaches Stein as an "experimental writer" along the lines of 
structuralist linguistics and especially gendered aspects of deconstructivist theory, 
covering the Post-Modem theories of Lacan, Derrida, and Kristeva. The "moving in 
and out of focus" of meaning in Tender Buttons, she argues, "functions anti- 
patriarchally, as presymbolic jouissance and as irreducibly, multiple, fragmented, 
open-ended articulation of lexical meaning. "5 More recently, in Curved Yhought and 
Textual Wandering (1992), Ellen E. Berry has defined this same "sense of a world 
going in and out of focus, of words becoming meaningful and then fading from 
meaning" as a "postmodern" "new aesthetics of fragmentation and textual 
,, 6 wandering. Similarly, in a 1998 article about what she calls the "linguistic 
exoticism and literary alienatiorf 'of Stein's Tender Buttons, Mena Mitrano remarks 
that "[t]he meanings the reader might detect rise, gain momentum, then drop one 
after the other in a sea of undecidability. tý7 
While each of these critics demonstrates an awareness of a dialectical tension 
between meaning and non-meaning, the ordered and the disordered in Stein's text, 
not one of them attempts an in-depth examination of the dialectic itself. This might 
have to do with the fact that Stein, as Cyrena Pondrorn perceptively remarks, 
3NeiI Schmitz, "Gertrude Stein as Post-Modemist: The Rhetoric of Tender Buttons, " Journal 
ofModern Literature 3 (1974): 1204,1203,1204. 
4 Maýorie Perloff, The Poetics ofIndeterminacy: Rimbaud to Cage (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), 33,44,98-99. 
5 Marianne DeKoven, A Different Language: Gertrude Stein's Experimental Writing 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983) 44,79. 
6 Ellen E. Berry, Curved Thought and Textual Wandering: Gertrude Stein's Post- 
Modernism (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992) 18,9. 
7 Mena Mitrano, "Linguistic Exoticism and Literary Alienation, " Modern Language Studies 
28.2 (1998): 89. 
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"recovers for us a dimension of experience routinely suppressed or concealed by the 
modes of discourse that give priority to consistency, order and coherence. "S 
Phenomenology brings to light exactly this concealed and usually invisible 
dimension of experience -a dimension that we hesitate to talk about because it seems 
beyond the power of words to talk about. This brings us back to Jean Wahl's letter to 
Wallace Stevens, referring to the Husserlian "enormous... a priori in our minds, an 
inexhaustible infinity of a priori .. the approach to the unapproachable" 
(OP, 194). 
In this chapter I hope to show that phenomenology offers the appropriate tool for 
breaking open the much-discussed dialectic of Tender Buttons. In drawing upon the 
phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty as well as the related thought of 
Gilles Deleuze, I hope to articulate more clearly the "unapproachable" and still 
unexplored dimension of Stein's work and, in continuation of my examination of 
Woolf s work, highlight a heretofore overlooked aspect of Modernist aesthetics at 
large. 
Whereas the Steinian critics above mentioned seek to isolate the genre of 
Tender Buttons in terms of its "Post-Modem", "indeterminate" or "uncertain" 
qualities, I would rather claim that this work, in a highly phenomenological manner, 
"restores wonder to the object, and in a quite specific sense. "9 In "Portraits and 
Repetition" Stein writes that her "business as an artisf 'is "not with where the car 
goes as it goes but with the movement inside that is the essence of its going" C'PR, " 
102). It is her business, in other words, not to present us with specific destination and 
result but to reveal the "how" of the destination. 10 The many objects that constitute 
8 Cyrena N. Pondrorn, "Gertrude Stein: From Outlaw to Classic, " Contemporary Literature 
27 (1986): 105,104,113. 
9 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, x 
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Tender Buttons are not written to reveal "this or that quality, " in the words of Judith 
Butler, "but rather the thatness of the thing - not what it is, its specific actuality in 
the world at this place and time, but that it is possible at all. "" Stein, like Woolf, was 
a great admirer of Paul Uzanne's painting and named him "the great master of the 
realization of the object itself. "12 Using phenomenology as my tool, I want to show 
that Stein, much like Uzanne, turns away from objectivism and places emphasis on 
the subject from which objects, names and clear expressions arise. Despite its 
baffling, "unordered" and "not resembling" (TB, 3) word combinations, it seems to 
me that the intention of Stein's dialectical logic is not to charge human 
consciousness with Post-Modem "agonized isolation" (Schmitz), "instability of 
emotion and thought" (Perloff) or "alienation" (Mitrano) but to reveal consciousness 
as the source of the meaning of our world of "Objects, " "Food, " and "Rooms. stU i 
thus wish to examine Stein's text as a constitution of the object through the 
perceptual act, which is what John Bamet Brough describes as "the product of 
human praxis... the accomplishment of a unique mode of intending subjectivity. 944 
Before turning to my reading of Tender Buttons, I must first establish the kinship of 
method and concern between phenomenology and Stein's mode of "composition. " 
10 Husserl as quoted in Brough, "Art and Artworld, " 30. Brough writes: ". .. the 
phenomenologist investigates, on the one hand, the subjective accomplishment through which we have 
a world and objects in it... and, on the other hand, the objects intended - not, however, 
'straightforwardly but rather as objects in respect to their 'how'. .. that is the 'how' of their manners 
of givenness" (30). 
11 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, x. 
12 Jayne Walker was the first critic to call attention to this statement from Steies unpublished 
writings. See Walker, The Making ofa Modernist. Gertrude Steinfrom Yhree Lives to Tender Buttons 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 3. 
13 The three parts that constitute Tender Buttons are titled "Objects, " "Food, " and "Rooms. " 
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11. Seein2 "a rine substance strangely": Epochj as Vision 
I have pointed out that Stein once praised Paul Uzanne for "conceiving the idea that 
in composition one thing is as important as another thing. Each part is as important 
as the whole" C71", 15). 1 have also stressed that phenomenology applies equal value 
to the part and the whole. What the reduction demonstrates is not a rejection of our 
habitual world but a fresh starting-point to re-explore the depth of our involvement 
with it. By adopting the phenomenological attitude through the operation of what 
Husserl called "bracketing, " the part is highlighted but only to provide a clear view 
of its implicit relation to the whole framework within which it exists. To illuminate 
how this adds to our understanding of Stein's work, let us recapitulae and briefly 
elaborate the movements of the reduction. 
Through the method of "bracketing" objectivity and factuality, the ipoche 
lays open the world's pre-givenness. This is what Husserl called the "misty horizon" 
(Ideas, 102) of experience, a terminology based on what William James, Gertrude 
Stein's teacher of experimental psychology, had called "fringe. "' 5 Bruce Wilshire 
adds to our understanding of this concept: 
I sit in my room not focally aware of anything outside it; but if I think of 
the room at all, I think of it as fringed: as having relationships to other 
rooms, places, and persons, as having a chimney above it and as having 
14 Brough, "Art and Artworld, " 32. 
15 For further details about James's influence on Stein, see Ronald Bartlett Levinson, 
"Gertrude Stein, William James and Grammar, " American Journal ofPsychology 54 (January 194 1): 
124-28; Allegra Stewart, "Quality of Gertrude Stein! s Creativity, " American Literature 28 (January 
1957): 488-506; Donald Sutherland, "The Elements, " in Gertrude Stein: A Biography ofHer Work 
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stairs leading to and from it. It is that general kind of thing. It is only 
when the horizon or fiinge determines expectations that are 
disappointed - only when I open the door and confront the abyss instead 
of stairs, or pick up the tea kettle and it flies up in my face - that I 
become focally aware of what was always on thehiargin. 16 
We have seen that Merleau-Ponty found in Uzanne's painting a paradigm for the 
epoche. Bracketing the habitual, in Cezanne's paintings "expectations" are 
"disappointed, " bringing into focus James's "fringe": "We live in the midst of man- 
made objects, among tools, in houses, streets, cities... We become used to thinking 
that all of this exists necessarily and unshakeably. Cezanne's painting suspends these 
habits of thought and reveals the base of inhuman nature upon which man has 
installed himself. " ("Doubt, " 16). Thus, by suspending habits and preconceptions, 
the task of the phenomenologist is to "[b]are all the roots, " as Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
and bring to light "the science of a pre-science... the expression of what is before 
expression and sustains itfrom behind" (VI, 169,167). What is recovered in 
phenomenology, then, is the non-focal "fringe'of our conventional ways of seeing, 
habits, acts and expression: the pre-scientific and pre-reflective dimension of 
experience upon which factuality and objectivity rest. 
Like William James's flying teakettle, exposing the non-focal "fringe' of 
perceptual experience, the tilting plates and rolling apples in Uzanne's still life 
paintings seem to move out of the picture surface. As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, Uzanne attempts an epochi, setting "out of action" the "thesis of the natural 
(New Haven, 195 1); 1-2 1; and Steven Meyer, "Writing Psychology Over: Gertrude Stein and William 
James, " The Yale Journal of Criticism 8, no. I (Spring 1995): 133-163. 
16 Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology, 122. 
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attitude" (Ideas, 108), that is, common sense and scientific notions about the world. 
Once again it is necessary to stress, however, that the habitual "thesie' is never 
rejected through this movement: "It still remains there like the bracketed in the 
bracket ... We can also say: The thesis 
is experience as lived (Erlebnis), but we 
make "no use" of it. . ." (Ideas, 108). In Uzanne's painting, gravity 
is bracketed: we 
are pushed off centre. Our usual "centre" still exists but is made "no use" of 
"Act so that there is no use in a centre" (TB, 43), Stein significantly 
commands in the opening line of "Rooms, " the third part of Tender Buttons. In this 
work too the expected is "disappointed. qi17 Evoking a reductive shift of attitude, this 
strange book also radically shifts our attention off centre. "What is the custom, the 
custom is in the centre, " (TB, 26) Stein tells us in "Breakfast" and usually "A Centre 
is in a Table" (TB, 15): in our daily, organised lives we unite and dine around tables. 
But although "A table means does it not my dear it means a whole steadiness. Is it 
likely that a change. A table means more than a glass ... it means 
it does mean that 
there has been a stand, a stand where it did shake" (TB, 15). Although we never 
forget that "the custom is in the centre, " the prose poems in "Objects, " "Food" and 
"Rooms" - the three parts of Tender Buttons - suspend the "steadiness" of daily 
habit, "shake" our expectations and trigger a "change" of standpoint. "[W]hy is not 
disturbing a centre no virtue" (TB, 49), Stein ponders in "Rooms. " Because it 
violates her belief in the pre-scientific C6zannian composition in which "[e]ach part 
is as important as the whole. " Likewise, in "A Piece of Coffee' Stein points out: "A 
17 Margueritte S. Murphy stresses a similar aspect of Stein's texts. She speaks of "the 
subversive aspects of these texts that work against the reader's expectations, and in some respects, 
against traditional modes of interpretation. " But whereas Murphy employs Bakhtinian dialogics to 
analyse Stein's "maltileveled subversion" and thereby shed light on the "lesbian subtexf' of her work, 
I am concerned with showing how Stein's phenomenological suspension of expectations, which, I 
argue, is tantamount to the shift of standpoint of reduction, is a key to articulate more clearly the 
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single image is not splendor" (TB, 5). Just as phenomenology offers a critique of a 
pre-conceived and freestanding reality, Stein criticises preconceived ideas about the 
composition of art. A "portrait" with a preconceived "centre, " giving way to "[a] 
single image, " would prevent the perceiver from experiencing the object in its 
"splendor. "18 
Thus, Stein leads us away from the particularities that are usually central to 
daily life - its "Objects", 'Tood" and "Rooms" - and back to the usually non-focal 
"fringe" of perceptual experience, away from usual modes of expression and back to 
a pre-structural form of expression before the habits of grammar take over, revealing 
"things seen not as one knows them but as they are when one sees them without 
remembering having looked at them" (Picasso, 15). 
What is usually done or seen is suspended in Stein's text: "rhere is no use at 
all in smell, in taste, in teeth, in toast, in anything" (TB, 2; italics mine). "So then the 
order... is it disappointine' (TB, 4), Stein asks her reader teasingly in "A Box. " The 
order disappoints and points away from our expectations of reality. But, as Stein 
promises us in "A Carafe that is a Blind Glass, " what we are left with is "not 
unordered in not resernbling7 (TB, 3) but rather "an arrangement in a system to 
pointing" (TB, 3). Intendo is Latin for the verb "to direct" and is best understood in 
the sense of directing or pointing one's attention at, which is the meaning of 
intentionality, the "starting-point and basis" (Ideas, 245) of phenomenology and, or 
so I argue, of the creative processes examined in this study. 19 In intentional 
dialectic of Tender Buttons. See Murphy, A Tradition ofSubversion: The Prose Poem in Englishfrom 
Wilde to Ashbery (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 139,149, and 7. 
" See section III of this chapter for a further analysis of Stein's notion of the "splendid. " 
19 The Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary, 72. 
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experience, "the subject 'directs' itself .. towards the intentional object' 
'(1deas, 
121). The shift of attitude occasioned by the reduction brings to light this 
directionality: all perception is perception of something. Similarly, all of Stein's 
"Objects, " "Food" and "Rooms" challenge us to re-direct our glance, to point it 
toward the essential structure of a visible world that we are used to taking for 
granted. The result is paradoxical. As the philosopher Maurice Natanson puts it in 
his study on Husserl: "The recognition of the familiar as a structure of experience 
creates a paradox: As soon as the familiar manifests itself as familiar, it is rendered 
strange. It is a bit like repeating a word over and over again... until it begins to 
sound peculiar and a noise replaces the word v12o Natanson's remark recalls Stein's 
line "Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose"' from the 1913 poem "Sacred Emily" (GP, 
187) and the last four lines of "Orange In" in the "Food" section of Tender Buttons: 
... only excreate, only excreate a no since. 
A no, a no since, a no since when, a no since when since, a no since 
when since a no since when since, a no since, a no since when since, 
a no since, a no, a no since a no since, a no since, a no since. 
(TB, 3 8) 
Thus each of Stein's "portraits" "excreate[s], " makes strange, and literally 
turns into non-sense Cno since") what is our usual sense. 21 What we are left with is 
what "A BO)C' calls "see[ing] a fine substance strangely" (TB, 4). Exposing what 
Judith Butler calls the "strangeness" that is "the condition of possibility of the 
20 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 14 1. 
21 Stein referred to the prose poems in Tender Buttons as "portraits": "And so I began again 
to do portraits but this time it was not portraits of men and women and children, it was portraits of 
anything and so I made portraits of rooms and food. .. " ("PW', 113). 
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ordinary, "22Stein's unfamiliar word combinations suspend the ordinary and emulate 
the extra-ordinary, pre-reflective dimension of experience from which our usual acts 
of naming and expression arise. Just as the "Nothing" that Wallace Stevens's "Snow 
Man" "beholds" (CP, 10) suggests not an end but an openness to the world, so does 
Stein's "no since", which, when repeated again and again, sounds like "non-sense, " 
refer not to an end but to a beginning of sense -a pre-reflective "first" sense of the 
thing seen. 
23 
The Cizannian Composition: Part and Whole 
Having suspended habituality and objectivity, the phenomenologist begins again. 
He/she becomes a "perpetual beginner" (PP, xiv) by examining his/her consciousness 
and realising that this is always directed toward some object; it is always 
consciousness of. The consciousness of and the object of consciousness fonn what 
Husserl called an "intentional unity"(1deas, 13 1) or "the Thing itself' (Ideas, 66). This 
'7hing itself' is not a thing but a relation: the intentional object only exists together 
with the subject side of the intentional structure. Thus the intending subject and 
his/her object-world require each other. Using Stein's description of C6zanne's mode 
of composition, "Each part is as important as the whole. " 
The reduction refers to what Husserl calls a "change of standpoint" (Ideas, 
13), that is to say, a change in our way of looking at the world. The aim of this 
change of attitude is not to achieve a reduced vision of experience. On the contrary, 
22 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xv. 
23 For a fin-ther examination of Stevens's poem "Ilie Snow Man" see chapter 4 of this study. 
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as Max van Manen stresses, "reduction is ironically a protest against 
reductioniSM.,, 24 Instead of reducing our vision to an introspective and partial one, it 
refers to "a new kind of practical outloole' (Crisis 1,169). The method of 
"bracketing, " then, should not be taken as a rejection of the world as we know it, but 
as a means towards a fresh starting-point from which to examine our relationship 
with the world. Through the operation of "bracketing, " the "parf' is highlighted but 
only to provide a clearer view of our involvement with the "whold" framework 
("fringe", "horizon) within which people and things exist in intentional relations. 
What phenomenology seeks to achieve is a better understanding of the relationship 
between the marginal and central, the invisible and visible, the pre-rcflcctive and 
reflective aspects of perceptual experience, only to see clearly how "[e]ach part is as 
important as the whole". 
Working back from this, it is my aim to show that the phenomenological 
reduction and its uncovering of the Jamesian "fringe, " the Husserlian "horizon" or 
Merleau-Ponty's "science of a pre-science, " allows us to articulate the insufficiently 
explored dialectic of Tender Buttons. Although Wendy Steiner, in Exact 
Resemblance to Exact Resemblance: The Literary Portraiture of Gertrude Stein 
(1978), notes that "[t]he influence of William James is probably the significant factor 
in any relation between Stein and the phenomenologists, since he is in part their 
, 925 - precursor, ' it seems odd that the related patterns between phenomenological 
24 Manen, http: // www. phenomenologyonline. conVinquiry/lO. html. 
25 Wendy Steiner, Exact Resemblance to Exact Resemblance: The Literary Portraiture of 
Gertrude Stein (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), 54. Likewise, Bruce Wilshire 
stresses James's influence on the phenomenologists and points out: ". .. it is startling that [James'] 
pioneering work in phenomenology and his influence on Husserl went without proper notice for 
seventy years and has only recently gained recognition7. Despite the fact that "James does not call his 
method phenomenological, " Wilshire writes, "his actual practice points in the direction of what 
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thought and SteiWs work are still an almost untrodden field in Steinian criticism. 
Susan E. Hawkins has noted but not examined the fact that Stein's Tender Buttons 
repeats "a kind of phenomenological moment in which consciousness meets (but 
does not process) perceptual reality. Reality is repetition; the perceiving subject 
,, 26 constantly re-enacts this moment. In 'Txsefrugter, " which I find one of the most 
illuminating articles on Stein's obscure work to date, the Danish critic Tania Orum. 
suggests that Tender Buttons challenges the reader to a "phenomenological-concrete 
interaction with the object. 9. )27 Elsewhere Orum perceptively remarks but leaves 
unexplored the fact that "the modernist form of writing could be described as a fonn 
of phenomenological reduction. " 21 My examination of Stein will focus on how 
Tender Buttons attempts such a reduction, exposing the pre-reflective dimension of 
perceptual experience. I will clarify how the "not resembling" (TB, 3) word 
combinations of this work are, in Merleau-Ponty's terminology, an "expression of 
what is before expression" (VI, 167), bringing to light the equality of the part and the 
whole; the intending subject and the object as intended; the marginal and the central; 
the usually invisible and visible aspects of perceptual experience. 
If "in composition one thing [is] as important as another thing, " the receiver 
of the composition should be as important as the creator and the creator's intention. 
Husserl later explicated. " See Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology 4 and 6; and Jayne L 
Walker notes that "Stein's years of study with William James enabled her to understand the striking 
'distortions' in Uzanne's paintings as faithful models of the multiple and fragmentary signs of 
immediate visual sensations. " Walker briefly refers to Merleau-Ponty after stressing James's influence 
on Stein but leaves unexplored the connections between Stein and phenomenology. Walker, The 
Making ofa Modernist, 11,9. 
26 Susan E. Hawkins, "Sneak Previews: Gertrude Steins Syntax in Tender Buttons; ' in 
Gertrude Stein and the Making ofLiterature, eds. Shirley Neuman and Ira D. Nadel (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: The Macmillan Press, 1988), 119. 
27 Tania Orurn "Lxsefi7ugter, " in Tcetpi Teksten, ed. Tania Orum (Kobenhavn: Museum 
Tusculanum, 1994), 49. All translations of the quoted passages from this article are mine. 
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Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology stresses that perception and creation alike are 
mobile activities, revealing the living experience of the embodied subject: 
"Philosophy is not the reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, like art, the act of 
bringing truth into being" (PP, xx). Hence the artwork - visual art or text - is never 
fixed but perpetually renewed in the space of the perceiver; it "undergoes a continual 
birth"; "at each instant it is something new" (Primacy, 6). What I want to stress is 
that the reader of Tender Buttons, like its creator, is a phenomenological "perpetual 
beginner, " faced with what Stein in "Composition as Explanation" refers to as 
"[b]eginning again and again [which] is a natural thing" C'CE", 23). In this sense, the 
"tenderness" of Tender Buttons signifies openness to mobility and perpetual renewal 
of interpretation. Stein underpins this view in Picasso: "the framing of life, the need 
that a picture exists in its frame, remain in its frame was over. A picture remaining in 
its frame was a thing that always had existed and new pictures commenced to want to 
leave their frames. .. " (Picasso, 12). 
Likewise, the prose poems in "Objects, " 
"Food" and "Rooms" "leave their frames. " Meaning does not frame Stein's text from 
the outside but is made and re-made from within through our phenomenological act 
of reading/perceiving Stein's "word-objects. " 29 
Much Steinian criticism is absorbed with what Norman Weinstein calls "the 
artist's mind during creation, "30 placing a primary emphasis on the artist's intentional 
28 Orum, "Modernismens realisme, " 216-217. 
29 The term "word-objects" -a suitable name for Stein's perceptual reconstructions - is 
Frederick J. Hoffmaes. Hoffman as quoted in Bruce F. Kawin, Telling it Again and Again. Repetition 
in Literature and Film (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), 127. 
30 Norman Weinstein, Gertrude Stein and The Literature ofModern Consciousness (New 
York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1970) 6. Similarly, in her study of Stein, Carolyn Faunce 
Copeland stresses "the struggle of the artist to find the essence of whatever object is being 
concentrated on at any one moment"; and Randa K. Dubnick emphasises the writer's process of 
perception, in particular, "the intersection of the real world with the writer's consciousness" and 
examines the "linguistic moment in the writer's consciousness. " See Copeland, Language & Time & 
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process. Charles Caramello, for instance, writes the following about Stein's work: 
"'creative thinking' about literature entailed an equally 'creative' writing, a method 
of composition in which observation and its statement would develop 
simultaneously. , 31 Caramello's point about the simultaneity of seeing and writing is 
perceptive but lacks an address to the intending reader, who, as both Herwig Friedl 
and Krzysztof Ziarek have recently pointed out, is an integral part of the emerging 
"event' 'of Stein's composition. 32 Stein's texts are "eminently performative, " Ziarek 
remarks, as they "both unfold and spend themselves in the event of 
,, 33 writing/reading. What I wish to explore in this chapter is the heretofore 
overlooked phenomenological aspect of this performativity. The fact that Stein's 
works "unfold in the event of writing/reading" is underscored by her own concern 
with unfolding what she again and again refers to as "the thing in itself ' ("PR, " 113, 
119; "PG, " 147). What I hope to show is that Stein's "thing in itself, " which has little 
to do with the Kantian concept of "the thing in itself' (the Ding an Sich), signifying 
the object in the world as it exists independently of our experience, refers to the 
perceiver's immediate, inner perception of the object and can therefore best be 
examined and clarified through the phenomenological notion of "the thing itself. " 
We have seen that Husserl, in getting back to "the thing itself, " sought to 
overcome the "crisis of European existence... the breakdown of life" (Crisis 2,299). 
Gertrude Stein (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1979), 82; and Dubnick, The Structure of 
Obscurity: Gertrude Stein, Language, and Cubism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 30, 
31. 
31 Charles Caramello, "Gertrude Stein as Exemplary Theorist, " in Gertrude Stein and the 
Making ofLiterature, eds. Shirley Neuman, and Ira B. Nadel (London: Macmillan Press, 198 8), 5. 
32 Herwig Friedl, "Art and Culture as Emerging Events, " in Emerging Structures in 
Interdisciplinary Perspective, eds. Rudi Keller and Karl Menges (Tabingen und Basel: Francke 
Verlag, 1997): 43-64; and Krzysztof Ziarek, "The Poetics of Event: Stein, the Avant-Garde, and the 
Aesthetic Turn of Philosophy, " Sagetrieb 12, part 3 (1993): 125-148. 
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The philosopher claimed that Western man's unquestioning trust in theoretical 
notions and pre-conceptions about the world had separated him from the original 
foundation of knowledge; it had made him lose sight of the fact that consciousness 
itself was the source of the meaning of the world, that objectivity arises from an 
intending subjectivity. Only by "bracketing7pre-conceptions could the original data 
of consciousness - the'tfing itself'- be uncovered and man re-engage with the 
world. What I wish to argue is that Stein, like Woolf, responds to and offers a 
critique of the "crisis" of early twentieth century culture -a culture which, in 
Picasso, she describes as full of "cracks" (Picasso, 49). Just as Woolf s Lily Briscoe 
wants to "get hold of. . that very jar on the ncrvcs, the thing itseýf 
before it has been 
made anything" (L, 260), so can Stein's unfolding of "the thing in itself 'be taken as 
an attempt to depict pre-reflective experience of the thing before this is wrapped up 
in conventional notions and names. Stein's "thing in itself' indicates that our world 
of visible things is constituted through our invisible, inside perceptions of these 
things. To use the words of critic Eva Meyer, Stein "manages to establish a direct 
link between the reflecting and the experiencing subject. tt34 Tender Buttons,, in other 
words, presents us with a radical shift of attitude, which uncovers the pre-reflective 
dimension of experience and takes this as the new "starting-point and basis" (Ideas, 
245) for creative expression. From what has been discussed, it should now be clear 
that Husserl's "thing itself' refers not to a thing but a relation between intending 
subject and object as intended. "Locating the object as thing or as intended 
phenomenon depends on the 
33 Ziarek, "The Poetics of Event, " 132-33. 
34 Eva Meyer, "A Matter of Folds, " Parallax 5, pt. 4 (Oct 1999): 95. Meyer's ideas about 
Stein are similar to mine but unlike her I call attention to the phenomenological aspect of Stein's logic 
of unfolding the "thing. " 
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perspective of the inquirer. 05 Similarly, the meaning of each "word-object" in 
Tender Buttons depends on the perspective of the reading/perceiving subject: each is 
an integral "part" of the "whole" composition. The radical shift of standpoint from 
reflective to pre-reflective experience that Stein promotes, then, must also be adopted 
by her reader. 
In examining the unfolding of Stein's text in the space of the reader, I am, 
once again, influenced by Mieke Bal's metaphor of the "textual navel, " that fine 
visual detail in the art work - visual art or text - which "hits the viewer, " and 
stimulates him/her to re-discover, reflect on, and participate in making the art work. 
36 
Stein's "Buttons, " I want to argue, are emblematic of such navel points, belly 
buttons. 37 The infantile term "belly button' ' sits well with both the pre-linguistic and 
child-like quality of the language used in Tender Buttons and the pre-reflective 
vision, which phenomenology exposes as the ground of philosophical inquiry. 
Moreover, the double meaning of Bal's navel metaphor sheds new light on the much- 
discussed dialectic encountered in Tender Buttons. A belly button or navel is a sign 
of both dependence on and detachment from the mother. It is, on the one hand, a sign 
of our primal bond with the pre-reflective dimension of experience (the umbilical 
cord was once attached), but, on the other hand, it points away from this dimension 
(the umbilical cord has been cut), thus signifying a point of opening, a new beginning 
for creation. Thus, Tender Buttons, which Stein calls "a system to pointing! ' (TB, 3), 
35 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 14. 
36 Bal, "Dispersing the Image, " 84. 
37 To Harriet Scott Chessman Tender Buttons also brings to mind the "belly button! ' but in a 
different way. She points out that children themselves, "may be called "buttons" as a term of 
endearment, just like other loved creatures, or parts of their bodies, as in "button-nose" or "belly- 
button. " See Chessman, The Public Is Invited To Dance (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1989) 91. 
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points in two directions at once, expressing a tension between attachment and and 
opening, leading the reader into a process of "[b]eginning again and again, " which, 
according to Stein, is "a natural thing" C'CE, " 23). Like Woolf s "Mark! ' and 
Stevens's "Notes, " Stein's "Buttons" can be taken as metaphors for the preliminary 
phase of creative production. As buttons must be pressed to switch on a process, on 
the one hand they designate starting-points for a creative process. On the other hand, 
however, they never allow us to lose sight of the pre-reflective source of this 
creativity. Stein's "Buttons, " in other words, signify both the "starting-point and 
basis" (Ideas, 245) for creative production. 
In structure, the rest of this chapter is divided into five main sections. The 
first section, entitled "The 'Splendour' Between the Cracks, " underscores my 
argument that Stein, like the phenomenologists, insists on a shift of attitude to get 
back to the original (pre-reflective) dimension of perceptual experience. To illustrate 
this point, I draw on passages from Stein's essays "Poetry and Grammar, " "Portraits 
and Repetition, " "Composition as Explanation, " "A Transatlantic Interview, " and 
the longer work Picasso. I offer a close reading of "A BOX" to illustrate how the 
shift of attitude central to Tender Buttons suspends the world of fact and lays bare its 
essence. This shift of attitude, which requires the attentive "eye" of the reader, 
reveals a pattern of opening, of phenomenological "perpetual beginning7that is 
central to Stcin's entire "system to pointing" (TB, 3). The section entitled 
"Orangeness" offers a gradual unfolding of the four "Orange" poems in the "Food" 
part of Tender Buttons. Here I expand on Danish critic Tania Orum's analysis of the 
first of these prose poems, revealing the co-existent emerging processes of reading 
and "peeling" Stein's strange fruit, thus underscoring the point that the reader is an 
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essential "pare' of the "whole" of Stein's composition. 38 What I hope to clarify is 
that these processes are essentially phenomenological, demanding that the reader 
adopt the shift of attitude of the reduction, leading him back to "that which antedates 
all standpoints" (Ideas, 78) prior to pre-conceptions about the object at hand. What I 
will highlight, in other words, is how Stein's strange text shifts our attention away 
from the familiar, named object and directs it toward what is given to consciousness 
in immediate experience. We are led from what Stein called "the things seen as 
every one sees thenf' (Picasso, 17) to the invisible and pre-reflective "thing in 
itself. " Finally, in section five, I underscore my point that Stein's emphasis falls not 
on result but on the intentional act of creativity itself. Here I demonstrate that the 
dialectic central to Tender Buttons approximates what Merleau-Ponty calls 
"hyperdialectic, " a dialectic without synthesis, which is based on "the impossibility 
of a complete reduction7 (PP, xiv). Due to this impossibility, we, the readers, can 
never completely get Stein's text "on the button" and are always faced with 
"beginning agaie'. The impossibility of complete reduction, in other words, is the 
engine of the re-beginnings in Stein's Modernist composition. What I propose is that 
this pattern of continual beginning and opening should not be taken as a sign of Post- 
Modem indeterminacy, uncertainty or instability of thought, but, rather, as a 
grounding of thought in pre-reflective intentional experience, embracing the ever- 
new and constantly possible. 
38 Oruni, "Lwsefrugter, " in TcetpLi Teksten, 45-67. 
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Ill. The "Splendour" Beneath the Cracks 
Just as Woolf s speculations on "life, spirit, truth or reality, this the essential thing, " 
(CD, 7) were connected with a "change" of "human relations, " taking place "about 
the year 1910" (A JIE, 70,71), Tender Buttons evidences a disarray in Modem 
culture. This work's radical upheaval of syntax and grammar, changing the relation 
between reader and text, is in itself an expression of the need for new meaning in a 
modem world, which, according to Edmund Husserl, suffered from "a radical life- 
,, 39 crisis. This "crisis" stemmed from Western m&s "nalfve" acceptance of the 
"objective sciences, " that is to say, all scientific theories, research and knowledge, 
which would assert an objective, ready-made reality. Pointing out that the world was 
first and foremost experienced by the subject, the goal of Husserl's epocU was to 
free the perceiving subject from this objective outlook (Crisis 1,149-92). 
In this light, consider the following passage from Stein's Picasso: 
The twentieth century has much less reasonableness in its existence 
than the nineteenth century but reasonableness does not make for 
splendor ... So the twentieth century is that, 
it is a time when 
everything cracks, where everything is destroyed, everything isolates 
itself, it is a more splendid thing than a period where everything 
follows itself (Picasso, 49). 
39 David Carr, introduction to The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, by Husserl, xxiv. 
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The adjective "splendid" stems from the Latin "splendidus, " meaning "bright, 
shining, glittering, brilliant, ... illustrious, showy. 'Ao "Objects, " "Food" and 
"Rooms, " the three parts that constitute Tender Buttons, are full of references to 
"shows" or the act of showing, spectacles and making something visible (TB,, 5,10, 
11,16,23). "Glazed Glitter" (TB, 3), the second poem of "Objects, " tells us that 
"[t]he change has come" in a twentieth century where "glittering is handsome" (TB, 
3). Stein's "splendid" twentieth century, then, suggests a time of cultural crisis and 
yet positive change and renewal -a time of uncovering the "splendour" of the world 
that the individual had lost sight of Just as Woolf attempted to uncover the "hidden 
pattern" lying behind "the cotton wool of daily life" (MB, 72), so did Stein see it 
as her task to lay bare, through poetry, the invisible ground or roots of a "cracked" 
twentieth century -a world threatened by what Beckett had called the "breakdown of 
the object. " 
What Stein primarily sought to recover were the forgotten roots of language: 
You had to recognize words had lost their value in the Nineteenth 
Century, particularly towards the end, they had lost much of their 
variety, and I felt that I could not go on, that I had to recapture the 
value of the individual word, find out what it meant and act within it. 
("AT, " 17-18) 
What Stein offers here is what one might term a secular genesis, attempting to re- 
create a cracked twentieth century by turning to human language, by "act[ing] 
within" and restoring "value" to words which had become taken for granted. "Was 
there not a way of naming things that would not invent names, but mean names 
40 The Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionag, 130. 
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without naming them" ("PG", 141), she wonders in "Poetry and Grammar. " In this 
essay Stein explores the ways in which she can "act within the word": "I had to feel 
anything and everything that for me was existing so intensely that I could put it down 
in writing as a thing in itself without at all necessarily using its name. " CTG", 145). 
"And so, " says Stein, "I was slowly beginning to know something about what poetry 
was" ("PG, " 145). Poetry, for Stein, is the paradoxical art of naming the unnameable. 
"I decided, " Stein writes, "that if one definitely completely replaced the noun by the 
thing in itself, it was eventually to be poetry" CTG", 147). Poetry, in other words, is 
the art of making language emulate pre-reflective experience without the 
obstructions of conventional nouns or names, which is what the phenomenologists 
call "the thing itself" Poetry, like phenomenology, uncovers the primacy of 
perception before our habitual modes of discourse have concealed it. 
Suspending the habitual and factual dimension of experience, the reduction 
leaves the perceiving subject with the essence of things. He/she is led back to a pre- 
rcflcctive statc of what Mcrlcau-Ponty calls "rclcaming to look at the world" (PP, 
xx), "before it is a thing one speaks of .. before it has been reduced to a set of 
manageable, disposable significations" (VI, 102). Looking for the world's essence, " 
Merleau-Ponty writes, "is looking for what it is as a fact for us, before any 
thernatization" (PP, xv; italics mine). This brings us back to Husserl's motto "Back 
to the things themselves, " indicating a return to the way things are originally 
experienced in consciousness, not as apprehended things but as what the philosopher 
called "phenomena" or "essences" (Ideas, 41,54-55). Being "simply aspects or 
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qualities of object-as-intended, "41 these "essences" are equivalent to the subject's 
intentional experience of things, that is to say, his/her prepositional consciousness of 
them. Although "[i]t should be noticed that intentional object of a consciousness 
is by no means to be identified with apprehended object" (Ideas, 121), it is, 
nevertheless, inseparable from this apprehended object: "every material thing has its 
own essential derivatives" (Ideas, 53). The essential aspect of the thing, then - the 
"thing itself' - is not detached from the thing as apprehended and material fact but is 
its "full correlate" (Ideas, 121). As the essence of the thing is what is given to the 
subject in immediate experience without being covered up by the thematisations of 
daily habit, it can best be described as the invisible inside of the visible and factual 
thing. When Stein in 'Tortraits and Repetition" claims that "my business as an artist 
was not with where the car goes as it goes but with the movement inside that is of the 
essence of its going" ("PR, " 117), she offers a similar pattern of thought: The "motor 
going inside and the car moving... are part of the same thing! ' C'PR! ', 102). The 
inside essence of the thing is in correlation with its factual outside: "each part 
as important as the whole. " 
In A Different Language: Gertrude Stein's Experimental Writing, Marianne 
DeKoven ponders upon Stein's concern with the "essence" of things in Tender 
Buttons: 'Tresumably the structures and essence of the subject (an orange, a cloak, 
Mabel Dodge) are somehow preserved in the shape of the language. But given 
the impossibility of deriving the subject of a piece from the writing itself without the 
clue of a title, the question of whether or not the subject is preserved in the shape of 
the language becomes irrelevant to the reader. 42 DeKoven claims that "A Substance 
41 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 14. 
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in a Cushion", the third poem in "Objects, " "does not make an interpretable thematic 
point either about cushions or about substance. 9-A3 Had DeKoven explored 
sufficiently the meaning of "essence, " however, she would have spotted what I think 
is a consistent "thematic point" throughout all of Tender Buttons. Stein's point is not 
to reconstruct the cushion the way we are used to seeing it in its usual "cover" (TB, 
3), but to emulate the "substance in a cushioif', that is to say, the subject's primary 
perception of this object before our conventional acts of naming have "covered" it 
UP. 
In Picasso Stein suggests that Picasso sought to incorporate in his art this 
primacy of perception. He wanted to re-create "things seen not as one knows them 
but as they are when one sees them without remembering having looked at them" 
(Picasso, 15. ). For instance, "when he ate a tomato the tomato was not everybody's 
tomato, not at all and his effort was not to express in his way the things seen as 
everybody sees them, but to express the thing as he was seeing it. .. " (Picasso, 17. ). 
Whereas various critics have used Stein's comments about Picasso to place her 
writing within a cubist context, 44 1 would rather argue that Stein's preoccupation 
with Piccaso's attempt to express pre-reflective experience - "things seen not as one 
knows them but as they are when one sees them without remembering having looked 
42 DeKoven, A Different Language, 78. 
43 Ibid., 80. 
44 Malcolm Brinnin, for instance, characterises Stein's Tender Buttons as "Wholly a product 
of cubist dispensation. " Brinnin, introduction to Selected Operas and Plays of Gertrude Stein 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970). xii. For other studies that characterise Stein's work as cubist 
see Dubnick, The Structure of Obscurity, 3 1; Michael J. Hoffnian, The Development of 
Abstractionism in the Writings of Gertrude Stein (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press 
1965), 18 1; Jane P. Bowers, "Experiment in Time and Process of Discovery: Picasso Paints Gertrude 
Stein; Gertrude Stein Makes Sentence, " Harvard Library Bulletin 5, pt. 2 (1994): 5-30; and Paul 
Gabriel, "A Little Bite More About Cubism in Tender Buttons, " Fu-jen Studies: Literature & 
Linguistics 22 (1989): 71-86. 
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at them" - is the "starting-point and basis" (Ideas, 245) of her own aesthetic 
concerns. In arguing this, I take my bearings from John Ashbery: "Poets when they 
, A5 write about other artists always tend to write about themselves. 
Picasso was a "genius, " Stein points out, a genius being someone who "sees 
something else, another reality" and who has "another vision than that of the world" 
(Picasso, 43). When Jonathan Levin remarks that the "dialectical complexity" of 
Stein's writing is simply "a sign of Stein having been so much at the centre of the 
diverse, eccentric currents of her age, " but that "[n]one of this makes Stein the odd 
genius in the midst of mere mortal modemiStS,, 
A6 he seems to rush to a conclusion 
without exploring sufficiently the logic behind Stein's concept of "genius. " 
"[G]eniuses are rare, 'A7 Stein points out: "to complicate things in a new way that is 
easy, but to see the things in a new way that is really difficult, everything prevents 
one, habits, schools, daily life, reason, necessities of daily life, indolence, everything 
prevents one, in fact there are very few geniuses in the world" (Picasso, 43). A 
"genius, " according to Stein's logic, is not concerned with our habitual world - our 
"habits, schools, daily 166" - but, like the phenomenologist, is interested in its genesis, 
that is to say, the origin of and condition for our habits, acts and expressions. "I was 
45 John Ashbery, "Gertrude Stein, " Reported Sightings: Art Chronicles, 1957-1987, ed. 
David Bergman (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1989), 106. 
46 Jonathan Levin, "Entering the Modem Composition: Gertrude Stein and the Patterns of 
Modernism, " in Rereading the New. - A Backward Glance at Modernism, ed. Kevin J. 11. Dettmar (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992) 143. 
47 Stein claimed that she herself belonged to the rarity of "geniuses": I may say that only 
three times in my life have I met a genius and each time a bell within me rang and I was not mistaken, 
and I may say in each case it was before there was any general recognition of the quality of genius in 
them. The three geniuses of whom I wish to speak are Gertrude Stein, Pablo Picasso and Alfred 
WhiteheaX'(ABT, 9). For other analyses of Stein! s concept of "genius" see See Bob Perelman's The 
Trouble with Genius: Reading Pound, Joyce, Stein and Zukofsky (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994); and Barbara Will, Gertrude Stein, Modernism and the Problem of "Genius 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000). 
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alone in understanding [Picasso], " Stein stresses, "perhaps because I was expressing 
the same things in literature" (Picasso, 16). 
Thus, in Tender Buttons, Stein attempts to lay bare the original ground upon 
which our visible world of objects and names rests: "I discovered everything then 
and its name, " she points out, "discovered it and its narne" ("PG", 141). Here the 
verb "to discover" is best understood in the sense of taking the cover off in order to 
expose what Stein in Picasso calls the "reality not of things seen but of things that 
exist" (Picasso, 19). Just as the Husserlian "thing itself' remains after the act of 
bracketing, this unseen reality is what presents itself to consciousness when the cover 
has been taken off our visible world of things, hence it is "contained within" ("PR!, 
12 1; italics mine) the visible world and becomes the reality of "the thing in itself.. 
that thing inside in that thing" C'PR, " 113,119, "PIT', 147; italics mine). Just as the 
essential and factual parts of an object are inseparable, the invisible reality of our 
primary perceptions exist within "the things everybody is certain of seeing" (Picasso, 
19). 
What emerges from my discussion so far, then, is that Stein, by virtue of her 
"unordered" and "not resembling" (TB, 3) word combinations, attempts to "[b]are all 
the roots" (Merleau-Ponty, VI, 169) upon which our habitual world - our "Objects, " 
"Food" and "Rooms" - are installed. The overall structure of Stein's book, which we 
might call the macro level, suggests a first step towards baring these roots and 
"act[ing] within [the individual word]" ("AT, " 18). Whereas we usually direct our 
attention towards "Objects" and intemalise the 'Tood" that we consume, "Rooms" 
are the spaces that we live within. By internalizing what is usually outside of us, on 
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this macro level we gradually move towards "act[ing] within" the object. Whereas 
objects, food and rooms structure the surface of daily life, Stein wants to uncover 
these surface details to reveal what structures them. "One of the things that is very 
interesting to know, " she says in "Poetry and Grammar, " "is how you are feeling 
inside you to the words that are coming out to be outside you" CTG", 125). Thus, in 
each of her "word-object[s], " Stein challenges us, the readers, to bracket the 
"outside" names and definitions of things in order to unfold our subjective "inside" 
perceptions of them. This is what we might terrn the book's micro level. All our 
habits of speech and thought must primarily be put out of play so that a new 
conceptual and perceptual logic can show itself in all its "splendoue' through the 
cracks of the twentieth century. 
Most of the titles of the prose poems that constitute Tender Buttons stem 
from ordinary life: "A Box, " "A Red Stamp, " "Orange, " "A Plate, " "Roastbeef. " The 
movement from these recognizable titles to their less recognizable content requires 
an epochal shift of attitude: a suspension of these conventional names. Intending to 
"mean names without naming them, " CTU', 141), Stein lays bare the visible world 
the way it "is originally rid of a covee, (TB, 3). As in Husserl's reduction, our 
familiar world of names is not rejected or altered but remains there on the page "'like 
the bracketed in the brackef '(Ideas, 108), while emphasis is placed on each "thing in 
itelf, " each object as this is met in immediate experience. No usual order is denied or 
changed: Stein's text is "not unordered in not resembling" (TB, 3) but is merely 
suggestive of a phenomenological shift of attitude. Borrowing from Stein's Picasso, 
48 For this thought I am indebted to Richard Bridgrmn's groundbreaking study of Stein. Ile 
writes: "However it be interpreted, the book's tripartite structure is unusually suggestive. "Objects" - 
what we perceive outside us. "Food" what we absorb. "Rooms" - what enclose us. " See Bridgman, 
Gertrude Stein in Pieces (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 126. 
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we, the readers, are "not to express. .. the things seen as every one sees them, but to 
express the thing as [we are] seeing it" (Picasso, 17). 
In "A Long Dress, " for instance, Stein leads our attention not to this 
concealing garment but to "the movement inside that is of the essence of its going" 
CTR, " 117): "What is the current that makes machinery, that makes it crackle, what 
is the current that presents a long line and a necessary waist. What is this current" 
(TB, 8). "Currents, currents are not in the air and on the floor and in the door and 
behind it first, " she explains in "Rooms" and yet, "Currents do not show it plainer" 
(TB, 49). The plainness of Stein's "currenf 'recalls Stevens's poem "The Plain Sense 
of Things" (CP, 502), referring to the subject's "plain, " that is to say, immediate and 
not yet thematised consciousness of the world. We have seen that the flow of 
consciousness, according to Husserl, is immersed in an infinite horizon of continuity. 
Stein's "currenf 'gestures towards the same unapproachable current of existence, 
which remains in advance of our expressions and acts of naming. Her "desire to 
express the rhythm of the visible world" (ABT, 130) in The Autobiography ofAlice 
B. Toklas is a desire to expose this rhythmic current underlying our daily world of 
objects, food and rooms. 
Opening "A Box" 
Most clearly in "A Box" (TB, 6), Stein exposes "the thing in itself, " that is, the 
invisible essence that is "contained within" CTR! ', 121) the factual and visible 
object. Taking the lid off this container, she literally turns our usual apprehension of 
the object on its head so that strange substances fall out of it: 
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Out of kindness comes redness and out of rudeness comes rapid same 
question, out of an eye comes research, out of a selection comes 
painful cattle. So then the order is that a white way of being round is 
something suggesting a pin and is it disappointing, it is not, it is so 
rudimentary to be analysed and see a fine substance strangely, it is so 
earnest to have a green point and to point not to red but to point again. 
(TB, 4) 
The "rednese' of blushing or sexual excitement comes "out of " the "kindness" of the 
giver of gifts (boxes) or the kind caressing of the woman's "box. " But the same red 
flushings (the "same question"), which, however, might be flushings of anger, also 
come out of "rudeness": a rougher gesture or touch. "Kindness" also brings to mind 
"kindred, " that is to say, family relationships. Just as children are born out of 
families, "research" comes out of the reader's "eye. " After this "eye" has done its 
research and made its "painful" "selection, " the product Cpainful cattle') is born out 
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of the creative process. What Stein presents us with, then, is an intertwining of 
physical and creative conception. "So then the order ... is it disapppointing"? No "it 
is not, it is so rudimentary to be analysed and see a fine substance strangely" (TB, 6). 
"[R]udimentary" derives from the Latin rudimenturn, and means "first lesson", or, as 
Alison Rieke points out, "from the beginning" or "in the early stages of 
49 Alison Rieke offers an extremely perceptive reading of the "Painful cattle": ". .. out of an 
eye comes research because we search with our eyes. What do we search for? We search perhaps to 
select. But out of "selection7' comes "painful cattle. " "Cattle" circles back to "kindness" and 
61 rudeness" because of "kine, " the plural of cow, and the pun of "kinx'. .. 'Tainful cattle" seems to 
suggest cows giving birth making "kind" or "kindred". . But how does 'ýpainffil cattle" come out of "selection! '? "Select" comes from the Latin se + legere, to choose or read, so it shares an etymological 
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development". 50 Rudiment refers to an imperfect beginning of something 
undeveloped 
and yet to develop such as a bud, a sprout, a child's speech, or the subject's primary 
instincts at the early stages of "research, " or an unborn baby inside that "white way 
of being round, " which, I think, is a suggestion of pregnancy. The colour "white" 
signifies something pure or still untouched. Stein's Tender Buttons, then, could be 
thought of as "rudimentary" buds, or tendres boutons, as others have pointed out, 
which are not yet ripe and still to unfold through the creative process of researching, 
reading, and writing. 51 The aspect of writing is implied in the phrase "a white way of 
being round is something suggesting a pin. " The word "pin7 is related to the Latin 
pinna associated with penna, meaning feather, which is also the source of pen as 
quill pens used to be made from feathers. 52 
Like the slater pins in Woolf s story "Moments of Being. Slater's Pins have 
No Points, " however, the "pin" in Stein's "A Box" has "no points. " At the end of this 
"word-object" we are simply told to "point again, " leading us in a "round" circle 
back to the beginning, challenging us to lift the lid off this box once again and 
embark on new "research. " Stein, then, is concerned not with result but with the 
"how" of the process of pointing itself. As noted, the verb "to point" comes from the 
meaning with "kindred": "kine" + "read" = "kindred. " When we "research! ' we also "read". " Rieke, 
The Senses ofNonsense (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1992), 80. 
50 Ibid., 80. 
51 William H. Gass, for instance, point out that Tender Buttons is an "etymological narrative" 
consisting of "buds based on hidden roots. " Gass, The World Within the Word (New York: Alfred A 
Knopf, 1979), 90,85. Others who speak of Stein's Tender Buttons as "buds, " "sprouts, " or tendres 
boutons, interpreting this as "nipples, " include Maýorie Perloff, The Poetics ofIndeterminacy, 99; 
and David Lodge, The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonomy, and the Typology of 
Literature (London: Edward Arnold, 1977), 153. 
52 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, based on the Oxford English 
Dictionary and Its Supplements, ed. J. B. Sykes, 6h Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). 
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Latin intendo: to aim or direct one's attention at, which is also the meaning of 
intentionality. Just as the intentional object exists only with the subject side of the 
intentional structure, the meaning of "A Box", like the meaning of all of Tender 
Buttons, is not fixed (no two readers come up with the same interpretation) but exists 
only through the present 
reader's act of "pointing. " In "Composition as explanatioW' Stein underscores this 
idea by claiming that all art cannot but exist in the "continuous present" ("CE", 25). 
Consider the following passage from this essay: 
The composing is the things seen by every one living in the living 
they are doing, they are the composing of the composition that at the 
time they are living is the composition of the time in which they are 
living... The time when and the time of and the time in that 
composition is the natural phenomena of that composition and of that 
perhaps every one can be certain. C'CE, " 24) 
Evcry crcativc "composition" dcpcnds on who sccs it and on the timc during which 
he/she sees it. It depends on "the things seen by every one living in the living they are 
doing. " Tender Buttons makes us reflect on "the single mind that directs an apple. 
All the coats have a different shape. .. "(TB, 46). The meaning of Stein's 
composition, in other words, depends on how "the apple" - the object - is directed 
and as "[a]ll the coats have a different shape, " that is to say, as the "single mind" of 
every reader brings with it a different cultural background, every single mind's 
"composition" reflects "the composition of the time in which they are living. " The 
whole composition, therefore, cannot be fixed but is always changing. In "Poetry and 
Grammar, " Stein says: "When I first began writipg, I felt that writing should go on, I 
still feel that it should go on" ("PG, " 130). What makes SteiWs writing "go on, " 
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making and re-making it in history, are the "contemporary" interpretations of the 
64 single mind" intending the text. 
"A Box, " then, offers no resting point, as when the traffic lights are "red, " but 
ends up inviting us to "point again' ': "it is so earnest to have a green point and to 
point not to red but to point again" (TB, 6). "The word "green" derives from the Old 
English grene, which is related to grass, which is, in turn, related to growth. 53 Thus, 
we, the readers, are challenged to reflect on our own growth of perception, which is 
what Merleau-Ponty calls "the lived perspective, that which we actually perceive" 
C'Doubt, " 14). Just as "perception is not a state but a mobile activity, " Stein's "word- 
object" is never fixed but perpetually renewed in the eyes of the reader. 54 
This pattern of continual renewal or opening is central to the entire "system to 
pointing" (TB, 3) that is Tender Buttons. But although we cannot quite pin down one 
fixed meaning when reading this work, what we are left with is neither "disorder, " 
"indeterminacy, " "uncertainty" or "fragmentatio as argued by critics such as 
Schmitz, Perloff, DeKoven and Berry. To elaborate this point, let us briefly turn to 
"A Piano" from "Objects": "if the speed is open, if the color is careless... if the 
button holder is held by all the waving color... it shuts and it lifts and awkwardly 
not awkwardly the centre is in standine' (TB, 9). The art work or composition - the 
piano's "speed" and "waving coloe' -. requires the participation of the "button 
holder, " the attentive subject engaging in Tender Buttons. As it depends on the 
reader's pressing of the Piano's "buttons, " the compositions "speed" is in constant 
movement and always opens anew: "it shuts and it lifts" (TB, 9) and yet, a 
composition that always begins again in this way is still concentrated: "the centre is 
53 Ibid. 
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in standing" (TB, 9). Stein's open and open-ended composition, in other words, does 
not indicate uncertainty or instability but expresses a perpetual amazement at itself, 
at the "how" of the composition. What we are presented with, is not a form of 
indeterminacy but, rather, a different form of being determined or "earnest": "it is so 
rudimentary to be analysed and see a fine substance strangely, it is so earnest to have 
a green point and to point not to red but to point again" (TB, 6). " The word "analyse" 
55 
stems from the Greek "analyein, " meaning to break or loosen Qyein) up (ana). In 
order to determine how "[e]ach part is as important as the whole" - and thereby 
establish the relationship of the parts to each other and to the whole - Stein must first 
break down the whole into its parts. She must loosen the inner strange "substance" 
from its outer familiar shell; she must show forth the essential structure of the 
conventional thing. What is determined in Stein's phenomenological universe is not 
some final objective quality belonging to the object that we see, or the poem that we 
read, but, rather, the "how" of its "manner of givenness" in immediate experience; its 
essence - "the scholastic quidditas, the whatness of a thing, " as Joyce's Stephen 
Dedalus calls it 56 By intending Stein's "word-objects" in all their possible 
manifestations, we are "not to express... the things seen as every one sees them, but 
to express the thing as [we are] seeing if' (Picasso, 17). 
By challenging us "to point again, " then, the end of Stein's prose poem 
leaves any hopes of closure or "ordee' disappointed. The lid is never put back on "A 
Box"; rather it is taken off again and again, perpetually unfolding the "rudimentary" 
54 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 85. 
55 Merriam- Webster Online, httt): //www. webster. com/cpi- 
bin/dictionary? book--Dictionaiy&va=analysis (accessed 20 April 2004). 
56 Joyce, A Portrait ofthe Artist as a Young Man, 70 
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but unfamiliar and therefore strange first perception from which our clear 
expressions take shape. The fact that the word "box" comes from the Latin pyxis 
meaning "boxwood" or "tree" underscores this notion of opening onto the original 
roots of perceptual experience. 57 Stein's work is constantly reminding us of the 
source of creativity itself. It never allows us to lose sight of the fact that words, 
objects and art are "product[s] of human praxis ... accomplishment[s] of a unique 
mode of intending subjectivity. , 58 
Marianne DeKoven is right in claiming that there is "no chess game" in 
Tender Buttons as chess games are characterised by fixed rules and a procession of 
moves working towards one player exhausting the other. 59 Tender Buttons lacks 
such fixed rules as well as termination and exhaustion, after which the game would 
usually end. The "respect is mutual" (TB, 21) in Stein's composition in which "each 
thing [is] as important as the whole. " Although we never forget that [t]he custom is 
in the centre" (TB, 26), each part of the whole will "act so that there is no use in a 
centre" (TB, 20), and yet "there is plenty of reason for making an exchange" (TB, 
10). The usual centre is meaningless. Meaning does not frame Stein's text from the 
outside but is made and re-made from within through the phenomenological act of 
reading itself, the continual "exchange" between text and the reader. The whole 
meaning of Tender Buttons can be grasped only when understanding that "[a] whole 
is inside apart" (TB, 38-39). 
"A Box" is just one of Stein's many portraits that unfold the inside essence of 
the thing "before it is a thing one speaks of and which is taken for granted, before it 
57 For this insight I am indebted to Gass, The World Within the Word, 90. 
58 Brough, "Art and Artworld, " 32. 
59 DeKoven, A Different Language, 77. 
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has been reduced to a set of manageable disposable significations" (VI, 102). Just as 
Husserl's transcendental phenomenology sought to recover a "first philosophy" of 
this world, so does Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception seek a language 
that "first" articulates the experience of the embodied subject. The perception that 
phenomenology recaptures, then, is perception in its "rudimentary, " first stage of 
development. The difficulty with all of Tender Buttons lies in the fact that it emulates 
exactly such an undeveloped, "rudimentary" impression of the object at hand. "[M]y 
only thought, " says Stein in "A Transatlantic Interview", "is a complicated 
simplicity" CTr', 34). Stein's work baffles us with its change of attitude and 
difference from the ordinary: "The change of colour is likely and a difference a very 
little difference is Prepared" (TB, 3). Her words seem complicated and yet her 
attempt is remarkably simple. What Maurice Natanson says about the 
phenomenologist can be used as a description of Stein's logic. Like the 
phenomenologist, who is "returning to the world from which mundanity has become 
estranged, " Stein's "phenomenological language appears grotesque. It is a genuine 
question of where simplicity lies and what power language has for shocking us back 
into experience .,, 
60 By virtue of their "not resembling" (TB, 3) appearance, the 
"word-objecte' that constitute Tender Button are "first lessons" in "mean[ing] names 
without naming them" ('TG"', 14 1). 
60 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 92. 
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IV. Oran2eness 
Like James' tea kettle, Uzanne's apples, and Picasso's tomato, Stein's "Orange" in 
Tender Buttons is strange and "act[s] so that there is no use in a centrcý' (TB, 43): 
ORANGE 
Why is a feel oyster an egg stir. Why is it orange centre. 
A show at tick and loosen loosen it so to speak sat. 
It was an extra leaker with a see spoon, it was an extra licker with 
a see spoon. 
(TB, 3 8) 
Thus Stein peels off, or, using Husserl's term, "brackets, " our presupposed 
knowledge of what this word-object is; she "loosen[s] it loosen[s] it so to speak" as 
if peeling an orange, and lets the object "speak" for itself, as it were. 61 As in "A 
Box, " Stein carries out an "analysis, "- a "loosening up" - and breaks down the whole 
into is component parts. Once again, she undoes our fact-world of narnes to reveal 
the essence of this "fine substance, " not by mentioning the orange in question but by 
teasing out the possible ways in which this object might feel to us: "Why is a feel 
oyster and egg stir. Why is it orange centre. " What Stein presents us with here is, I 
think, what Husserl meant by "free variation" or "free fancies" (Ideas, 198), the 
61 As pointed out, my account of Stein! s "Orange" is indebted to the Danish critic Tania 
Orum's essay "Lxsefrugter. " The essay, the title of which could be translated as "Readerly Fruit, " 
uses "Orange" as an example of the performative quality of Stein! s work, arguing that our process of 
reading the poem is tantamount to the process of peeling the fruit. My specifically phenomenological 
approach to Stein's work can be regarded as an expansion of Orum's analysis. 
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phenomenological thought experiment referred to in the previous chapter. 
62 "Free 
variation7 is related to the "eidetic reduction" (Ideas, 55), the shift of standpoint 
from the world of fact to the world of essence or eidos. When the mind deals with 
essence, there is a concern with the possible rather than the actual. The point of "free 
variation, " Judith Butler explains, is "not to fix the actuality of the object, but to 
render its actuality into a possibility, " revealing the object's essence, "the strangeness 
, -A3 of quiddity, that it is rather than not. Thus, Stein's "Orange" challenges us to tease 
the possible from the actual object. As Orurn also suggests, an orange might "feel" 
like an "oyster" or an "egg": both oysters and oranges have rough surfaces, 
sometimes an orange has an egg-like shape, and it has a juicy "orange centre, " an 
"extra leaker. "64 
These possible variants of Stein's "Orange" are "loosen[cd]" from the actual 
through "[a] show at tick. " The word "tick7 in this context is, I think, a reference to 
what the dictionary describes as a "case of a mattress or pillow, in which the filling is 
contained, "65 recalling both "A Substance in a Cushion, " directing our attention to 
the substance in the cushion and to "Nickel" which, is "originally rid of a cover" (TB, 
3). Stein's "cases, " covers, concealing garments ("A Long Dress") or fruit peel, then, 
refer to our usual mode of discourse -a seal in itself - which must be "loosened 
loosened" so that the "the thing in itself' C'PF, " 113) - the thing as intended - can 
"show. " 
62 Similarly, Margueritte S. Murphy points out that "The reader is led to create contexts, to 
imagine associations, to 'free-associate' as freely as Stein would have done. " See Murphy, A Tradition 
ofSubversion, 145. Unlike Murphy, I suggest that Husserl's "free variation, " which is part of the 
eidetic reduction, allows us to articulate this process of association more clearly. 
63 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xii. 
64 Orum, "Lxsefrugter, " 48. 
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Apart from transforming the real into variants of the possible, Husserl's 
"imaginary variation, " Judith Butler explains, "also lays out the temporality of the 
I t. 66 -Ponty refers to this object... the specific time of its unfolding' Merleau 
temporality when pointing out that Uzanne's paintings represent "the impression of 
an emerging order, an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself before our 
eyes" ("Doubt", 14). Similarly, Stein's focus in Tender Buttons is not the factual 
(thematised) outside of objects - "the things seen as every one sees them" (Picasso, 
17) -but the object's manner of appearing to the individual subject, the "inside" 
unfolding of the object as intended. In "Portraits and Repetition" she, significantly, 
speaks of "The thing in itself folded itself up inside itself like you might fold a thing 
up to be another thing which is that thing inside in that thing" ("PR! ', 119). "How 
was anything contained within itself' CTR! ', 121), she wonders. 
In order to visualise this "matter of folds, g167 she advises us to "think how you 
fold things or make a boat or anything else out of paper or getting anything to be 
inside anything, the hole in the doughnut or the apple in the dumpling" CTR! ', 120). 
The reductive shift of attention that must be adopted by the reader of Stein's text, 
leading us away from our usual acts of expression and naming and back to a pre- 
reflective awareness of the thing, makes us "fold" in upon ourselves, as it were, 
reflect on our own perceptual process, and examine the essence or "whatness" of the 
thing. Looking for the world's essence, " Merleau-Ponty taught us "is looking for 
what it is as a fact for us, before any thematization" (PP, xv). It is in this sense that 
Stein attempts to make us "see ... fine substance[s] strangely, " placing emphasis on 
65 OxfordAdvancedLeamers Dictionary of Current English, ed. A. P. Cowie, 4"' Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
66 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xii. 
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the inside essence of things before these are folded up inside habitual forms of 
expression: "the hole in the doughnut or the apple in the durnpling, " the "substance 
in a cushion, " the things in "a box" or the "orange centre" within the orange peel. 
When Stein speaks of "the thing in itself, " then, her focus is not on the object "in 
itself 'but on the way in which the object presents itself to the perceiver in 
immediate experience. 
The "composition7' of "Orange, " in other words, once again underscores the 
inseparability of the essential and the factual, the invisible and the visible, the object 
as intended and the object as named: "Each part is as important as the whole. " Once 
again Stein's notion of the "thing in itself, " then, approximates the Husserlian notion 
of the "thing itself, " signifying the "intentional unity" (Ideas, 13 1) between the 
intending subject and the object as-intended. 
Using a "see spoon" (TB, 38) to feed us her unusual food for thought, like a 
mother feeds her child, Stein exposes us to "Orange" as if we have never experienced 
it before. Not only does she make us sense its egg- or oyster-like shape, but also its 
taste and leaking texture: "It was an extra leaker with a see spoon, it was an extra 
licker with a see spoon" (TB, 38). Considering Stein's German origins, the words 
"lickei" and "leaker" are puns on the German "lecker, " meaning delicious and 
referring to the sensation of the reader who, as Tania Orurn has suggested, is eating 
from Stein's spoon and licking him/herself through her words. 68 Reading is made 
equivalent to touching, peeling and consuming. What Stein presents us with has, I 
think, much in common with Gilles Deleuze's explanation of the notion of 
"sensation, " which, he argues, was given "unprecedented status" by Paul Uzanne: 
67 1 have borrowed the term "matter of folds" from Meyer, "A Matter of Folds. " 
68 Onim, "Lxsefrugter", 49. 
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Sensation is the opposite of the facile and the ready-made, the cliche, 
but also of the "sensational, " the spontaneous, etc. Sensation ... has 
no faces at all, it is both things indissolubly, it is Being-in-the-World, 
as the phenomenologists say: at one and the same time I become in the 
sensation and something happens through the sensation, one through 
the other, one in the other. And at the limit, it is the same body which, 
being both subject and object, gives and receives the sensation. As a 
spectator, I experience the sensation only by entering the painting, by 
reaching the unity of the sensing and the sensed. This was Uzanne's 
lesson against the Impressionists: sensation is not the "free" or 
disembodied play of light and color (impressions): on the contrary, it 
is in the body, even the body of an apple ... Sensation is what is 
painted. What is painted on the canvas is the body, not insofar as it is 
represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining 
this sensation (what [D. H. ] Lawrence, speaking of Cezanne, called 
"the appleyness of the apple"). 69 
Much like Cezanne's "appleyness, " Stein presents us with the "orangeness" of the 
4'orange, " the bodily sensation of the object prior to the object as named. In 
"Portraits and Repetition, " Stein writes: "I began to wonder ... just what one saw 
when one looked at anything really looked at anything. Did one see sound and what 
was the relation between colour and sound did it make itself by description by a word 
that meant it or did it make itself by a word in itself' CTW', 114). Applying 
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Uzanne's notion of "sensatiotf 'to the work of Francis Bacon, Deleuze seems to 
provide a response to Stein's question: 
Between a color, a taste, a touch, a smell, a noise, a weight, there 
would be an existential communication that would constitute the 
"pathic" (nonrepresentative) moment of the sensation. In Bacon's 
bullfights, for example, we hear the noise of the beast's hooves 
and each time meat is represented, we touch it, smell it, eat it ... The 
painter would make visible a kind of original unity of the senses, and 
would make a multisensible Figure appear visually. 70 
It is like this in Stein's "Orange". Not as spectators but as readers of her work, we 
"experience the sensation only by entering" the portrait of this fruit. By means of the 
"see spoon, " suggesting at once the acts of seeing and tasting, we experience the 
"nonrepresentative" and "multisensible" manner of the object's appearing: we peel, 
eat, lick the leaking "orange centre". This "button's" unfolding lies in the reader's 
embodied perception of it. 
Peeling, Unfolding, Ripening 
To recapitulate what has been discussed so far, just as the macro level of Tender 
Buttons suggests a movement from looking at "Objects" through intemalising 
"Food" to looking out from the inside of "Rooms, " so are our intertwined acts of 
reading and peeling Stein's "Orange, " until we reach its leaking juicy centre, a 
movement towards what Stein termed "act[ing] withiif 'the word. This is the "first 
69 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic ofSensation (New York: Continuurr4 2003), 
34-35. 
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lessore' that Stein teaches us. She makes us unfold and see clearly "the thing in 
itself ' ('TR, " 113), which is usually concealed by our conventional ways of seeing 
and naming. As "A Mounted Umbrella! ' reminds us, "[t]he lesson is to learn that it 
does show, that it shows if' (TB, 10). 
The "Orange" portrait that we have looked at is the first in a series of four. 
Offering us her "see spoon, " Stein challenges us to unfold the orangeness of 
"Orange. " But to "spoon" is also old-fashioned slang for engaging in amorous 
(tender) behaviour, such as caressing. Through "spooning" or tenderly caressing this 
object with our eyes, we reach the "extra" leaking juices of the fruit. This "spooning" 
interaction takes on a tone of sexual pleasure in the second portrait in the series: 
ORANGE 
A type oh oh new new nor no nor knealer knealer of old show 
beefsteak, neither, neither. 
(TB, 3 8) 
The result of which is: 
ORANGES 
Build is all right. 
(TB, 3 8) 
Sexual pleasure can lead to the birth of more "Oranges", to being "Build", that is to 
say, to becoming more numerous. We are once again faced with the idea of 
conception and pregnancy suggested in the "white way of being round" (TB, 4) that 
"A Box" referred to. This finally leads to: 
ORANGEIN 
Go lack go lack use to her 
70 Ibid., 42. 
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Cocoa and clear soup and oranges and oat-meal 
Whist bottom whist close, whist clothes, woodling. 
Cocoa and clear soup and oranges and oat-meal. 
Pain soup, suppose it is question, suppose it is butter, real is, real 
in only, only excreate, only excreate a no since. 
no, a no since, a no since when, a no since when since, a no since 
when since a no since when since, a no since, a no since when since, a 
no since, a no ,a no since a no since, a no since, a no since. 
(TB, 3 8) 
The repeated lines "Cocoa and clear soup and oranges and oat-meal" in this "Tender 
Button' 'bear resemblance to nursery rhymes or children's songs. I have noted that 
the "rudimentary, " undeveloped language of Tender Buttons, which might remind 
the reader of child's speech, sits well with the pre-reflective way of seeing, which 
phenomenology exposes as the ground for philosophical inquiry. Still open to the 
essence of this world, the child looks at the world in wonder. His /her understanding 
of things is still pre-reflective. It should be clear from my discussion that the aim of 
Husserl's epoche was to recapture the wonder of this world overlooked by Modem 
man's preconceptions and presuppositions. 71 "Wonder in the face of the world, " 
Merleau-Ponty stresses, is "the best formulation of the reduction7(PP, xiii). In other 
words, the world exposed by wonder, by a more "rudimentary" way of seeing, and 
the attitude shift occasioned by it, are central to both phenomenology and Stein's 
Tender Buttons. The reader, who plays an important part in the phenomenological 
process of Stein's composition, must also adopt this shift of attitude. In order to 
71 For an in-depth examination of the epochi as a return to "wonder" see Kingswell, 
"Husserl's Sense of Wonder. " 
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engage in a more "rudimentary" way of seeing, he/she must suspend his conventional 
"clear" expressions. 
Hence, in "Orange In, " we move from "clear soup" to "[p]ain soup" (TB, 38; 
italics mine), which might be a reference to labour pain - the pain that is felt when a 
pregnant woman's waters break (a soupy fluid). From this emerges a long stream of 
varying combinations of the words "a no since when since, " which burst forth and 
bear resemblance to intense contractions: "only excreate, only excreate a no since. A 
no, a no since, a no since when, a no since when since, a no since when since a no 
since when since, a no since .. ." Thus, Stein's portrait "excreat[es]" - puts out of 
play - our conventional description of "orange, " turning into non-sense ("no since') 
what is our usual sense, but only to promote a form of re-creation of the thing as it is 
met with in immediate experience. I began my discussion by emphasising that 
poetry, according to Stein, comes into being by "replac[ing] the noun by the thing in 
itself' (TU', 147). Poetry, for Stein, is the art of making language emulate the 
primacy of perception, which is what the phenomenologists call "the thing itself. " In 
"Orange In, " as in "A Box, " the participation of our eyes is, once again, required to 
give birth, as it were, to our inside perception of this object. The "Orange In, " the 
"thing in itself' can only be brought into being through the accomplishment of the 
intending subjectivity: the reader intending the text. Like the phenomenologist, Stein 
is "restoring a power to signify, a birth of meaning ... an expression of experience 
by experience" (VI, 155). Underscoring the aspect of opening examined in "A Box, " 
Stein's "Orange" portraits do not lead to closure but open up the ground from which 
expression stems. 
What emerges from my discussion so far is this. The emphasis in Tender 
Buttons falls not on result but on articulating the "unapproachable" source of creative 
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production. Stein's "business as an artist [is] not with where the car goes as it goes 
but with the movement inside that is of the essence of its going! ' CTP, " 117). It is 
her business, in other words, not to offer a specific destination but to focus on the 
"how" of the destination, bringing to light the usually invisible essence of our world 
of 'Tood" and "Objects. " The point of her work is not to reveal a "specific actuality" 
of the objects in question but rather "the thatness of the thing ... that it is possible at 
all. "72 Thus, in a phenomenological manner, Tender Buttons tums away from 
objectivity and turns, instead, to the intending subject from which objectivity arises. 
As subjects intending Stein's text, we, the readers, are invited to adopt the 
phenomenological attitude by suspending our conventional ways of seeing and forms 
of expression. Tender Buttons demands of us to "act so that there is no use in a 
centre" and re-learn to read/look at "word-objects" as these are met in immediate 
experience. The process of reading this strange text involves an ex-creation - an 
uncovering or peeling - of the conventional thing as named and a recreation through 
44mean[ing] names without naming them" ("PG, " 141), which is tantamount to 
"replacing" them by "the thing in itself. " In my discussion of Stein's "Orange" 
portraits I hope to have shown that meaning comes into being as the possible is 
teased from the actual, as the immediate perception of "the thing in itself' is teased 
from the factual thing as named, and as the invisible is unfolded from within the 
visible. Just as Woolf s "hidden ... pattern" with which we are all connected is 
visible only if we look behind "the cotton wool of daily life" (MB, 72), Stein's 
"word-objects" are presented as containers that must be opened ("A Box"), cushions 
that must be uncovered ("A Substance in a Cushion"), fruit that must be peeled 
("Orange"), or "dirt" that must be removed by what "Glazed Glitter" calls "perhaps 
72 j. Butler, introduction to Yhe Erotic Bird, x 
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washing and polishing" (TB, 3). Hence Stein's "see spoon" (TB, 38), her new tool 
for uncovering the hidden essence of these objects in a twentieth century that in 
Picasso she describes as "crack[ed]" yet "splendid" (Picasso, 49), that is, glittering, 
showy. Feeding us her unusual food for thought and making us "see ... fine 
substance[s] strangely, " Stein's "see spoon! ' shows forth the forgotten roots of this 
century and opens onto the division of experience that phenomenology brings to 
light: the division between "what is given" and "what is presupposed in order for the 
giving to occur. " 73 
The Space of Differentiation 
So far the purpose of this chapter has been to show that the phenomenological 
reduction, exposing what James called the "fringe" of experience, allows us to 
articulate the insufficiently explored dialectic of Stein's Tender Buttons. I finally 
want to demonstrate that the difficulty of this text lies in the fact that it operates as a 
perpetual oscillation between the pre-reflective and the reflective, the pre-objective 
perceptual experience of what Stein called "the thing in itself' and the factual, nained 
object. As Merleau-Ponty puts it in The Visible and the Invisible, "There remains the 
problem of the passage from the perceptual meaning to the language meaning" (VI, 
176). 
We have seen how Stein in Tender Buttons challenges us to "mean names 
without naming them7'CTU', 141), to bracket factuality and objectivity, thus making 
us see "fine substance[s] strangely. " In "Rooms, " the last part of this book, Stein 
73 Hart, "The Experience of Poetry, " 288. 
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invites us into an unfamiliar territory, which, like a room, is "a wide place stranger, a 
wideness makes an active centre" (TB, 52). As our usual "centre" is bracketed and 
meaning is made through the act of reading itself, the new "centre" is both "wide" 
and "active. " "Why is the name changed, " (TB, 48) Stein ponders: "The name is 
changed because in the little space there is a tree... in every space there is a hint of 
more, all this causes the decision" (TB, 48). The "tree" brings us back to the patterns 
of conception incorporated in Stein's "A Box, " for, as William Gass perceptively 
remarks, "the root of box is tree (the boxwood). A family tree, the Tree of 
knowledge. "74 The "little space" that Stein's "Rooms" exposes is, as I will now 
clarify, the space where "the difference is spreading" (TB, 3), that is to say, the space 
of difference from which meaning and knowledge arise and which, therefore, "causes 
the decision. " 
Differentiation is what Merleau-Ponty thought of as "icart " (VI, 197,198, 
201). Although we perpetually seek to grasp the real through acts of naming or 
expressions, the gap between immediate intentional experience and our speaking 
about it can never be closed, for "[b]etween experience and its own (propre] truth, 
there is always a certain. . Aemporal displacement, ... an 
icart, or 'spacing, ' of a 
temporal nature, this distantiation being itself a necessary condition for the 
production of meaning. "75 Just as "the visible itself has an invisible inner framework 
(membrure)" (VI, 215-216), language has a silent centre, a "core of primary meaning 
round which the acts of naming and expression take shape" (PP, xv). In other words, 
all our acts and our clear expressions arise from this "distantiation" or separation 
7' Gass, The World within the Word, 90. 
75 G. B. Madison, "Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: La diff6rEnce, " in tcart and 
Diffirance: Merleau-Ponty and Derrida on Seeing and Writing, ed. M. C. Dillon (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1997), 104. 
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between the invisible and the visible, between the primacy of perception and the 
articulation of the perceived. Although "[t]his separation (6cart) ... forms meaning" 
(VI, 216), we do not perceive it as it is prior to our ability to reflect on and speak 
about the world. 
76 
What I want to argue is that Stein's Tender Buttons, paradoxically, articulates 
this usually unperceived divergence between "mute" meaning and language meaning. 
Her preoccupation with "mean[ing] names without naming them" suggests that our 
language of distinct ideas and names arises from a more primordial language, from 
the expression of things as "essence", or, as Deleuze argues, the "pathic" 
(nonrepresentative) moment of the sensation. " As demonstrated above, Stein's 
"Orange" arises from orangeness, that is to say, the intending subject's primary 
sensation of this "extra leaker. " Similarly in "A Long Dress" (TB, 8), the dress as 
concealing gannent is a reference to language as a seal. Here Stein uncovers the 
ongoing "current" (TB, 8) beneath the seal, which always underlies our daily fact- 
world, thus exposing the fine line between the pre-predicative dimension of 
experience and our apprehended world; a more primordial meaning and the imposed 
meaning of our operative language: "A line distinguishes it. A line just distinguishes 
it" (TB, 8). Likewise, in "Rooms, " Stein writes: "This which is mastered has so thin a 
space to build it all that there is plenty of room and yet it is quarrelling" (TB, 49). 
Here Stein opens onto that "thin, " insubstantial in-between "room" of divergence and 
66quarrelling, " "a narrow footpatW' (TB, 14) where "[t]he difference is spreading" 
(TB, 3). This is the "difference" that forms meaning. 
76 See Seigel, "A Unique Way of Existing: Merleau-Ponty and the Subject, " 475. 
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Expanding upon Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty 
demonstrates that although we have the power to practise "free variation" and 
emulate a more primordial vision of the world, this emulation, paradoxically enough, 
relies on the virtues of a language that is always already a belated version of this 
vision. Thus, there is no point at which full reduction, that is to say, pure self- 
reflection in the moment of perceiving, can be achieved. As "the thing itself' can 
never be completely grasped, the space of difference (icart) between "perceptual 
meaning" and "language meaning" cannot be closed. It always remains open. From 
this enigma emerges Merleau-Ponty's formulation of the "fate of perception": "If the 
thing itself were reached.... [i]t would cease to exist as a thing at the very moment 
when we thought to possess it. What makes the 'reality' of the thing is therefore 
precisely what snatches it from our grasp" (PP, 233). 
This perpetual movement toward but lack of gasp of the object in the 
perceptual process is also central to Derrida's notion of "diff6rance, " a combination 
of "to differ" and "to defer, " implying that every sign is a set of differences and that 
meaning is produced exactly through the material of the different signifiers. 
Whenever we grasp one signifier, we move on to another, hence a stable meaning or 
"signified" is always deferred. In a recent article, Jennifer Ashton offers a critique of 
the "law of indeterminacy" in Stein's work embraced by critics such as Maýorie 
Perloff, Neil Schmitz and Marianne DeKoven. "Deriving their methodological 
authority from post-Saussurian linguistics and deconstruction, " Ashton points out, 
"such approaches customarily argue for indeterminacy as a means of displacing 
various idealized forms of representation, including that of a rigid correspondence 
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between sign and referent . 7977 Derrida is the key 
figure in such Post-Modem 
speculations about indeterminacy. In order fully to understand the implications of the 
phenomenological "fate of perception, "' which, I argue, lies central to the dialectic of 
Tender Buttons, a brief clarification of the difference between Derrida and Merleau- 
Ponty's projects will prove useful. 
Whereas philosophers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard and Rodolphe Gasch6 
have described Merleau-Ponty as a precursor of Derrida's project and drawn parallels 
between Merleau-Ponty's "6carf'andDerrida's"diff6rance, "78 recent philosophers 
have emphasized an important difference between the two philosophers' inquiries. 
As Dcrrida is a grammatologist and Mcrlcau-Ponty an ontologist, the philosophcrs' 
projects do not stem from the same source. M. C. Dillon narrows down their 
differences: "For Derrida seeing reduces to reading as the seen reduces to text, 
whereas for Merleau-Ponty the reading of a text is derived from a primordial vision 
of the world, in the sense that any interpretation or understanding is a kind of 
perception. '979 
For Derrida, "it is in words and language that things first come into being and 
are, " hence "there is no meaning apart from signification and apart from 
77 Jennifer Ashton, "'Rose is a Rose': Gertrude Stein and the Critique of Indeterminacy, " 
Modernism IModernity 9, no. 4 (2002): 593. 
78 See Jean-Francois Lyotard, Discourse, figure (Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1978); and 
Rodolphe Gasch6, "Deconstruction as Criticism, " Glyph 6 (1979): 127-215. 
79 M. C. Dillon, "Introduction: tcart & Diff6rance, " in Ecart & Diffirance, 6. Joseph 
Margolis writes on the same topic: "Derrida. proceeds by mimicking discourse at a (would-be) 
postulated point, at which it cannot possibly function in the way it mimes: that is what deconstruction 
both 'does' and exposes. Merlcau-Ponty reconstructs, by way of a mythical (not fictional) conjecture, 
our sense of the condition of infancy from which (and continuously through which) we must have 
emerged as the perceiving and thinking being we are. " See Margolis, "Philosophical Extravagance in 
Merlcau-Ponty and Derrida, " in tcart & Diffigrance, 121-122. For other elaborations of this topic see 
Hugh Silverman, "Reading Postmodernism as Interruption (between Merleau-Ponty and Derrida), " in 
tcart and Diffirance, 208-219 and "Is Merleau-Ponty Inside or Outside the History of Philosophy, " 
in Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty's Notion offlesh, eds. Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2000,131-143. 
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signifiers.,, 8oAs his concept of diffirance operates exclusively within the domain of 
signifiers, "the bar between signifier and signified... bars access to the perceptual 
domain, " revealing a gap of "difference without identity. .., groundlessness, total 
,, 81 absence of foundations. It is this pattern of thought that lies behind the "multiple, 
fragmented, open-ended articulation of lexical meaning"82 that Marianne DeKoven 
assigns to Tender Buttons, the "agonized isolation"83 of the subject that, according 
to Neil Schmitz, is central to Stein, and "the instability of emotion and thought, " 
which, according to Maýorie Perloff, pervades Stein's work: "The gap between 
signifier and signified is repeatedly emphasized, " she stresses, "a gap that leaves 
room for continuous verbal play. , 84 
Merleau-Ponty's icart also refers to a gap, but instead of "bar[ring] 
access to the perceptual domain, " it represents a passage of continual 
"exchange between me and the world, ', 85 underscoring the point that perception 
is always grounded in a carnal being in the world. Although the gap (ecart) 
between "perceptual meaning" and "language meaning" can never be closed, 
the reduction nevertheless teaches us that the primacy of perception is assigned 
to the "fleW' of the body. Therefore "[t]he most important lesson which the 
reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (PP, xiv) for 
so Dillon, "Introduction: tcart & Diff6rance, " 3,6. 
81 Ibid. 13,14. 
82 DeKoven, A Different Language, 79. 
83 Schmitz, "Gerfrude Stein as Post-Modernist, " 1204. 
94 Perloff, Yhe Poetics oflndetenninacy, 98-99. Elsewhere Perloff points out that she in 
referring to "Indeterminacy" she "take[s] issue with Derridean theory. " Ibid., 17. 
85 Dillon, "Introduction: tcart and Diff6rance, " 3,4,6,7. 
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"the incompleteness of the reduction... is not an obstacle to the reduction, it is 
the reduction itself, the rediscovery of vertical being7' (VI, 178). In other words, 
the reduction perpetually rediscovers the embodied subject's "first" experience 
of the object, thus constantly highlighting the source from which language 
comes into being. 
The incompleteness of the reduction, exposing the passage between the 
primacy of perception and language meaning, brings to light the paradox of the eye/I. 
On the one hand we are immersed in the world as perceiving beings but, on the other 
hand, we are detached from it through our expressive language; on the one hand 
every perceptual moment is grounded in the pre-predicative dimension of experience 
- James's "fringe" or Husserl's "horizon7- but, on the other hand, every reflective 
moment is a new beginning and an opening towards new meaning. It is this paradox 
that lies behind Merleau-Ponty's later notion of "hyperdialectic, " a "dialectic without 
synthesis, " which, the philosopher stresses is "the only good dialectic" (VI, 94,95- 
96,94): 
The bad dialectic begins almost with the dialectic, and there is no 
good dialectic but that which criticizes itself and surpasses itself as a 
separate statement ... The bad dialectic is that which thinks 
it 
recomposes by being a thetic thought, by an assemblage of statements, 
by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; the good dialectic is that which is 
conscious of the fact that every thesis is an idealization, that Being is 
not made up of idealizations or of things said, as the old logic 
believed but of bound holes ... (VI, 95-96) 
This dialectic without synthesis, central to which lies the impossibility of 
complete reduction, "is not a surpassing centered upon finality, " Merleau- 
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Ponty stresses elsewhere, but "a 'perpetual genesis' to 'a plurality of levels of 
orders. ,, 86 A lack of synthesis or closure, in other words, should not be taken 
as a sign of inconclusiveness or groundlessness but as a "perpetual genesis" of 
creativity. We learned from Phenomenology ofPerception that an emphasis on 
perpetual genesis can be found in the work of artists like Proust and Uzanne. 
Their "kind of attentiveness and wonder" and their "will to seize the meaning 
of the world... as that meaning comes into being (PP, xxi) is, Merleau-Ponty 
argues, a characteristic of Modernist aesthetics at large. He calls it "the general 
effort of modem thought" (PP, xxi). Hence, the Modem thinker is a "perpetual 
beginner" and his creative process is "a renewed experience of its own 
beginning, it consists entirely in describing that beginning" (PP, ix). 
There is, or so I suggest, a striking similarity between Merleau-Ponty's 
"hyperdialectic" and what Ellen E. Berry, in her study of Stein, calls "a paradoxical 
split of attention -a relaxed hyperattention, an unconscious hyperconsciousness, a 
borderline state of awareness a little like insomnia" which, she claims, is required in 
order to read the Stein text. 87 Merleau-Ponty's dialectical speculations allow us to 
articulate more clearly this "split" attentiveness that the reader must adjust himself to 
in order to read Stein's work. In proposing this I once again take my bearing from 
Max van Manen's claim that phenomenology is "not only a research method, it is 
also a phenomenological attitude that must be adopted by anyone who wishes to 
participate in the questions that a certain project pursues. "88 
86 Merleau-Ponty as quoted in Jacques Terminiaux, "From Dialectic to Hyperdialectic, " 
Research in Phenomenology 10 (1980): 74. 
87 Berry, Curved Thought and Textual Wandering, 18. 
" Manen, http: H www. phenomenologyonline. com/inquiry/lO. html. 
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Merleau-Ponty's "hyperdialectic, " which, as shown above, is an elaboration 
of an embodied sign-system, sheds new light on the "hypee' oscillation in Tender 
Buttons: an oscillation bctwccn the prc-rcflcctivc and the rcflcctivc, bctween the 
almost pre-linguistic form of language used in Stein's strange portraits and ordinary 
language, evoking in the reader a feeling of "[b]eginning again and again" C'CE, " 
23). A clue to my argument lies in the title Tender Buttons. Metaphorically speaking, 
Stein's "Buttons" are gaps or cleavages, which simultaneously differentiate and join. 
The central knot of our body, the "belly button, " is such a cleavage. It is at once a 
sign of the subject's detachment from and dependence on the mother, signifying a 
creative opening (birth), while, simultaneously, pointing back to the pre-reflective 
dimension of experience when the umbilical cord was still attached. In proposing this 
idea I, once more, take my bearings from Mieke Bal's suggestion of the "textual 
navel. " Bal's "navel" is a metaphor of the fine detail in the artwork, attracting the 
viewer's attention, thus leading him/her to participate in making the art work. In this 
sense, on the one hand Stein's "Buttons" designate starting points for creative 
production - buttons must be pressed to switch on a process - but on the other hand, 
they are points of return to the source of this creativity: the pre-reflective dimension 
of experience beneath the "cover" of habituality. 
The double meaning of Stein's "Buttons" is, moreover, underscored by the 
word "Tender, " which, when understood as the verb "to tender" (meaning to "offer 
or present formally") derives from the Latin tendere, 89 meaning on the one hand "to 
strech out, extend" or, on the other hand, to "direct one's course" at, underscoring the 
theme of intentionality, which is both the "starting-point and basie' (Ideas, 245) of 
89 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English. 
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the creative processes examined in this thesis. 90 If we place the verb "to stretcW' next 
to "button, " the result is a process of oscillation, of continual stretching through 
switching on or switching off, opening or fastening. Stein! s "Buttons" are "Fender" 
because they, through our necessary participation as readers, are stretched back and 
forth between the pre-reflective and the reflective, the "thing in itself' and the object 
as named, "perceptual meaning, " as Merleau-Ponty calls it, and "language meaning" 
(VI, 176): "every time there is a division there is a dividing" (TB, 2 1). 
BeginningAgain andAgain 
I have argued that the world exposed by wonder, and the attitude shift occasioned by 
it, are central to both phenomenology and Stein's Tender Buttons. Still open to the 
essence of this world, the child looks at the world in wonder. "[T]he only thing that 
is spontaneously poetic is children, " Stein says in "A Transatlantic Interview": 
"[c]hildren themselves are poetry" ('71, " 23). When repeated quickly, the "no since' 
in "Orange In" CA no, a no since, a no since when, a no since. .. " (TB, 3 8)) does 
not only sound like "non-sense" but also as "nuisance. " The "nuisance" felt by the 
reader when faced with the continually oscillating meaning of Tender Buttons recalls 
the despair of Lewis Carroll's little Alice when in "Wool and Water, " the most 
surreal scene of Alice in Wonderland, she cannot reach the most beautiful of a bunch 
of "darling scented rushes": 
"I hope the boat won't tipple over! " she said to herself. "Oh, what a 
lovely one! Only I couldnt quite reach it. " And it certainly did seem a 
90 The Pocket Latin Dictionary, 137. 
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little provoking ("almost as if it happened on purpose, " she thought) 
that, though she managed to pick plenty of beautiful rushes as the boat 
glided by, there was always, a more lovely one that she couldn't reach. 
"Me prettiest are always further! "91 
"What makes the 'reality' of the thing is ... precisely what snatches 
it from our 
grasp" (PP, 233). Alice is in Wonderland, a land where philosophy begins again and 
again; where wonder at the world is constantly renewed through phenomenological 
reduction and expansion. Wonderland can only be reached through the act of passing 
through: Alice falls through a long tunnel in order to get there and she stays there by 
virtue of perpetual shrinking and stretching. 
As readers of Tender Buttons we experience a similar oscillation between 
shrinking and stretching, reduction and expansion of meaning. The interconnected 
patterns of "excreation"- peeling, uncovering, washing - and re-creation in this 
book stretch us back and forth through the passage between child-like "[w]onder in 
the face of the world" and habituality. Although we are continually yearning for 
some kind of synthesis, the passage cannot be closed, hence we never escape the fate 
of what Stein in "Composition as Explanation" calls "Beginning again": "Beginning 
again and again and again explaining composition and time is a natural thing, " 
C'CE, " 23). Her work guides us to such perpetual activity so that reading itself 
becomes "a renewed experience of its own beginning, it consists entirely in 
describing that beginning" (PP, ix). Like the phenomenologists, in other words, we 
become "perpetual beginner[s]" (PP, xiv) and are faced with an ultimate deferral of 
91 Lewis Caffoll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and 77irough the Looking-Glass 
(London: Penguin Books, 1998), 177-78. 
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getting Stein's text "on the button. " The reality of Stein's "thing in itself' is 
"precisely what snatches it from our grasp. " 
What I am claiming, then, is that the process of reading Tender Buttons is 
emblematic of the "fate of perception7 articulated by Merleau-Ponty. In her analysis 
of Stein's first "Orange, " Tania Orum points out that the shift from the present tense 
"is" in this button's first line to the past tense "was" in the third line ("Why is a feel 
oyster and egg stir" to "It was an extra leaker with a sea spoon" (TB, 38; italics mine) 
implies that the fruit has been both peeled and consumed during the process of 
reading. Once a clear image of this "word-object" has appeared, Orum. suggests, the 
fruit is eaten and the text will already be read. 92 Our immediate experience of the 
object is not thought until it has become a reflective imitation of something already 
experienced. Similarly, in "A Piece of Coffee" from "Objects" we learn: "The time 
to show a message is when too late" (TB, 5). Once the full "message" regarding the 
perceived is crystallized it is already "too late, " In this light, consider "Malachite" 
from the "Objects" section: 
The sudden spoon is the same in no size. The sudden spoon is 
the wound in the decision. 
(TB, 12) 
Stein's "see spoon, " feeding us the primary sensation of the object, does make us see 
clearly but not until after we have made our interpretive "decision. " As it is the 
temporal displacement of the passage from primary perception to language meaning 
that "causes the decision" (TB, 48), our final "decision' 'about the thing seen might 
suddenly differ from what was originally perceived. Hence Stein's "see spoon" 
92 Onmi, La-sefi-ugter, p. 49 
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becomes a "sudden spoon. " This is the "fate of perception" and the fate of the 
intentional act of reading, the tender "wound in the decision. " We never stop feeling 
the "hurt" (TB, 3) of this "wound" and yet this is what makes us "go on" ("PG, " 130) 
and create again and again. 
The tenderness of our grasp of reality is the painful and yet pleasurable reality 
of StchYs perceptual reconstructions. Buds become flowers, which flourish and fade 
only to develop new buds. In the words of Wallace Stevens, "Life is always new, it is 
always beginning. The fiction is part of this beginning" (Stevens, Letters, 434). 
Likewise, for Stein, "Beginning again and again' 'is "a natural thing" ("CE, " 23). 
This recursive pattern, embedded in every part of the "composition" of Tender 
Buttons, is "as important as the whole": it corresponds with the continuity and 
repetition of the whole world within which we exist. In "Portraits and Repetitions" 
Stein writes, 
I became conscious of these things, I suppose anybody does when 
they first really know that the stars are worlds and that everything is 
moving, that is the first conscious feeling of necessary repetition, and 
it comes to one and it is very disconcerting. C'PR, " 10 1) 
Stein's Tender Buttons shows us that the daily acts of perceiving, eating, and even 
digesting "Objects" and 'Tood" are conditioned by this underlying pattern of 
repetition, "[an] a priori repetition, " in phenomenological terms, "which is axial to 
everyday reality. , 93 The multisensible experience of reading Tender Buttons (by 
reading we touch, we peel, we lick, we consume) is followed by an abrupt digestion: 
"the kind of show is made by squeezing " (TB, 11). In this light, consider "A Brown" 
93 Natanson, The Erotic Bird, 15. 
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from "Objects": "A brown which is not liquid not so more is relaxed and yet there is 
a change, a news is pressing" (TB, 14). This hinting at the processing of excrement 
underscores the tenderness and constantly changing shapes of Stein's strange 
portraits. As soon as a substance appears, revealed from underneath its "cover, " it 
liquefies, becomes 'lender, " and fades. "Beginning again and again and again... is a 
natural thing" ("CE, " 23). 
Like the acts of perceiving objects and eating and digesting food, desire - 
both physical and creative - is part of a world which always "begins again. " In 
"Poetry and Grammar, " Stein writes: 
Poetry is concerned with using with abusing, with losing with 
wanting, with denying with avoiding with adoring with replacing the 
noun. It is doing that always doing that and doing nothing but that. 
Poetry is doing nothing but using losing refusing and pleasing and 
betraying and caressing nouns ("PG, "138). 
In Tender Buttons we are exactly faced with these continual oscillations between 
"losing" and "wanting, " "avoiding" and "adoring" the object. The relationship 
between reader and text takes shape as a love relationship, recalling the "spooning" 
interaction between the reader and Stein's "Orange. " The experience of Stein's 
poetry is tantamount to unreachable desire for the object: our grasp of it remains 
"tender. " Desire, in other words, is revealed as the gap between the invisible "thing 
in itself' and "the things seen as every one sees them" (Picasso, 17). The closure of 
this gap would mean the end of desire and the end of creativity, which would violate 
what Stein told us in "Poetry and Grammar": "When I first began writing, I felt that 
writing should go on, I still feel that it should go on" C'PG, " 130). The impossibility 
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of complete reduction, then, our "slippery hold" of Stein's "thing in itself, " keeps the 
creative processes of both writing and reading alive - it makes them "go on. '994 
All in all, the difficulty of Steins dialectic lies in realising, again and again, 
what "Rooms" tells us: "The conclusion came when there was no arrangement"(0, 
44). Tender Buttons opens onto the division of perceptual experience, hence the 
"conclusion" is not one of synthesis, "arrangemenf 'and fixity but one of 
betweenness, openness and difference: "Is there pleasure when there is a passage, 
there is when every room is open" (TB, 44). Although Stein wants to "mean names 
without naming them" C'PG", 141), the dialectical tensions central to Tender 
Buttons demonstrate that we can never fully accomplish such a reductive shift of 
attitude. Just as the phenomenological "thing itself' cannot be reached, a full grasp 
of what Stein calls "the really visible thinge' or "[t]he thing in itself' cannot be 
attained. 
I have argued that Stein, in reconstructing this tenderness of our hold on 
reality, does not anticipate a Post-Modem poetics of indeterminacy, fragmentation or 
disorder. Although her portraits in "Objects, " "Food, " and "Rooms" are "not 
ordinary, " these are "not unordered in not resembling" (TB, 3; italics mine). This is 
underscored in "Rooms": the "paper shows no disorder, it shows no desertion" (TB, 
47). What Stein's "paper" - her text - does show, however, is a shift of attitude, 
which is intended to make us re-leam to look at the world. Despite the fact that her 
"word-objects" are always snatched away from our grasp, her intention with Tender 
Buttons is "still concentrated, setting out over and over again, amazed at itself. ', 
95 
94 For the terminology "slippery hold" in connection with the impossibility of complete 
reduction, I am indebted to Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor, 'Me Value of Flesh: Merleau-Ponty's 
Philosophy and the Modemism/Postmodemism Debate, " introduction to Chiasms, 9. 
95 Raynova, "Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Turning Point, " 243. 
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This work challenges us constantly to look at our object-world anew, to "Dance a 
clean drcam ... and translate more than the authority" (TB, 5 1). What 
is "translated" 
in Tender Buttons is not some authoritative version of the independent object but the 
"thatness of the thing ... that it is possible at all. "96 Stein's dialectical work "show[s] 
the choice... This means cleamess"(TB, 51), shedding light, again and again, on the 
expression of things in their essence from which our clear ideas and choices arise. 
Meaning for Stein lies in the "spreading" of "difference" (TB, 3). By opening onto 
the invisible within our visible fact-world and onto the primacy of perception 
inhabiting the words that signify this fact-world, her obscure portraits tell us that 
meaning is difference. In an examination of Merleau-Ponty's "hyperdialectic, " 
Jacques Terminiaux points out that the meaning of the word dialectic is found in "the 
,, 97 most ancient dialegein: to welcome the difference. Thus, recalling the "incessant 
rise and fall and fall and rise again7ff, 234) of Bernard's creative cycle in Woolf's 
Yhe Waves, and anticipating what Stevens calls the poet's "never-ending meditation" 
(CP, 465), it seems reasonable to suggest that the dialectic of Tender Buttons 
embraces the possibility of creative production itself, stresses perpetual opening and 
welcomes the difference. 
96 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, x. 
97 Jacques Terminiaux, "Merleau-Ponty: From Dialectic to Hyperdialectic, " 76. 
182 
CHAPTER 4 
REMOVING THE "VARNISH AND DIRT": 
THE "IDEA7'OF WALLACE STEVENS 
Poetry has to be something more than a conception of the mind. 
It has to be a revelation of nature. Conceptions are artificial. 
Perceptions are essential. 
-Wallace Stevens, OP (19 1) 
I. Phenomenoloay and Stevens Criticism 
For more than forty years there has been what one might call a phenomenological 
camp in Stevensian criticism! Oddly enough, this has resulted in only one published 
book-length study on the subject, namely Thomas J. Hines's The Later Poetry of 
' Apart from the critics discussed in this section, the list of Stevens criticism drawing on 
phenomenology goes as far back as James Baird, "Transvaluation in the Poetics of Wallace Stevens, " 
Tennessee Studies in Literature, Special Number; Studies in Honor ofJohn C Hodges and Alwin 
Thaler (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1961), 166-67; and Glauco Cambon, The Inclusive 
Flame: Studies in American Poetry (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963): 237. Critics that 
approach aspects of Stevens through Husserlian phenomenology in particular include R. D. Ackerman, 
"Believing in a Fiction: Wallace Stevens at the Limits of Phenomenology, " Philosophy and Literature 
3, no. I (Spring 1979): 79-90; Richard Macksey, "The Climates of Wallace Stevens, " in The Act of the 
Mind: Essays on the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, eds. Roy Harvey Pearce and J. Hillis Miller (The 
John Hopkins Press, 1964), 192-93; George S. Lensing, Wallace Stevens and the Seasons (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 34-37 and 81-82; Simon Critchley, "The 
Philosophical Significance of a Poem (on Wallace Stevens), " Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 
96 (1996): 269 - 29 1; and Paul Kenneth Naylor, "'The Idea of It': Wallace Stevens and Edmund 
Husserl, " The Wallace Stevens Journal 12 (Spring, 1998): 44-55. 
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Wallace Stevens: Phenomenological Parallels with Husserl and Heidegger (1976). 2 
Disturbingly, many of the phenomenological readings of Stevens, including Hines's, 
do not explore sufficiently the implications of the phenomenological reduction, 
hence missing the point of the intentionality of consciousness, "the main 
phenomenological theme" (Ideas, 241). This has led to either misleading parallels or 
accusations of a lack of fit between Stevens's poetry and phenomenology. This 
chapter is an attempt to straighten out these misleading parallels. In constrast to 
Hines's claim that Husserl's phenomenology is "inadequate for [Stevens's] aesthetic 
purposes, " 3 which is echoed by James S. Leonard and Christine E. Wharton's more 
recent description of Husserl's thought as "antiaesthetic, "4 but in agreement with 
Kevin Hart's position that "[Husserl's] broodings over the reduction speak .. 
. vividly of something central to art, 
" 51 hope to show that the reduction allows us to 
articulate not only Stevens's aesthetics but also Modernist aesthetics at large. To 
establish a foundation for my argument, I will set out by looking at previous 
phenomenological approaches to Stevens's work, beginning with Hines's book. 
While devoting the first part of his study to a purely Husserlian account of 
Stevens's early poems from Harmonium (1923), Ideas of Order (193 5), and The 
Man with the Blue Guitar (1937), and the second part to a Heideggerian approach to 
Stevens's later works (Parts ofa World (1942), Transport to Summer (1947), The 
Auroras ofAutumn (1950), and The Rock-(1954)), Hines argues for a sharp division 
2 Thomas J. Hines, The Later Poet? y of Wallace Stevens: Phenomenological Parallels with 
Husserl and Heidegger (London: Associated University Presses, 1976). The only other book-length 
study on the subject is Thirunavukarasu Balan's PhD dissertation "Wallace Stevens and 
Phenomenology" (PhD diss., The University of Toledo, 1994). 
3 Hines, The Later Poet? y of Wallace Stevens, 27 
4 Leonard and Wharton, "Wallace Stevens as Phenomenologist, " Texas Studies in Literature 
and Language 26 (1984): 331 
5 HarVThe Experience of Poetry, " 286. 
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between the poetic inquiries of an early and a late Stevens. The goal of Husserl's 
phenomenological reduction, Hines writes, was "[t]o reject all universal Ideas... to 
eliminate the intellectual preconceptions that had plagued philosophical investigation 
since Plato's ideal. " The "poetic procedure" of Stevens's early poems, Hines argues 
"is like the process of phenomenological reduction, " a "process of destruction 
wherein the ancient orders are reduced to nothing" or "thrown out. " 6 In an analysis 
of "The Idea of Order at Key West, " Hines points out that "Stevens's process of 
reduction is again at work as the speaker separates mind and world" -a separation 
which is rejected by the late, more Heideggerian Stevens: 
As Stevens rejects the division between mind and world, he also finds 
that the clear perceptions that were available through the processes of 
reduction that he had developed in Ideas of Order and The Man with 
the Blue Guitar were inadequate for his aesthetic purposes. As the gap 
between subject and object is closed in several of the poems in Parts 
of the World (1942), the poet discovers a new relation of self and 
world. 7 
By using terms such as "reject, " "eliminate, " "destruction and "thrown out, " Hines's 
description implies that the outcome of both Husserl's process of reduction and its 
equivalent in Stevens's early poems is a complete removal of preconception and 
common sense notions about the world, leading to a division between mind and 
world. This viewpoint recalls Glauco Cambon's much earlier statement that "both 
Husserl and Stevens aim at a focused apprehension of the essence of things ... by a 
process of 'stripping' or 'unhusking' ..., which Stevens calls 'abstraction' and 
6 Hines, The Later Poet? y of Wallace Stevens, 31,46,47,48 
Ibid., 52,26-27. 
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which appears in so many of his poems as a kind of preliminary negation of the 
given object, or of our construed interpretations. "8 But, when insisting on the epochi 
as a means to return to a "first philosophy, " Husserl never suggests an elimination or 
negation of the existing world. On the contrary, he argues: "Our phenomenological 
idealism does not deny the positive existence of the real (realen) world and of 
Nature.... Its sole task and service is to clarify the meaning of this world" (Ideas, 
2 1; italics mine). To recapitulate, in epochi our preconceived, theoretical ideas and 
practical considerations about the world are never denied, but merely pushed off 
centre, as it were: "We do not abandon the thesis we have adopted, we make no 
change in our conviction ... And yet the thesis undergoes a modification ... we set 
it as it were 'out ofaction, 'we 'disconnect it, ' 'bracket it'. .. We can also say: The 
thesis is experience as lived [Erlebnis], but we make 'no use' of it. " The "thesis we 
have adopted" - our uncritical preconceptions - thus remains there "like the 
bracketed in the bracket" (Husserl, Ideas, 108); it is never abandoned but simply not 
made use of. Thus, as the epochg is "a mere change of standpoint" (Ideas, 15) it 
does not change, eliminate or reject anything. On the contrary, after the operation of 
"bracketing, " Husserl stresses, "[w]e have literally lost nothing" (Ideas, 15,154). In 
claiming that the Husserlian method of reduction is an "inadequate" tool for 
examining the "relation of self and world" in the aesthetics of the later Stevens, 
Hines ironically misses the point that epochi brings into clarity this exact "relation, " 
which is "the essence of consciousness in generar' (Ideas, 113). All "acts of 
consciousness" are "intentional, " intentionality being "the unique peculiarity of 
experiences 'to be the consciousness of something" (Ideas, 112,242). Let us, once 
again, quote Judith Butler's clarifying explanation of the concept of intentionality: 
8 Cambon, The Inclusive Flame, 237. 
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"The notion that consciousness belongs solely to the domain of subjectivity thus 
misses the phenomenological point that subjectivity always belongs to the world ... 
Conciousness is, thus, in its very structure, in an implicit relation to the world it 
seeks to know. "9 
The epoche thus occasions not "the division between mind and world, " as 
Hines suggests, but their implicit relation or primordial bond. The consciousness of 
and the object of consciousness form what Husserl called an "intentional 
unity"(Ideas, 13 1) or "the Thing itself' (Ideas, 66): the intentional object only exists 
together with the subject side of the intentional structure. When Stevens in "Of 
Modem Poetry" speaks of "the poem of the act of the minX'(CP, 240), he implies 
that poetry is built up through intentional acts of consciousness, which are always 
implicitly related to reality: "It is not only that the imagination adheres to reality, but, 
also, that reality adheres to the imagination and that the interdependence is essential" 
(NA, 33). Again and again Stevens underlines this intentional aspect of poetry: 
"Poetry is not the same thing as the imagination taken alone. Nothing is itself taken 
alone. Things are because of interrelations and interactions" (OP, 163); "In poetry at 
least the imagination must not detach itself from reality" (OP, 161). 10 
Unfortunately, other critical studies of Stevens which, like Hines's, argue for 
an "early" Stevens, separating the mind from the real, misread Stevens's gestures 
toward the implicit bond between subject and obj ect-world, which constitutes the 
intentional "act of the mind" (CP, 240). Bernard Heringman writes: "in most of 
9 J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, x 
10 Another elaborate description of the intentionality in Stevens is offered by Richard A. 
Macksey. "For Stevens, as for Husserl, " he writes, "'the world' is an irreducible component of the 
given: consciousness is relational and not substantial, not so much mental as 'weltlich. ' Moods 
suffuse and penetrate the moving chaos of the outer world, an enormous field of intentional relations. " 
See Macksey, "The Climates of Wallace Stevens, " 192-193. 
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Stevens's work, poetry is either located in the realm of imagination, or, less 
frequently, in reality, "' 1 and J. Hillis Miller argues: "Imagination is the inner 
nothingness, while reality is the barren external world. .. Stevens's problem 
is to 
,, 12 reconcile the two. But such a reconciliation turns out to be impossible. This lack 
of "reconciliation" is also the focus of Helen Regueiro's interpretation of Stevens's 
early poems of "ordce'(Harmonium and Ideas of Order). Constructing his poems 
out of "a recognition of [their] intentionality, " Regueiro writes, the "intentional 
structure of the poetic imagination" undercuts any correspondence with the real: 
"Distanced from the natural world ... by the poetry that constructs an intentional 
landscape, " the poet is "den[ied] the possibility of experience" and left in a dark and 
"imprisoned" space. Thus, in her reading of Stevens, Regueiro uses the concept of 
"intentionality" as an implication of the poet's purely subjective, imaginative 
creation, completely isolating the mind from the objective world: "the poetic act is 
an act of the mind, and as such an act of enclosure. " 13 But, to repeat Anthony J. 
Steinbeck's words, "describing intentionality in terms of 'subjective' and 'objective' 
correlates can be misleading if they are taken as independent entities": 
"intentionality is not a thing, but a relation. "14 Like Hincs, Regueiro also argues for a 
difference between an "early" and "late" Stevens. While the Stevens of the early 
poems of "order" suggests an interiorisation of the ordering mind, the poet gradually 
11 BernardHeringman, "Wallace Stevens: The Use of Poetry, " in The Act ofthe Mind, 3. 
12 J. Hillis Miller, "Wallace Stevens's Poetry of Being, " in The Act ofthe Mind, 145. 
13 Helen Regueiro, The Limits ofImagination: Wordsworth, Yeats, and Stevens (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press), 38,151,27,149,148, and 164. 
14 Steinbeck, "Merleau-Ponty, Husserl, and Saturated Intentionality, " in Rereading Merleau- 
Ponty, 55. 
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recognizes the "limits" of his own imagination and "begins ... to redescend into 
reality. "15 
In another attempt to clarify the relationship between mind and world in 
Stevens's work, Alan Perlis also draws on the reduction. Like Hines, Perlis assumes 
that the reduction separates mind from world and yet his reading of Stevens is 
entirely different from Hines's: "phenomenology ... is the most outspoken in 
refusing to connect particulars and to contrive synthesis; it abdicates point of view or 
inclusive position, in favour of microscopic observation and exclusive vision. Yet 
Stevens continually argues that an object, to be properly perceived, must be held in 
relation to its environment. "16 Thus, like Hines, Perlis reads the phenomenological 
concept of reduction as a method which cancels rather than suspends our fact-world, 
isolating the "microscopic" mind from any relation with the outside world, while he, 
unlike Hines, stresses Stevens's promotion of the necessary relation between subject 
and object-world. Due to his unfortunate description of phenomenology's central 
theme, despite his emphasis of intentionality in Stevens, Perlis fails to see the 
connection between phenomenology and the poet's work, leading him to emphasise 
"the dangers inherent in trying either to connect Stevens's poems to a philosophy or 
to call Stevens himself a philosopher. ', 17 
Such "danger" is also sensed by James S. Leonard and Christine E. Wharton. 
Comparisons between Stevens and Husserl or Heidegger, they argue, "tend to distort 
both the philosophical and the poetic material (characterizing Stevens's view as 
nonaesthetic, or even antiaesthetic). " Drawing on Stevens's words that "[p]oetry 
15 Regueiro, The Limits ofImagination, 190 
16 Perlis, Wallace Stevens, 78. 
17 Ibid. 
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enhances the sense of reality, heightens it, intensifies if' (NA, 77), Leonard and 
Wharton seem to jump to the conclusion that Stevens's "view of art - or imaginative 
acts in general - as enhancement of reality is well beyond the sphere of Husserlian 
phenomenology, " which they see as "antiaesthetic. " 18 Stevens's work, they stress 
elsewhere, is "foreign to Husserl's 'phenomenological science ... : it "clears the way 
for new interpretations, not for a Husserlian apprehension of essence; and Stevens's 
use of the 'object' displaces Husserl's reductive program. "19 
In her more recent study The Practical Muse: Pragmatist Poetics in Hulme, 
Pound, and Stevens (1997), Patricia Rae uses the Husserlian epoche to read Stevens 
as a poet not of fictions, which, she claims, "is an important and damaging 
simplification, " but as a poet of hypothesis. Rae writes: 
[Stevens] places his vatic figures within ironically circumscribed 
spaces - jars, crystals, and mirrors, and huts and houses - or in spaces 
midway between the earth and the sky. These "epochal" settings, as 
Husserl might call them, are tantamount to phenomenological 
brackets. 20 
Stevens's "epochal spaces ", she points out, "stress the lack of interaction between 
phenomenologically reduced experience and the outer world. " Taking her bearings 
from Hans Vaihinger's The Philosophy of 'As If, ' Rae claims that a fiction is always 
"known to be false, " whereas the hypothesis "seeks to coincide with objective reality 
18 Leonard and Wharton, "Wallace Stevens as Phenomenologist, " 331,334, and 340. 
19 James S. Leonard and Christince E. Wharton, The Fluent Mundo: Wallace Stevens and the 
Structure ofReality (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1988), 90,89. 
20 Patricia Rae, The Practical Muse: Pragmatist Poetics in Hulme, Pound, and Stevens. 
(London: Associated University Presses, 1997), 15, 
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and will fall apart when 'the facts of experience' appear to contradict it.,, 21 
According to Rae, Stevens is a poet of hypothesis because the poet's enclosed 
"epochal spaces, " enclosed "shelters" of "peace" and retreat, "emphasiz[ing] the 
middleness of [Stevens's] expressive landscapes, " fall apart when the forces of 
reality "enter the poetry, " thus "profoundly disturbing the carefully balanced epoche 
,, 22 Stevens otherwise works so hard to preserve. Although I agree that the epoche is a 
useful tool to examine the important "middleness" of Stevens's landscapes, Rae 
fails to note that the phenomenological act of "bracketing" is not an act of 
preservation or "retreat, " protecting the poetic mind and denying enhancement of the 
real; rather, it provides access to the intentionality of consciousness, which, as we 
have seen, means that the imagination is always, already, in an implicit relation to 
the real. 23 Much like Hines and Regueiro, Rae finally distinguishes the poetic 
inquiries of the early Stevens from those of the late Stevens. Her Stevens also 
gradually comes to realise "that one is part of everything, " hence his "will to sustain 
the epoche weakens, " and the poet can re-unite with the world. 24 
11. Epoch6 as Aesthetic Tool 
The most recurrent assumption among the critics mentioned is that Stevens's early 
works separate subject and object or the mind's poetic constructions from the outside 
21 Ibid., 155,172. 
22 Ibid., 150,165,164,154. 
23 For an elaboration of this point please see the final subsection of this chapter entitled "A 
Half-Way State. " 
24 Rae, The Practical Muse, 165. 
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world. "In fact, " Anca Rosu stresses, "it has become an almost ritual gesture to recall 
such a dichotomy in any discussion of Stevens's poetry. "25 She, too, suggests that 
the method of phenomenological reduction, which is often used to shed light on this 
dichotomy, rejects everday reality, thus separating the subject from his familiar 
world: "The main reason (and proof) for the associations between Stevens's Ideas 
about reality and the Ideas promoted by Husserl or Heidegger is a certain manner his 
poems have ... of seeming to advance perception 
by cancelling previous 
9926 representations of the real. In this chapter I hope to offer both an entirely different 
reading of this mind/world relationship and a clarification of the phenomenological 
aspect of Stevens work. 27 
Before turning to an in-depth reading of Stevens's work, however, it will be 
helpful to recapitulate the phenomenological context for my argument. In this section 
and the following C'The C6zannian Composition: Part and Whole"), I will map out 
this context and point out how Stevens's poetic inquiry can be read in continuation 
from Woolf and Stein's phenomenological compositions. 
It is ironic that the majority of the critics mentioned charge the method of 
"bracketing" with a denial of interaction with the ordinary, leading to a mind/world 
25 Anca Rosu, The Metaphysics ofSound in Wallace Stevens (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The 
University or Alabama Press, 1995), 52. 
26 Ibid., 53. 
27 Taking his bearings from Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology, in his PhD 
dissertation Thirunavukarasu Balan also bases a phenomenological discussion of Stevens on "the 
ways in which wrong assumptions about phenomenology and reality/mind polarization have rnisled 
Stevens studies. " See Balan, "Wallace Stevens and Phenomenology, " iv. Like Balan I am concerned 
with clarifying the relation between mind and world in Stevens through phenomenology, but unlike 
Balan, I use Husserl's epochg, and Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the concept, as my guiding 
theme. Knowing that "[p]henomenology is accessibble only through a phenomenological method" 
(PP, viii), and that no phenomenological text is accessible without adopting the shift of standpoint of 
the reduction, I promote the reduction as a suitable tool for investigating Stevens's phenomenological 
poetry. 
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,, 28 split, whereas "[n]othing is denied in epoch6 and nothing is forgotten. Maurice 
Natanson explains: 
Another misunderstanding of epoch6 presents the phenomenologist as 
a recluse of his ego. With the abstention from existential positing, it is 
assumed that all that is left to the individual is the pulsation of his 
own consciousness: a residuum which no longer has any connection 
with reality. The trouble here is that Husserl never suggested that 
placing one's believing in the world in abeyance means that what is 
so placed is neglected, let alone denied ... Instead. .. the 
phenomenologist remains as much in the world as he ever was, 
retains all of his interests and knowledge ... The only change (and it 
is a crucial one to be sure) is that he reflects selectively on what he 
had hitherto simply lived, though both the reflecting and the living 
continue, side by side, in the life of consciousness. Rather than a 
residuum of nothing, the world in its entirety is retained, and if you 
like, regained. 29 
Thus, rather than implying a rejection or cancellation of preconceived notions, 
leading to introspection or self-enclosure, the epochal shift of attitude, which, I 
claim, lies central to Stevens's poetics, "enhances the sense of reality, heightens it, 
intensifies it" (NA, 77). In stark contrast with Rae's suggestion that the later Stevens 
gives up the epochi after realising "that one is part of everything, " the reduction in 
fact uncovers "that one is part of everything, " or, borrowing from Stevens's "An 
Ordinary Evening in New Haven ... .. [p] art of the res and not about it" (CP, 473). 
28 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 59. 
29 Ibid., 58-59 
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However, from what has been said about the epoche so far, it can hardly be denied 
that the method of "bracketing7' brings to light a relationship between part and 
whole, subject and world which is neither completely dichotomous nor completely 
unitary; rather, it points to something in between. In the words of Mark Kingswell, 
the reduction "does not take me out of the world. Instead it serves to point out a 
central paradox in human experience as Husserl explores it. How is it that I am both 
a subject experiencing the world and an object within the world? 9930 In drawing upon 
the work of both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I hope to show that Stevens' early as 
well as late works reveal neither a mind/world dichotomy, nor a complete unity; 
rather, his "poem[s] of the act of the mind" (CP, 442) are at once distinguished from 
and defined by their context. 
Whereas literary critics tend to stress "the dangers inherent in trying either to 
connect Stevens's poems to a philosophy, " underlining that Stevens "had read ... 
almost every modem philosopher and, except in a very general sense, understood 
almost none, " 31 many philosophers and theorists take Stevens's work as a paradigm 
for phenomenological speculation. In an essay examining the "philosophical 
significance" of Stevens's early poem of order "The Idea of Order at Key West, " 
philosopher Simon Critchley describes Stevens as "philosophically [the] most 
profound of modem poets, " who "advocates a phenomenological sense of the real as 
that pre-theoretical meaningful context for our practical involvement with things. " 
Just as philosopher and theorist Kevin Hart, in an essay on poetry and the 
implications of the phenomenological reduction uses Stevens's work as an example 
of his main argument', so does theorist Mark C. Taylor never question the 
30 Kingswell, "Husserl's Sense of Wonder, " 99. 
31 Perlis, Wallace Stevens, 78; Josep N. Riddell, Yhe Clairvoyant Eye: The Poetry and 
Poetics of Wallace Stevens (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1965), 37. 
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philosophical implications of Stevens, as, rather than applying phenomenology to 
Stevens's work, he clarifies a point about Heidegger by means of Stevens's 
"Anecdote of the Jar. " Both Judith Butler and philosopher Maurice Natanson use 
Stevens's poetics as an example of phenomenology in The Erotic Bird. 
Phenomenology in Literature (1998), and in "'The Idea of It: Wallace Stevens and 
Edmund Husserl" (1998), Paul Kenneth Naylor offers an illuminating examination 
and comparison of Husserl and Stevens's notions of "the idea. , 32 
In joining forces with these readings, I do not argue that Stevens was directly 
influenced by the work of Husserl. Rather, I agree with Maurice Natanson's remark: 
"the poetry of Wallace Stevens is surely philosophical; it should be suggested, 
however, that it is philosophical - without self-consciousness or deliberation - in a 
phenomenological way. 03 1 have pointed out that this is not a study of influence but 
an intertextual examination, highlighting the kinship of method and concern between 
phenomenology and the aesthetics of Woolf, Stein and Stevens. What I hope to show 
is that Stevens, like Woolf and Stein, evidences a breakdown of common notions of 
"reality" and a change of relations within Modem civilisation. His work also implies 
that the cure to what Husserl called the "crisis" of Modem Culture can be found in a 
"change of standpoint, " the main purpose of which is to expose the world as 
phenomenon and lay bare its essential structure. The result of this is to reveal that the 
primordial bond between consciousness and world - the "thing itself' - is the 
"'starting-point and basis" (Ideas, 245) for all inquiry. Stevens gestures toward this 
structure, when in The Necessary Angel he claims: "if we desire to formulate an 
32 See Simon Critchley, "The Philosophical Significance of a Poern, " 271,28 1; Mark C. 
Taylor, Nots (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 112; Kevin Hart, "The 
Experience of Poetry, " 300; J. Butler, introduction to The Erotic Bird, xiv-xiv; Natanson, The Erotic 
Bird, 5-7; and Paul Kenneth Naylor, "'The Idea of It': Wallace Stevens and Edmund Husserl. " 
33 Natanson, The Erotic Bird, 8. 
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accurate theory of poetry, we find it necessary to examine the structure of reality, 
because reality is the central reference for poetry" (NA, 7 1). "[P] oetic truth is an 
agreement with reality" (NA, 54). 
In previous phenomenological approaches to Stevens's work, parallels have 
been drawn between the method of reduction and Stevens's famous notion of 
"decreation. " In "rhe Relations between Poetry and Painting, " Stevens writes: 
Simone Weil in La Pesanteur et La Grdce has a chapter on what she 
calls decreation. She says that decreation is making pass from the 
created to the uncreated, but that destruction is making pass from the 
created to nothingness. Modem reality is a reality of decreation, in 
which our revelations are not the revelations of belief, but the 
precious portents of our own powers. The greatest truth we could 
hope to discover, in whatever fields we discover it, is that man's truth 
is the final resolution of everything. Poets and painters alike today 
make that assumption. (NA, 174-175) 
Although I agree with R. D. Ackerman, Roy Harvey Pearce, and Thomas J. Hines 
that the concept of "decreation" is similar to that of the reduction, this is not because, 
"decreation, " "like Husserl's methods of reduction and intuition, " "moves from the 
destruction of old constructs to creation of new ones. 04 Nothing is destroyed or 
negated in either the reduction or Stevens's poetry. The reduction is a "change of 
standpoint, " the aim of which is to regain sight of the obscured fact that 
consciousness itself is the source of the meaning of the world. Likewise, Stevens's 
34 Hines, The Later Poetry of Wallace Stevens, 26; 
Also see R. D. Ackerman, "Believing in a Fiction: Wallace Stevens at the Limits of Phenomenology, " 
79; Roy Harvey Pearce, "Toward Decreation: Stevens and the 'Theory of Poetry, "' in Wallace 
Stevens: A Celebration, eds. Frank Doggett and Robert Buttell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980), 286-307. 
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"decreation" makes the intentional act of consciousness - "the act of the mind" (CP, 
240) - the subject of his poetry, the result of which is to point out that "the precious 
portents of our own powers, " that is to say, consciousness iself, is the source of 
"trutW' or meaning. In my emphasis on the kinship between the reduction and 
Stevens's poetic inquiry, then, my focal point is not the poet's notion of "decreation7 
but his perpetual reflection on the primordial ground from which creativity arises. 
As mentioned above, the term re-ducere means to lead or bring back. What 
the phenomenologist is led back to through the reduction is the pre-reflective 
dimension of experience from which our reflections stem: "we start from that which 
antedates all standpoints: from the totality of the intuitively self-given which is prior 
to any theorizing reflectioný'(Ilusserl, Ideas, 86). Epochj opens onto intentionality, 
to the fact that consciousness is always already in an implicit relation to the real, 
hence it cannot possibly demonstrate separation of the mind and the real. Thus, 
"reduction is ironically a protest against reductionisrný': 35 instead of reducing our 
perceptual experience to "microscopic vision, " as Perlis calls it, by rejecting or 
negating our familiar world, it refers to "a new kind of practical outloole' (Crisis 1, 
169), which is not a rc ection of the world as we know it, but a fresh starting-point to i 
see clearly the depth of our involvement with the world, to see it "clearly in the idea 
of if' (CP, 380) as Stevens puts it in "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction. " 36 
Part of my argument in this chapter, then, lies in the awareness that 
intentionality, laid bare through the reduction, is central to both Stevens's early and 
late poetic inquiries, automatically ruling out the sharp division between an early 
Stevens, who separates or isolates mind from world, and a late Stevens, who 
35 See Manen, http: fl www. phenomenologyonline. com/inquiry/ I O. htn-d. 
36 "Notes toward a Supreme Fictioif' is hereafter abbreviated as "Notes. " 
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"discovers a new relation of self and world . *937 "1 am aware, " George Lensing writes 
in a recent study on Wallace Stevens and the Seasons, "that Stevens underwent 
certain modifications - often divided as Hannonium and post-Hannonium ... But it 
is my contention that there is far more continuity in Stevens's work than reinvention 
and redirection. ', 38 I agree that there is both important and overlooked intertextuality 
and continuity across Stevens's oeuvre, but whereas Lensing uses the cyclical pattern 
of the seasons in Stevens as a trope to illuminate the "coherent and inclusive 
wholeness" of his work, 39 1 am concerned with showing that the meaning of 
intentionality, which can only be understood through the reduction, helps us 
understand the "interrelations and interactions" (OP, 163) of Stevens's work. 
The Cizannian Composition: Part and note 
We have seen that Stein once praised Cezanne for conceiving "the idea of each part 
of a composition being as important as the whole. " Phenomenology too ascribes 
equal importance to the part and the whole. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology of Uzanne's painting, in the first chapter of this thesis I 
demonstrated how this equal balance between part and whole is implied in 
Uzanne's The Large Bathers and Woolf s Yhe Waves. In the previous chapter we 
saw how the same balance pervades the "composition" of Stein's Tender Buttons. 
Evoking reduction -a shift of attitude - Tender Buttons radically shifts our attention 
off centre, commanding us to "[a]ct so that there is no use in a centre" (TB, 43). 
37 Hines, The Later Poet? y of Wallace Stevens, 27. 
38 Lensing, Wallace Stevens and the Seasons, 17. 
39 Ibid. 
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Stein's strange "portraits" suspend the particularities of our fact-world - its 
"Objects, " "Food, " and "Rooms" - to uncover their constitutive essence; they put out 
of play common sense grammatical structures to emulate the experience of "fine 
substance[s] strangely" (TB, 4), that is to say, the pre-reflective, immediate 
experience of things seen. In Stein's "composition, " the marginal and the central, the 
invisible and visible, the pre-reflective and the reflective are given equal balance: 
"each part of [the] composition [is] as important as the whole. " 
This is also true of Stevens's poetry. The fifth stanza of "A Primitive Like an 
Orb" illustrates how our uncritical objectivism about the world is "bracketed, " or 
"ma[de] 'no use' of'(Ideas, 108), to use Husserl's words, and redefined through a 
process of reduction, bringing to light the equality of aspect and whole, single poem 
and world: 
the used-to earth and sky, and the tree 
And cloud, the used-to tree and the used-to cloud, 
Lose the old uses that they made of them, 
And they: these men, and earth and sky, inform 
Each other by sharp informations, sharp, 
Free knowledges, secreted until then, 
Breaches of that which held them fast. It is 
As if the central poem became the world, 
And the world the central poem, each one the mate 
Of the other 
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The central poem is the poem of the whole, 
The poem of the composition of the whole, 
The composition of blue sea and of green, 
Of blue light and of green, as lesser poems, 
And the miraculous multiplex of lesser poems, 
Not merely into a whole, but a poem of 
The whole, the essential compact of the parts, 
The roundness that pulls tight the final ring 
(CP, 441-442) 
"The central poem, is the poem of the whole, / The poem of the composition of the 
whole" (CP, 442) -a "composition" which is as essential to the poet as the painter: 
"Poetry and painting alike create through compositioif ' (NA, 163). This statement 
from "The Relations Between Poetry and Painting" recalls a 1938 letter written by 
Stevens to his friend Wilson E. Taylor: 
When I stop to think that Uzanne has been the source of all painting 
of any interest during the last 20 years, say, it becomes pretty clear 
that there is something wrong about calling the damn things [his 
watercolours] monstrosities. It is the way he composes, as one might 
say to a bar tender. 40 
For Stevens, as for Uzanne, the "composition" of poetry "does not mean slavishly 
copying the object: it means perceiving harmony among numerous relationships 
ýAl 
. Just as the reduction is a "mere change of standpoint" (Ideas, 15) which lays 
40 Wallace Stevens as cited by Wilson E. Taylor, "Of A Remembered Time, " in Wallace 
Stevens: A Celebration, 10 1. 
41 Paul C6zanne, Cizanne By Himseýr, ed. Richard Kendall (London: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1994), 298. 
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bare the relation between part and whole, subject and world, so does Stevens's 
poetry highlight the "interrelations and interactions" of the poem and the outside 
world, the unit and horizon, the single "note" and the entire "harmony. " In the 
"Notes, " the Canon Aspirin realises that the two parts of this relationship are not 
mutually exclusive: 
He had to choose. But it was not a choice 
Between excluding things. It was a not a choice 
Between, but of He chose to include the things 
That in each other are included, the whole 
The complicate, the amassing harmony. 
(CP, 403) 
"[I]nclud[ing] the things / That in each other are included, " each of Stevens's poems 
is as much a "poem of the act of the mind" as a "poem of the composition of the 
whole" (CP, 442), a synecdoche for the creation of both art and life. In "A Primitive 
Like an Orb, " the poet writes: "One poem proves another and the whole" (CP, 441) - 
poetry is always in an implicit relation to the frame within which it exists. "There 
is, " he stresses elsewhere, "a world of poetry indistinguishable from the world in 
which we live'(NA, p. 319). This recalls Woolf in A Room of One's Own: "fiction 
is like a spider's web, attached ever so lightly perhaps, but still attached to life at all 
four comers" (ROO, 43). Just as the single perceptions of Woolf's six subjects in 
The Waves change in accordance with the natural scenes that frame their voices, so is 
each of Stevens's poems framed by the larger body of his poetry, which is, in turn, 
framed by the cyclical pattern of life within which it comes into being: "Why should 
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a poem not change in sense when there is a fluctuation of the whole of appearance? " 
(OP, 213). 
These interrelated cyclical patterns of the perceiving mind and the world are 
central to phenomenology. In seeking to penetrate to "the philosophy of the 
Beginning" (Ideas, 16), Husserl pointed out that the philosopher too would be a 
"beginner as he reflects upon himself' (Ideas, 17). Continually enacting the 
reduction, "beginning" for Husserl, was both the permanent state of the philosopher 
and the cause of his essentially incomplete phenomenological project (Ideas, 29). It 
is this incompleteness that Merleau-Ponty responds to and takes to be the central 
theme of phenomenology itselL 
The "pre-reflective contact of self with self' that the reduction aims at 
achieving is, according to Merleau-Ponty, "impossible": "To have the idea of 
'thinking' (in the sense of the 'thought of seeing and of feeling'), to make the 
'reduction, ' to return to immanence and to the consciousness of... it is necessary to 
have words" (VI, 171). Since description of pre-reflective intentionality, 
paradoxically enough, relies on the virtues of our reflective language there is, of 
course, no point at which full reduction can be completed. Hence from his 
Phenomenology ofPerception to Yhe Invisible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty gives 
the impossibility of complete reduction a dialectical placement as a point of 
departure and point of return for his philosophy. Just as the world is "displayed only 
gradually and never 'in its entirety"' (PP, 208), "[t]he philosopher is a perpetual 
beginner.... It means also that philosophy is an ever-renewed experiment in making 
its own beginning; that it consists wholly in the description of this beginning" (PP, 
xiv. ). What I will show in this chapter is that Stevens's work, like that of his 
contemporaries Woolf and Stein, gives poetic voice to this pattern of re-beginnings. 
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Again and again his "poem refreshes life so that we share, / For a moment, the first 
idea7' (CP, 3 82), creating what the poet calls a "never-ending meditation" (CP, 465) 
or the "endlessly elaborating poeie' (CP, 486). 42 
Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on "the impossibility of the reduction"' - the 
reason behind the "perpetual beginning" of the creator - not only sheds new light on 
the cyclical patterns in Stevens's poetry, but is also a means of putting a stop to the 
much discussed imagination/reality polarisation in Stevens, a polarisation which is 
"too late, 'A3 as pre-reflective intentionality - the fact that consciousness is of the 
world - is always, already presupposed. Stevens's "Notes" sums it up: 
Two things of opposite nature seem to depend 
On one another, as a man depends 
On a woman, day on night, the imagined 
On the real. This is the origin of change. 
(CP, 392) 
"'Two things of opposite nature": the mind and the world or "the imagined" and "the 
real" are not mutually exclusive but are always already interdependent parts of one 
whole. Thus, creative production can never lie solely within the enclosed space of 
the poet's mind, as claimed by several of the critics mentioned, but depends on what 
Stevens in the Necessary Angel calls "the transaction between reality and the 
sensibility of the poet from which poetry springs" (NA, 217), the ongoing 
"transaction' 'between "[t]wo things of opposite nature, " between what the poet calls 
42 For my suggestion of the connection between Merleau-Ponty's notion of the impossibility 
of reduction and the recursive pattern in Stevens's poetry, I am indebted to Hart, "The Experience of 
Poetry. " 
43 Balan, "Wallace Stevens and Phenomenology, " 32. 
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his "first idea7' (Stevens, Letters, 426-427) - his primal, pre-objective experience of 
the "the thing itself'- and an articulated (objective) reality. Seen in this light, 
Stevens's "central poem" is "central" because it lays bare this space of betweenness. 
This poet too "state[s] the space, " to use Beckett's terminology, between him and the 
world, thus calling attention to the space or blank page where creative production 
takes place. His "poem of the act of the mind" is concerned not with "the reflection 
of a pre-existing trutW' (PP, xx) but with the very "act of bringing truth into being. " 
(PP, xx) - 
Now that a general overview of what I claim are misleading examinations of 
the phenomenological concepts of reduction and/or intentionality in Stevens's poetry 
has been given, and the context for my phenomenological approach to Stevens has 
been specified, we are finally ready to turn to a more in-depth study of the poet's 
work. In structure the rest of this chapter is divided into three overall parts. In the 
next section entitled "The Horizon, " a brief examination of Husserl's philosophical 
notion of the "horizon! ' and Stevens's equivalent notion of the "infinity of the world" 
will lay the foundation from which to examine the poet's concerns with aesthetic 
production. Arguing against the widely held view that Stevens's early poems of 
"order" (Hannonium (1923) -Ideas of Order (1935)) suggest an order imposed 
upon the outer world by an enclosed poetic mind, thus implying a post-reflective 
polarisation of the subjective and the objective, 44 I will set out by showing that 
intentionality- the fact that subjectivity is already implicitly related to the world - is 
44 See Helen Regueiro's essay "The Ordered World" in her chapter on Stevens in The Limits 
of Imagination, 165-178; Bonnie Costello also suggests that Stevens's early poems are imbued with 
the theme of the poetic mind ordering the world. In Parts of a World Stevens "began a new approach 
to the genre, in which landscapes become parts of a world rather than ways of summarily ordering a 
world of parts. " Costello "Wallace Stevens: The Adequacy of Landscape, " The Wallace Stevens 
Journal 17, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 211. For a discussion of other critics arguing for this imposition of 
human order upon the world in "The Idea of Order at Key West" in particular, see the part of this 
section entitled "Muddy Centre. " 
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the "starting-point and basis" (Ideas, 245) of Stevens's early and late poetic inquiry. 
In section IV entitled "The Essence of Order, " which includes four subsections, I 
will sharpen this point in a reading of one of the most famous poems of "order": 
"The Idea of Order at Key West. " Phenomenology is, as mentioned, "the study of 
essences, and according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of essences" 
(1111, vii). I will show that Stevens's "Idea of Order"brings to light not an order 
imposed on the world from the outside but an "essence" of order existing within it. 
By continually juxtaposing my reading with passages from the "Notes, " and by 
highlighting my argument by means of the 1955 poem "Of Mere Being" (OP), the 
early Hannonium (1923) poems "The Snow Man" and "Anecdote of the Jar, " and 
"An Ordinary Evening in New Havee'from The Auroras ofAutumn (1950), 1 will 
demonstrate important and overlooked intertexuality across Stevens's oeuvre. While 
doing this I hope to induce in my reader a state of phenomenological clarity, an 
awareness of the pre-reflective dimension of experience that is the "starting-point 
and basis" for both phenomenological investigation and creative production in 
Stevens's work. As in the previous chapters it is assumed that the reduction is "not 
only a research meth od, it is also a phenomenological attitude that must be adopted 
by anyone who wishes to participate in the questions that a certain project 
,, 45 pursues. Like the nail and hole that Mieke Bal spots in Vermeer's "Woman 
Holding a Balance", Steven's poetic "notes" are "traces of the work of art, in all 
senses of that word, " 46 proclaiming both the production of art and of how the reader 
is a necessary part of that production. 
In the final section, entitled "A 'Total-Double-Thing': The Fate of 
Perception, " my focus is on the in-between space of creative production itself or 
45 Manen, http: //phenomenologyonline. com/inquiry/IO. html. 
46 Bal, "Dispersing the Image", 77. 
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what Stevens terms "the transaction between reality and the sensibility of the poet 
from which poetry springs" (NA, 217). Taking my bearings from Merleau-Ponty's 
notion of "hyperdialectic, " his dialectic without synthesis introduced in the previous 
chapter, I show that the cyclical patterns in Stevens's poems, leading poet and reader 
into perpetual beginning or "never-ending meditation[s]" (CP, 465), is guided not 
only by the theme of reduction but by the impossibility of complete reduction. This 
final section is developed with the support of passages from "Notes" and an 
amalgamation of other late poems. 
In my interpretations of Stevens's poems, I refer to sections from the essays 
in The Necessary Angel (1951) and frequently draw on his Adagia, notebook 
aphorisms which appear in the Opus Posthumous (1957). My choice to use the long 
poem "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction" as a continual point of reference throughout 
the chapter is not only based on the fact that, in agreement with Paul Kenneth 
, A7 Naylor, I find this "the most Husserlian of Stevens's poems, but also lies in the 
symbolic implications of the poem's title. Stevens's "Notes" not only suggest the 
musical notation of the "exceeding music" (CP, 167) that in "The Man with the Blue 
Guitar" "must take the place / Of empty heaven and its hymns" (CP, 167) but are, 
like Woolf s "mark on the wall" and Stein's "buttons, " metaphors for the 
preliminary note-taking phase of creative production. "Notes, " "marks" and 
"buttons" are representative of what Mieke Bal terms "textual navels": fissures, 
which simultaneously divide andjoin. Like Woolf's "marle'and Stein's "Buttons, " 
Stevens's poetic "Notes" reflect on the division of perceptual experience which 
phenomenology uncovers: "not only are we dealing with what is given but also with 
47 Naylor, 'Thc Idca of If'. 45. 
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what is presupposed for the giving to occur. , 48 In this sense, on the one hand they 
designate starting points - preparatory notes or scribbles - for creative production, 
but, on the other hand, they uncover a more primordial dimension of experience as 
the ever-present ground of creativity. Thus, I will once again be using the double 
meaning of B al's "naver' to illuminate the ways in which intentionality is the 
"starting-point and basis" of Stevens's poetic inquiry. On the one hand his "Notes" 
signify creative birth and beginning -the umbilical cord has been cut, as it were - but, 
on the other hand, they never allow us to lose sight of the primordial relation 
between subject and world. This ongoing interplay between creative opening and a 
primordial attachment to what Merleau-Ponty calls "a kind of original past, a past 
which has never been a present' ' (PP, 242), results in the perpetual beginning of 
Steven's "never-criding meditation[s]" (CP, 465). 
Ill. The Horizon 
Suspending what we, according to habit, believe to be real, the reduction brings to 
light the world as phenomenon, laying bare its essential structure, which has been 
obscured by the surface of our everyday fact-world. In other words, the roots of our 
usual notions about the world are uncovered. The reduction, which, as noted above, 
is often misread as a method leading to reductionism and introspection, does not 
imply abandonment of one world for another but a shift of attention, leading us away 
from our world of facts and back to its underlying ground. Thus, Husserl, "direct[s] 
48 Hart, "The Experience of Poetry, " 288. 
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our attention to the fact that phenomenological epoch& lays open... an infinite realm 
ofbeing ofa new kind" (CM, 27): 
... a dimly apprehended depth orfringe of indeterminate reality ... 
an empty mist of dim indeterminacy gets studded over with intuitive 
possibilities, or presumptions, and only the "form" of the world as 
"world" is foretokened. Moreover, the zone of indeterminacy is 
infinite. The misty horizon that can never be completely outlined 
remains necessarily there. (Ideas, 102) 
Husserl's "misty horizon' 'of "indeterminacy, " based on what William James, before 
him, had called "fringe, " is a figure of the continuity and repetition of the world 
which underlie all our determinate expressions, but which we take for granted. 49 The 
task of phenomenology, the aim of which was to come upon a new certainty of roots, 50 
is exactly"to penetrate to th[is] primal ground"(Husserl Short, 10), which is "always 
already there, existing in advance for us, the 'ground' of all praxis. "51 It is in this 
fundamental gound of experience that "the immediate a priori phenomenology, the 
'first philosophy... (Ideas, 16) takes root. This brings us to the often mentioned and 
only reference to Husserl in Stevens's writings: 52 
Jean Wahl wrote to me, saying "I am just now reading the 
M6ditations Cartesiennes by Husserl. Very dry. But he affirms that 
there is an enormous (ungeheueres) a priori in our minds, an 
inexhaustible infinity of a priori. He speaks of the approach of the 
49 Wilshire, William James and Phenomenology, 120 and 122. 
50 Natanson, Edmund Husserl 53. 
51 Husserl as quoted in Natanson, The Erotic Bird, 44. 
52 See Hines, The Later Poetry of Wallace Stevens, 23. 
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unapproachable. " This enormous a priori is potentially as poetic a 
concept as the idea of infinity of the world. 
(OP, 194; italics mine) 
Commenting on the same passage, Maurice Natanson points out: "Wahl was a 
careful and knowledgeable reader of Husserl, " and as "Stevens read French with 
ease, he should have had the time to discover phenomenology. " But whether or not 
the poet was familiar with phenomenological thought, Natanson stresses that his 
work always "hovered at its edges. " 53 1 must agree with Natanson that the "infinity 
of a priori... the approach of the unapproachable" to which Wahl refers exists 
throughout Stevens's oeuvre as the underlying condition for the creation of poetry; it 
is at once the "starting-point and basis" (Ideas, 245) for creative production. When 
Stevens in "The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet" defines poetry as an "unofficial 
view of being" (NA, 41), he directs us toward the phenomenal features of this world - 
the infinity of the world and the intentionality of consciousness - which we take for 
granted, but which, nevertheless, remain the basis for our official view of being: our 
conventional acts and modes of discourse. 54 In "An Ordinary Evening in New 
Haven, " the poet most clearly shifts the direction of our attention away from our 
official or "ordinary" outlook on daily life to the a priori and extra-ordinary 
dimension of experience: "A blank underlies the trials of device / The dominant 
blank, the unapproachable" (CP, 477). "Poetry, " he claims in the Adagia, "is a 
search for the inexplicable" (OP, 173). 
Just as Husserl, by means of the reduction, sought access to ... pure' 
consciousness, " that is, an experience of the world before it is touched by our 
53 Natanson, The Erotic Bird, 8. 
54 For this insight I am indebted to J. Butler's introduction to The Erotic Bird, xiv-xiv. 
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"theorizing reflection7' (Ideas, 114), so does Stevens, in "An Ordinary Evening in New 
Haven, " seek, 
The poem of pure reality, untouched 
By trope or deviation, straight to the word, 
Straight to the transfixing object, to the object 
At the exactest point at which it is itself, 
Transfixing by being purely what it is, 
(CP, 471) 
"The poem of pure reality" is the invisible but nevertheless essential half of the 
visible poem on the page, which has been touched by "trope or deviation": "Every 
poem is a poem within a poem: the poem of the idea within the poem of the words" 
(OP, 174) 
A "pure, " pre-reflective consciousness of the world - that is to say, 
intentionality- is the starting point of philosophical inquiry. "True philosophy, " 
Merleau-Ponty tells us, "consists in relearning to look at the world, " (PP, xx). We 
are reminded of Woolf's Lily Briscoe who, in her painting, yearns to capture a state 
of pre-objective freshness "before habits had spun themselves across the surface, " a 
point of pure intentionality prior to habit and reason: "it was not knowledge but unity 
she desired... nothing that could be written in any language known to meif ' (L, 25 8, 
70). The previous chapter shed light on Stein's paradoxical attempt in Tender 
Buttons to make written language emulate the pre-reflective experience of objects; to 
4&see ... fine substance[s] strangely" 
(TB, 4) and express this experience "in writing 
without at all necessarily using its name" C'PG,, " 145). Just as Woolf and Stein are 
concerned with bringing into words the insubstantial shapes of pre-semantic 
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experience, so does Steven ponder on how "[the rational mind] finds... the unknown 
always behind and beyond the known7(OP, 228): "Is there a poem that never 
reaches words ... ?" (CP, 396). 
Stevens's "poem of pure reality, " the ideal "poem that never reaches words, " 
is connected with what he terms "the first idea": "If you take the varnish and dirt of 
generations off a picture, you see it in its first idea. If you think about the world 
without its varnish and dirt, you are a thinker of the first idea" (Stevens, Letters, 426- 
427). The return to this "first idea" is also pondered on throughout the first section of 
Stevens's "Notes" (CP, 381,382,383,387), which is, significantly, titled "It Must 
Be Abstract. ', 55 The "abstract" is that dimension of experience exposed to the subject 
when the shift of attitude of the reduction is adopted, that is to say, when the 
"varnish and dirt" of preconceived notions about reality are "bracketed. " Just as 
Stein in Tender Buttons emulates a more direct experience of things before these are 
covered or wrapped up by conventional fonns of expression and symbolises this 
attempt by opening boxes, uncovering cushions, and peeling fruit, so does Stevens 
scrape the varnish and dirt off the world to see it "with an ignorant eye / And see it 
clearly in the idea of it" (CP, 380). The "anti-master-man" of "Landscape with Boat" 
yearns for a world "without its varnish and dirf': 
He brushed away the thunder, then the clouds, 
Then the colossal illusion of heaven. Yet still 
The sky was blue. He wanted imperceptible air. 
He wanted to see. He wanted the eye to see 
And not be touched by blue. 
(CP, 241) 
55 1 will return to several of the passages in the "Notes" that ponder on the "first idea" 
throughout this chapter. 
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Thus, in this poem-painting, Stevens's "anti-master-man" unpaints reality as it were. 
He too attempts an epochi - an abstention from conventional ways of seeing - in 
order to get closer to "[t]he poem of pure reality, untouched / By trope or deviation" 
prior to reflection. As "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven7puts it, he wants to see 
"through the certain eye, / The eye made clear of uncertainty, with the sight / Of 
simple seeing, without reflection7 (CP, 47 1). This approach approximates what 
Husserl in the Ideas refers to as "Immediate 'seeing' (Sehen), not merely the sensory 
seeing of experience, but seeing in general as primordial data consciousness of any 
kind whatsoever [which] is the ultimate source ofjustification for all rational 
statements" (Ideas, 84). "Poetry must be irrational"(OP, 162) says Stevens in the 
Adagia: it opens onto the source of the rational. 
In "A Collect of Philosophy" Stevens claims that "poetry is to a large extent 
an art of perception and ... the problems of perception as they are developed in 
philosophy resemble similar problems in poetry" (OP, 19 1). Both Husserl's "first 
philosophy" and Stevens's "first idea" are such "problem[s] of perception. " In order 
to perceive this "first philosophy" (within which philosophy is grounded) or to be a 
thinker of the "first idea" (within which poetry is grounded) one must begin by 
shifting the direction of one's attention from the reflective to the pre-reflective 
dimension of experience. 56 
When Maurice Natanson claims that Stevens's work is phenomenological 
"without self-consciousness, " he refers to this primordial aspect of Stevens's poetic 
inquiry, which is, or so I argue, as much part of his early as late poems. In the early 
poems from Harmonium and Ideas of Order, Stevens never allows his reader to lose 
56 "Phenomenology is accessible only through a phenomenological method" (PP, viii), 
writes Merleau-Ponty. The "method" he refers to is, of course, the reduction. Likewise, any 
phenomenological text (and most of Stevens's poems are phenomenological) is accessible only 
through the reduction. 
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,. sight of 
the horizon of continuity within which what is given appears. Like the sea in 
"The paltry Nude Starts on a Spring Voyage, " (CP, 5) and "Infanta Marina7'(CP, 8) 
and the "rimeless Mothee, in "In the Carolinas" (CP, 4), Stevens's "river" in "rhe 
River of Rivers in Connecticuf ' (CP, 533) is a gesture towards this horizon, the 
presupposed stream of existence: 
There is a great river this side of Stygia, 
Before one comes to the first black cataracts 
And trees that lack the intelligence of trees 
No shadow walks. The river is fateful, 
Like the last one. But there is no ferryman. 
Call it, once more, a river, an unnamed flowing, 
Space-filled, reflecting the seasons, the folk-lore 
Of each of the senses; call it, again and again, 
The river that flows nowhere, like a sea. 
(CP, 533) 
Thus Stevens makes us aware that "[i]ntentionality is a flow, a river which 
consciousness is immersed in, making it unnecessary to say that one can 'step' into the 
river; one is the river. "57 Stevens's "river" is "fateful": it is full of our fate as it 
always underlies our living acts and expressions. The trees by this river "lack the 
intelligence of trees" - they are representative of the unintelligible and 
"unapproachable" horizon to which all our acts relate. Its flowing is "unnamed" as it 
57 Natanson, The Erotic Bird, 25. 
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always already exists before we even learn to name and impose meaning upon it. 
"The meanings are our own, " writes Stevens in "Things of August, " as they create "a 
text that we shall be needing": "A text of intelligent men / At the centre of the 
unintelligible" (CP, 493). Our objective texts try to make existence meaningful, 
making it flow somewhere. Stevens's river, however, "flows nowhere" and "there is 
no ferryman. " 
What emerges from my discussion, then, is that in examining the kinship of 
method between phenomenology and creative production in the poetry of Stevens, 
the emphasis falls less on result than on approach and attitude. Like Husserl's "first 
philosophy, " Stevens's "first idea" is rooted in the underlying "river" of experience, 
which can only be laid open through a change of attitude. Much like the "current' 'in 
Stein's "A Long Dress" or the ongoing rhythm of the waves in Woolf's The Waves, 
Stevens's "river"refers to the Husserlian horizon of continuity - the "a priori 
repetition, " which is immanent to daily life and remains in advance of our acts and 
58 
expressions. In the words of Kevin Hart, "not only are we dealing with what is 
given but also with what is presupposed in order for the giving to occur. "59 Like the 
phenomenologist, then, Stevens steps back into epochg, exposes the world in its 
pregivenness and the implicit relation of consciousness to it. Challenging Modem 
thought to reflect on the ground from which it descends, the poet starts from scratch 
and uncovers the intentionality of consciousness as a "starting-point and basis" for 
the creation of poetry. In what follows I hope to demonstrate that this radical shift of 
attitude sheds a clarifying light on the much discussed imagination/reality dilemma 
in Stevens's work. 
58 Natanson, The Erotic Bird, 15. 
59 Hart, "The Experience of Poetry, " 288. 
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IV. The Essence of Order 
It should be clear from what I have already said that there are two inter-related terms 
at work in our discussion: horizon and intentionality. We have seen that just as 
intentionality - our perceptions ofthings - manifests itself against a horizon of 
continuity, the perceptions of the six perceivers in Woolf's The Waves manifest 
themselves against the cyclical pattern of nature in the interludes: the rising and 
setting of the sun, the singing of the birds, and the continual breaking of the waves. 
Although Woolf s voices try to impose private orders upon a world of flux, they are, 
inevitably, "made of the same stuff' (Primacy, 163) and caught up in the same world 
of "flesh. " Although each wants to sing a song of his/her own, they are all connected 
by "the singing of the real world. "60 In a similar manner, the singer in Stevens's 
"The Idea of Order at Key West" is "the maker" (CP, 129) of her own song and yet, 
at the periphery of her intentional creation, her "poem of the act of the mind" (CP, 
240), lies a horizon of continuity, the singing of the sea: 
She sang beyond the genius of the sea 
The water never formed to mind or voice, 
Like a body wholly body, fluttering 
Its empty sleeves; and yet its mimic motion 
Made constant cry, caused constantly a cry, 
That was not ours although we understood, 
60 1 have taken this expression from one of Woolf's diary entries : "If I could catch the 
feeling, I would: the feeling of the singing of the real world. .. " (Diary 3,260). 
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Inhuman of the veritable ocean. 
The sea was not a mask. No more was she. 
The song and water were not medleyed sound 
Even if what she sang was what she heard, 
Since what she sang was uttered word by word. 
(CP, 128) 
Stevens scholars have often noted that the singing woman, who is the object of the 
poet's eye, recalls the singer in Wordsworth's "The Solitary Reaper. , 61 There are, 
however, significant differences between the two poems, a clarification of which will 
add to our understanding of the phenomenology of perception that Stevens's work 
promotes. 
For the Romantic poet, poetry was an "imitatress of nature, " a 
"reconcilement of the external with the internal. 9ý62 The poet's encounter with nature 
would open the way to the poet's mystical and at times divine moments of vision, 
which would transcend the common world. Although the Romantic poet would 
claim a close relationship with other men, he would actually stand apart from them 
by virtue of his higher vision. He was, on the one hand, "a man speaking to men" in 
that he would "thin[k] and fee[l] in the spirit of human passions, " but on the other 
hand, he was "endowed with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and 
,, 63 tenderness. Hence the Romantic moment of vision would be that of the poet and 
61 Several scholars have drawn parallels between these two poems. See Louis L. Martz, 
"Wallace Stevens: The Skeptical Music, " in The Poem ofthe Mind., Essays on Poetty, English and 
American, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 192; Regueiro, The Limits ofImagination, 84- 
85; Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: 71e Poems of Our Climate (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 
1977), 102-103. 
62 Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, 131 
63 Wordsworth as quoted in Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, 107,108,102. 
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never really that of his reader. As David Walker has pointed out, this distance 
between reader and poem is echoed by a similar distance between poet and object- 
world. Despite his yearning for an ultimate reconcilement with the natural world, the 
Romantic poet "paradoxically affirms the ultimate separation implicit in his act of 
consciousness. "64 Whereas the poet in "The Solitary Reaper" bears the "music" of 
the reaper's song in his "heart" "[flong after it was heard no more, " thus expressing a 
"powerful... emotion recollected in tranquillity" and stressing a gap between the 
poet and the scene that his inner eye beholds, 65 Stevens's "The Idea of Order at Key 
Wesf 'casts light on the immediacy of perceptual experience. From what has been 
said so far, it should be clear that the phenomenological reduction, apart from being 
a "research method, " is a specific shift of attention that must be practised by the 
reader of a phenomenological text. In what follows, I indicate that Stevens, by virtue 
of a phenomenological shift of attitude, rejects the divine aspect of Romantic poetry, 
offers a closer relation between seer and seen, poet and singer, reader and text, thus 
"stat[ing] the space, " in Beckett's terminology, that the Romantics were incapable of 
stating. 
In Stevens's song about a song, his poem about poetry, a woman "sing[s] 
beyond the genius of the sea, " implying a distance between her song and the ever- 
present world (the sea), which is a "genius, " that is to say, the original ground of her 
creation. Although the "empty" and "fluttering" "body" of the sea "[m]ade constant 
cry, caused constantly a cry" and is thus the "constanf 'occasion for the singer's 
creative notes, its singing stands apart from her human song: "The song and water 
were not medleyed sound. " Although the woman sings about her experience of the 
64 David Walker, The Transparent Lyric: Reading andMeaning in the Poetry ofStevens and 
Williams (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 7. 
65 Worsdworth, The Complete Poetical Works, 192. 
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world, she can never fully grasp this experience in words. "The water never form(s] 
to mind or voice" because the meaning of her song relies on the virtues of a 
language, of an "utter[ing] word by word, " that is always, already later than her 
immediate intentional experience of the world. As Husserl claims in the Ideas: "we 
do not see what we are actually experiencing" (Ideas, 459), and as Stevens puts it in 
"A Collect of Philosophy": 
According to the traditional views of sensory perception, we do not 
see the world immediately but only as a result of a process of seeing 
and after the completion of that process, that is to say, we never see 
the world except the moment after. Thus we are constantly observing 
the past. Here is an idea, not the result of poetic thinking and entirely 
without poetic intention, which instantly changes the face of the 
world. (OP, 190) 
Recalling Merleau-Ponty's notion of icart, the temporal "distantiation! ' 
between the primacy of perception and articulation, Stevens's singer at Key West is 
"observing the past, " reflecting on the world and singing a song that cannot but be 
"beyond" (later than) the "genius" of the sea, which is, nevertheless, the original 
ground of her song. Thus, like Woolf and Stein, Stevens opens onto the gap between 
pre-reflective and reflective experience, between the immediate "act of the mind" of 
intentional experience and "the moment aftee, of the fully thought and verbalised 
expression. 
In this sense, Stevens entitles one of the poems from The Auroras ofAutumn 
(1950) "What We See is What We Think"(CP, 259) and claims elsewhere that "The 
tongue is an eye" (OP, 167), suggesting that our everyday reality, based on our own 
reason and"tongue" is, in fact, "A little different from reality" (CP, 344). This daily 
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reality is what "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven' 'calls "Reality as a thing seen 
by the mind, H Not that which is but that which is apprehended" (CP, 468). Hence 
the paradox of "This Solitude of Cataracts": "There was so much that was real that 
was not real at all" (CP, 424). 
Stevens's singer offers an interesting parallel to a passage from Joyce's 
Ulysses (1922). In the chapter significantly called "Proteus" -a reference to the 
shape-shifting God of the sea who stands for the strearn of existence - Stephen 
Dedalus walks along the sea-shore between the fixed and the unfixed, between 
definite and indefinite. Having broken his glasses the day before, he is essentially 
short-sighted, tests the "reality" of his inner eye - "Shut your eyes and see" - and 
realises that it is the incessant activity of perceptual experience that shapes objective 
reality. 66 
The singer at Key West, then, sings the world as "[n]ot that which is but that 
which is apprehended. " Recalling the earlier Harmonium poem "rea at the Palaz of 
Hoon" in which the sea's "golden ointment" and "blowing hymns" (CP, 65) rain out 
of the speaker's mind and are made by his ears, respectively, the singer herself 
becomes "the compass of that sea" (CP, 65): 
It was her own voice that made 
The sky acutest at its vanishing. 
She measured to the hour its solitude. 
She was the single artificer of the world 
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea, 
Whatever self it had, became the self 
That was her song, for she was the maker. 
66 James Joyce, tflysses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 37. 
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It may be that in all her phrases stirred 
The grinding water and the gasping wind 
But it was she and not the sea we heard. 
(CP, 129) 
While the two onlookers, the poet and his friend Ramon Fernandez (CP, 130), can 
only fully grasp the singer's song as this is "uttered word by word" in a language 
that they are familiar with, they are, nevertheless, aware that "[t]he grinding water 
and the gasping wind" "sti[r]" within the song. Just as consciousness is always of 
something, the woman can only sing if she has something to sing of. As Merleau- 
Ponty puts it in Phenomenology ofPerception: "reflection does not grasp its full 
significance unless it refers to the unreflective fund of experience which it 
presupposes, upon which it draws, and which constitutes for it a kind of original 
past, a past which has never been a present" (PP, 242). Although the woman herself 
does not perceive it, the meaning of her song presupposes and is dependent on "the 
meaningless plungings of water and the wind" (CP, 129), "meaningless" referring to 
the fact that it is not of human meaning. The human meaning of her song signifies 
inasmuch as it opens onto a more original "wild meaning" (VI, 155) inhabiting it. 
The crying sea is "not a mask [and] No more was she" (CP, 128): both sea and 
singer - the singer of "the real world" and the singer of "the artificial world" (CP, 
252) - are equally real and equally important parts of the whole meaning of the song. 
"Muddy Centre" 
The singer at Key West thus shapes her song out of the "meaningless" sea (CP, 129): 
her singing adds what the "Notes" calls "sweeping meaning" (CP, 384) to its 
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"fluttering" sounds. Hence critics have stressed that the point of the poem's title is 
the mind's "idea of order" imposed upon the chaos of reality, implying both a 
struggle between and separation of mind and world. Helen Vendler claims that 
"Stevens decides or appears to decide, that the human voice, given its powerful 
effects, is of a greater order of magnitude than the voice of the ocean; he 
consequently must decide how to represent the greater magnitude of the singer's 
power. ', 67 Denis Donoghue, too, emphasises the power of the singer's voice, arguing 
that the woman "imposes upon reality her own imagination, until reality is taken up 
,, 68 into her song and there is nothing but the song. The polarisation of the human and 
the natural is also brought into focus by Thomas J. Hines, who claims that "the order 
that is suggested to the observer by the woman's song is not part of or in unison with 
the surrounding reality represented by the sea. In fact, the poem describes the 
process of the ordering imagination in terms that continually stress the difference 
between the idea (the created song) and the sea (physical reality) . "69 For Joseph N. 
Riddell, however, the "idea of order" is the belated "realized moment of order" of 
the onlooking poet: "The poet receives the impression of a drama, and translates the 
song into the sound of words, which become at once a projection of and comment on 
experience. (Note that the poem is three removes from the girl's sense of order; it has 
become an 'idea. '). "70 But when considering that Stevens in the "Notes" tells us 
"Never [to] suppose an inventing mind as source / Of this idea" (CP, 381; italics 
mine) and that "[flhe first idea was not to shape the clouds / In imitation. The clouds 
67 Helen Vendler, Words Chosen Out ofDesire (Knoxville: The University of Tennesec 
Press, 1984), 68. 
68 Denis Donoghue, Connoisseurs of Chaos: Ideas of Order in Modern American Poetry 
(London: Faber, 1965), 190. 
69 Hines, The Later Poet7y of Wallace Stevens, 5 1. 
70 Riddell, The Clairvoyant Eye, 118. 
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preceded us" (CP, 3 83), the "idea of order" seems to be of neither the "inventing" 
singer, "shap[ing]" the world "[fln imitation, " nor of the poet. But what, then, is it 
of? Once again Stevens's "Notes" provides an answer: 
There was a muddy centre before we breathed. 
There was a myth before the myth began, 
Venerable and articulate and complete. 
From this the poem springs: that we live in a place 
That is not our own, and, much more, not ourselves 
And hard it is in spite of blazoned days 
We are the mimics. Clouds are pedagogues 
The air is not a mirror but a bare board, 
(CP, 384) 
Thus, over against Vendler's emphasis on "the greater order of magnitude" of 
the human voice, it seems to me that Stevens's singer is but a "mimic" and 
"the outer voice of sky /And cloud" (CP, 129) are her "pedagogues. " Just as 
the phenomenological "horizon7' or Stevens's "infinity of the world" is "the 
background from which all acts stand ouf ' (PP, xi), the sea and clouds 
constitute the background from which the singer's song "springs" (CP, 383). 
We describe the world to make it our own, but as we "live in a place / That is 
not our own" (CP, 383), this is merely "description without place. It it is a 
sense H To which we refer experience" (CP, 343), hence "[t]he first idea, is not 
[the singer's] owif'(CP, 383). 
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"[B]efore we breathed, " before we could even think and sing of the 
world, "[tlhere was a muddy centre. " Stevens suggests that our ability to speak 
of and "shape the clouds /In imitation" has germinated from this "muddy 
centre", which, much like Merleau-Ponty's notion of "ecart, " is "a principle of 
differentiation7' existing within being. 71 "Meaning is invisible, " Merleau-Ponty 
told us, "but the invisible is not the contradictory of the visible: the visible 
itself has an invisible inner framework" (VI, 2 15). Just as our visible 
perceptions are conditioned by a pre-existing but unperceived ground or 
"horizon, " our clear expressions are conditioned by a "core of primary 
meaning round which the acts of naming and expression take shape" (PP, xv). 
Our ability to perceive, differentiate objects, and impose order upon the world, 
then, rests on a not yet differentiated "muddiness" within being itself It is 
from this same muddiness that Stevens's "first idea7' arises. 72 
In "On Poetic Truth, " Stevens claims: "the essence in art is insight of a 
special kind into reality" (OP, 238). This insight reveals that "[w]e live in concepts 
of the imagination before the reason has established them. .. reason is simply the 
methodizer of the imagination7(NA, 154; italics mine). Significantly, 
"Phenomenology is the study of essences, " and "[I]ooking for the world's essence, " 
writes Merleau-Ponty, is looking for what it is as a fact for us, before any 
73 
thematization7 (PP, vii, xv; italics mine). The usually invisible and yet essential 
71 The term "principle of differentiation7' is Jerrold Seigel's, "A Unique way of Existing, " 
475. 
72 For the pattern of thought in this passage I am indebted to David Lavery, "The More Than 
Rational Distortion in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, " The Wallace Stevens Journal 8 (1983): 1-7. 
73 Paul Kenneth Naylor uses Erazim's Kohak's clarifying and demystifying explanation of 
"essence" in his article on Husserl and Stevens. Kohak writes: "We usually think of 'essence' as a 
hidden inner core, which has to be abstracted by an operation of the active intellect, by a mystical 
intuition... By contrast, 'Wesen, ' derived from the old Germanic verb for 'to be, ' suggests 
something directly presented in experience. " See Naylor, "'The Idea of It, "' 50. 
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"muddy ccntre" around which our rational thoughts and thernatisations take shape 
can only be revealed to the perceiver when he/she is "ignorant" of that world: 
"Ignorance is one of the sources of poetry" (OP, 173). Thus Stevens challenges us in 
the "Notes": "You must become an ignorant man again / And see the sun again with 
an ignorant eye / And see it clearly in the idea of it" (CP, 380). A "thinker of the first 
idea, " then, is someone who finds creative inspiration from the already "[v]enerable 
and articulate and complete"(CP, 383) "muddy centre" that our "artificial world" 
(CP, 252) has lost sight of 
When Leonard and Wharton in The Fluent Mundo argue that "Stevens is 
drawn less to the 'essence of things' than to a fictionality, " 74 they stress that 
"Stevens returns, not with a cognitive but with a sensuous vision, to the 'first idea' of 
'Notes' - the idea of 'this invented world, / The inconceivable idea of the sun' (CP, 
380), " which, in their view, is "foreign to" Husserl's phenomenological study of 
essences. 75 What Leonard and Wharton fail to note, however, is that a vision of the 
world "in the idea of it, " in Stevens's terms, is tantamount to a vision of its 
"essence. " Consider Husserl's Ideas: 
At first "essence" indicated that which in the intimate self-being of an 
individual discloses to us "what" it is. But every such what can be 
"set out as Idea". Empirical or individual intuition can be transformed 
into essential insight (ideation) -a possibility which is itself not to be 
understood as empirical but as essential possibility. The object of 
such insight is then the corresponding pure essence or eidos ...... 
74 Leonard and Wharton, The Fluent Mundo, 90. 
75 Ibid., 92 and 90. 
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On quite similar lines essential intuition is the consciousness of 
something of an "object, "... (Ideas, 54-55) 76 
The "essence" of a thing, "disclos[ing] to us 'what' it is, " recalls "Tbe scholastic 
quidditas, the whatness of a thing" that Stephen Dedalus refers to in A Portrait ofthe 
Artist as a Young Man 77 _a whatness that Stevens ponders on in the essay "On 
Poetic TrutW': "there is a unity rooted in the individuality of objects and discovered 
in a different way from the apprehension of rational connections" (OP, 237). "[P]ure 
essence or eidos" (idea) is what is left of the individual object after its "rational 
connections" - its "varnish and dirt" - have been "bracketed. " Thus, the poet shifts 
the direction of our attention from fact to essence, from sight to insight: "the essence 
in art is insight of a special kind into reality" (OP, 238). 
This insight is not imposed upon the world, that is, added to it by an independent 
imagination; rather, it is taken from within the "muddy centre" of this world and is 
thus part of it: `17he poem is the cry of its occasion, / Part of the res and not about it. 
/ The poet speaks the poem as it is, ... He speaks 
/ By sight and insight as they are" 
(CP, 473). As pointed out in the previous chapter, the essence or "idea" of an object 
is not detached from but always "corresponding" (Ideas, 55) with the factual object 
in the world: it is the perceiver's prepositional consciousness ofthis object and thus 
exists within it: "Every poem is a poem within a poem: the poem of the idea within 
the poem of the words" (OP, 174). Thus, using Stein's description of Uzanne's 
mode of composition, "[e]ach part is as important as the whole. " The visible and the 
invisible, fact and idea/essence, the reality of what is "apprehended" and the "poem 
of pure reality" are interdependent and equally important parts of what the "Notes" 
76 For noting this passage in particular, I am indebted to Naylor, who draws on it in "rhe 
Idea of It, "' 44-55. 
77 Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, 70. 
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calls "an intrinsic couple" (CP, 392; italics mine), a couple that already exists within 
being. "Two things of opposite natures seem to depend / On one anothee,: 
Music falls on the silence like a sense, 
A passion that we feel, not understand. 
Morning and afternoon are clasped together 
And North and South are an intrinsic couple 
And sun and rain a plural, like two lovers 
That walk away as one in the greenest body. 
(CP, 392). 
As noted above, Leonard and Wharton claim that Stevens's return to "the 
idea of "this invented world, / The inconceivable idea of the sun" (CP, 3 80; italics 
mine) is a "sensuous vision" different from the phenomenological study of essences. 
Paul Kenneth Naylor, however, offers an entirely different reading and suggests that 
a clue to the meaning of Stevens's "idea" and its equivalence with phenomenological 
"essence" lies in the poet's use of the word "invention7: 78 
Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea 
Of this invention, this invented world, 
The inconceivable idea of the sun. 
(CP, 380) 
As Naylor also suggests - although he uses the translation "to come upon" or "to 
disclose', 79_ the word "inventioif 'refers not to the art of making up but should be 
understood in terms of the Latin "invenire, " which means to find, manage to get, or 
78 Naylor, "The Idea of 14" 5 1. 
79 Ibid. 
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discover. 80 When Stevens in the "Notes"claims that man "imposes order as he thinks 
of them, " "builds capitols, " and "establishes statues of reasonable men" (CP, 403), 
he shakes his head and stresses, 
But to impose is not 
To discover. To discover an order as of 
A season, to discover summer and know it, 
To discover winter and know it well, to find, 
Not to impose, not to have reasoned at all, 
Out of nothing to have come upon major weather, 
It is possible, possible, possible. It must 
Be possible. 
(CP, 403-404) 
"[T]o impose is not / To discover": imposing order upon the world is not the same 
as discovering an order existing within it, an "intrinsic" order. Stevens's point here is 
in agreement with Husserl's critique of Modem man' s naive acceptance of 
preconceptions and theoretical notions, which would assert an objective, ready-made 
reality. Likewise, the poet's emphasis on discovering an order hidden within our 
artificial, imposed orders is tantamount to Husserl's insistence on getting back to the 
original ground from which objectivity arises. What emerges from our discussion, 
then, is that "The Idea of Order at Key West" implies not a human idea of order 
imposed upon the world by an independent mind, but refers to an immanent essence 
80 The Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary, 74. 
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(eidos) of order, a pennanently present "order as of /A season7 (CP, 403) - 
something wholly other that is discovered by the two onlookers: 
Whose spirit is this? we said, because we knew 
It was the spirit that we sought and knew 
That we should ask this as often as she sang. 
If it was only the dark voice of the sea 
That rose, or even colored by many waves; 
If it was only the outer voice of sky 
And cloud, of the sunken coral water-walled, 
However clear, it would have been deep air, a sunimer sound 
Repeated in a summer without end 
And sound alone. But it was more than that, 
More even than her voice and ours, among 
The meaningless plungings of water and the wind. 
(CP, 129; italics mine) 
"But it was more than thaf ' (italics mine). Recalling the repeated "if ' in Woolf's 71e 
Waves and "A Haunted House, " "if', the essential "spirit, " is "more" than "sound 
alone" as it is "'already there' before reflection begins" (Merleau-Ponty, PP, vii. ), 
before our ability to perceive the sound of it, reflect on and sing about it. We have 
seen that Stevens distinguishes between our "apprehended" reality of the "moment 
after" -ý'a thing seen by the mind, H Not that which is but that which is apprehended" 
(CP, 468)) - and a more "real" reality of immediate sense perception. For this poet, 
"Reality is the beginning not the end" (CP, 469); "Reality is the spirit's true centre" 
(OP, 176; italics mine). In this manner, the "spirit" (CP, 129) that the on-looking 
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poets seek is that pre-verbal "muddy centre, " which precedes our "apprehended" 
version of the real, and which is the source of the poet's "first idea. "' 
What finally emerges from my discussion, then, is that "The Idea of Order at 
Key West" speaks not of a human order imposed upon the world but shifts our 
attention to the usually unseen "essence of order" - an "essence" which is 
presupposed for the singer's human song to occur. The "[b]lessed rage for order" 
that the on-looking poet refers to in the poem's final stanza stands in contrast with 
the essence of order that the poem celebrates: 
Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon, 
The maker's rage to order words of the sea, 
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred, 
And of ourselves and of our origins, 
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds 
(CP, 130) 
"The maker's rage to order words of the sea7 (CP, 13 0) refers to man's "rage" for 
objective order and meaning, recalling the "lights in the fishing boats" (CP, 130), 
which, in the previous stanza, "mastered the night and portioned out the sea! ' (CP, 
130). The "words of the sea, / ... of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred" (CP, 130), 
however, are not just of the sea, the poet points out, but also "of ourselves and of our 
origins" (CP, 130), as they, ironically, are the original foundation (the 
presupposition) for this "rage. " Stevens's raging maker brings us back to what 
Husserl called the "sickness" of Modem man (Crisis 1,153) -a "sickness" of the 
spirit due to man's separation from the ultimate source of meaning and order: the 
"first idea. " 
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Gigantic "Giant" 
The "first idea! 'belongs to what Stevens in the "Notes" calls "the giant" (CP, 386) 
and nevertheless his singer at Key West sings because "[i]t feels good as it is without 
the giant, /A thinker of the first idea! ' (CP, 3 86). So, what, then, does Stevens mean 
by this "giant"? Rajeev S. Parke has argued that "the giant may be a reflection of an 
aspiration within us, but it is not among Stevens's more successful figurations: partly 
because it is empty of figurative content, and partly because the evocation of this 
figure sets up no kind of resonance of meaning or significance within the poem. " 81 
In contrast to Parke's claim, I do think that Stevens's repeated use of the giant spins 
a web of significations, which "interrelat[e] and interac[t]" (OP, 163) with his 
notions of the "infinity of the world" and the "muddy centre. " 
In "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven, " the poet's "few words, an and yet, 
and yet, and yet-" (CP, 465), referring to the "perpetual beginning" of his poetic 
inquiry, will always be "part of the never-ending meditation, / Part of the question 
that is the giant himself' (CP, 465), and "A Primitive Like an Orb" speaks of "[a] 
giant, on the horizon, glistening" (CP, 442). Just as Stein in Tender Buttons 
describes her "Orange" by what it is not, turning actuality into possibility, fact into 
essence, Stevens's "pineapple" in'Toem written at Morning" is "a leather fruit, /A 
fruit for pewter, thorned and palmed and blue" (CP, 219). "The truth must be, " 
Stevens concludes in this short poem, "That you do not see, you experience, you 
feel, / That the buxom eye brings merely its element / To the total thing, a shapeless 
81 Rajeev S. Parke, The Long Poems of Wallace Stevens (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 150. 
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giant forced [Upward. " The "shapeless giant" (CP, 219) and the "giant on the 
horizon, glistening" (CP, 442) are figures for the insubstantial shapes of pre- 
semantic experience, which the "buxom eye" fixes in poetic trope. Stevens's "giant" 
reminds us of the "gigantic conversation" (Diary 3,285) that was to become Woolf's 
Yhe Waves. The six voices in this book "melt into each other with phrases ... are 
edged with mist.. .. [and] make an unsubstantial territory" (W, 14). Like the 
Husserlian "misty horizon, " Stevens's idea of the "giant" is "gigantic" as well as 
"unsubstantial": it can never be fully expressed in words and yet remains the 
foundation of all reasoning and expression. '6[1]t is not the reason / That makes us 
happy or unhappy" (OP, 118), Stevens writes in his 195 5 poem "Of Mere Being" 
and guides our attention to the same "queer regiore' from which Woolf s "fin ... 
passing far out" (Diary 3,23 9; 19 1) - her primary impulse to write - stems. 
In "Of Mere Being, " a "palm at the end of the mind" is situated "Beyond the 
last thought [and] rises / In the bronze distance" (OP, 117). The palm stands "on the 
edge of space" and in it "A gold-feathered bird / Sings... without human meaning, 
without human feeling, a foreign song, " recalling the "meaningless" singing of the 
sea in "The Idea of Order at Key West. " This bird too is "singing of the real world, " 
in the words of Woolf. its song is prior to "human meaning. " Just as the "giant on 
the horizon [is] glistening" (CP, 442), the bird's "feathers shine" "in the bronze 
distance, " at the edge of visibility from which the primary impulse to create arises. 
Offering a pun on the famous opening stanza from Blake's "Auguries of Innocence": 
"Hold infinity in the palm of your hand / And eternity in an hour, 982 Stevens's "palm 
at the end of the mind / Beyond the last thouglif ' also refers to the pahn of the 
82 The entire stanza reads: "0 see a world in a grain of sand / And a heaven in a wild flower, 
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand / And eternity in an hour. " William Blake, The Poetical 
Works of William Blake (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891), 180. 
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writer's hand, where the pen, translating the bird's "foreign song" into reason, rests. 
The "bird" whose "fire-fangled feathers dangle dowif 'could be a figure for the sun, 
that "bird of paradise, reborn each century, created in flames to perish in flames" that 
,, 83 is Hans Christian Andersen's illustration of "The Bird Phoenix. We recall how the 
speaker of the "Notes" tells us to perceive "[flhe inconceivable idea of the sun (CP, 
380) after having suspended the "varnish and dirt" imposed upon the world: "How 
clean the sun when seen in its idea, / Washed in its remotest cleanliness of a heaven 
That has expelled us and our images" (CP, 38 1). There is no poetry without first 
seeing the world "in its idea" and "[flor that the poet is always in the sun" (CP, 
407). In this sense, the "fire-fangled" "bird" singing in the "palm at the end of the 
mind" symbolises the perpetual creation and re-creation of poetry itself, which is 
always interlinked with the rising and setting sun, marking the perpetual re-birth of 
the world: "the never-ending meditation, / ... that is the giant himself' 
(CP, 465). 
"Ecstatic Identities" 
To be of mere being is to be of bare being, a being that belongs to the world of pure 
sense prior to the "varnish and dirt" that our reason has imposed upon it. This 
understanding of the word "mere" sheds new light on Steven's singer at Key West, 
to whom the sea is "merely a place by which she walked to sing" (CP, 129; italics 
mine): it is the bare being from which her song originates and onto which it writes 
83 Hans Christian Andersen, The Penguin Complete Fairy Tales and Stories ofHans 
Christian Andersen, trans. Erik Christian Haugaard (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books 
Ltd., 1997), 375. One might also argue that Stevens's 1955 poem alludes to Yeats's 1930 poem 
"Byzantium, " which gives us another image of the Bird Phoenix: "Miracle, bird or golden handiwork, 
/ More miracle than bird or handiwork, / Planted on the star-lit golden bough. " Yeats's bird is also 
"Dying into a dance, / An agony of trance, / An agony of flame. .. " See William Butler Yeats, Selected Poetry, ed. Timothy Webb (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 173. 
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itselE This barrenness recalls "the same bare place" (CP, 10) which is the home of 
Stevens's "Snow Man. " "The Snow Man, " an early version of the "ignorant man" 
(CP, 380) that Stevens urges us to become in the "Notes, " is emblematic of the "first 
idea7: that creative point of eternal return when the world is seen clearly in "its 
essential barrenness" (CP, 373). Stevens's description of creative production by 
means of winter imagery recalls Woolf s claim in "On Being III" that illness gives 
access to "the snowfield of the mind" (CD, 48), a fresh and thus "colder" starting- 
point for creativity: "There is a virgin forest in each; a snowfield where even the 
print of birds' feet is unknown. " (CD, 46). In an 1896 conversation with Joachim 
Gasquet, Paul Uzanne characterises aesthetic experience by a similar mutuality of 
physical landscape and consciousness: 
The landscape becomes reflective, human, and thinks itself through 
me. I make it an object, let it project itself and endure within my 
painting ... I become the subjective consciousness of the 
landscape, 
and my painting becomes its objective consciousness. 84 
It is this reciprocity of "subjective" and "objective" consciousnesscs that Stevens has 
in mind in "The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poef': "The mind of the poet describes 
itself as constantly in his poems as the mind of the sculptor describes itself in his 
forms, or as the mind of Cezanne described itself in his 'psychological landscapes"' 
85 (NA, 46). Stevens, too, displays the cycle of creativity as a world with seasons and 
84 C6zanne as quoted in Medina, Cezanne and Modernism, 2. 
85 "What we have under observation: ' in these "psychological landscapes, " Stevens points 
out, "is the creative process, the personality of the poet, his individuality, as an element in the creative 
process; and by process of the personality of the poet we mean... the incidence of the nervous 
sensitivity of the poet in the act of creating the poem.. . "(NA, 48). 
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cycles of lives. The poet "live[s] in the centre of a physical poetry" (NA, 65). 86 Thus, 
in "rhe Snow Man, " the winter landscape and the central consciousness exist 
mutually and reciprocally: "One must have a mind of winter / To regard the frost and 
the boughs / Of the pine-trees crusted with snow" (CP, 9). Still "untouched/ By trope 
or deviation7(CP, 471), like Stevens's "poem of pure reality, " the "Snow Man, " who 
"nothing himself, beholds / Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is" (CP, 
10), "antedates all standpoints" (Husserl, Ideas, 78), re-articulating the world from a 
"Nothing, " which is not an end but anticipates the preliminary "cold" referred to in 
"An Ordinary Evening In New Haven. " In this poem, too, the landscape is 
"psychological, " as the "exterior (is] made / Interior, "(CP, 481), 
With the inhalation of onginal. cold 
And of original earliness. Yet the sense 
Of cold and earliness is a daily sense, 
Not the predicate of a bright origin. 
Creation is not renewed by images 
Of lone wanderers. To re-create, to use 
The cold and earliness and bright origin 
Is to search 
(CP, 48 1) 
"The sense / Of cold and earlinese' "is a daily sense": it belongs to the "[c]reation" 
and "re-creation! ' of the poet's "search, " that "search for the inexplicable" (OP, 173), 
96 For a recent examination of the importance of the seasons in Stevens's work see Lensing, 
Wallace Stevens and the Seasons. 
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which remains the poet's task: "A poem need not have meaning and like most things 
in nature often does not have" (OP, 176). 
The interdependence of internal and external seasons recalls the nineteenth 
century Transcendentalists, the fathers of the "deep spring7 of American optimism in 
the context of whom Stevens is often read. 87 For Thoreau, Emerson and Whitman 
society was a barrier to "Self-Reliance. "88 Man's spiritual awakening could only take 
place within the cyclical patterns of the natural world outside of civilisation. By 
moving nature inside the imagination, the poet could "front only the essential facts of 
life, " "[d]irect [his] eye right inward, " find harmony within the self and "rise to a 
higher and more ethereal life. "89 In direct opposition to this, however, Stevens's 
poetry is essentially non-spiritual. The poet's aim is "to press away from mysticism 
toward that ultimate good sense which we term civilisation" (NA, 116), thus 
indicating that poem and self are "parts of a world. "90 As it is part of a world that is 
always becoming, poetry is a living act of creation which "Must Change" (CP, 
389)91: it "has to be living, to learn the speech of the place. / It has to face the men of 
the time and to meet / The women of the time" (CP, 240). Just as phenomenology 
exposes intentional consciousness as the ground of objectivity and factuality, so does 
Stevens suggest that the "first idea7 is the source of the meaning of civilisation. 
87 See for instance Blooxr4 Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate; J. Hillis Miller, The 
Linguistic Moment From Wordsworth to Stevens (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1985), 390-422. 
88 See Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Rehance, " in The Best ofRalph Waldo Emerson, ed. 
Gordon S. Haight (New York: D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1941), 119-146. 
89 Henry David Thoreau, Walden and Other Writings ofHen? y David Thoreau, ed. Brooks 
Atkinson (New York: The Modem Library, 1937), 81,285,37. 
90 Parts ofa World (1942) is the title of Stevens's fourth collection of poetry. 
91 "It Must Change, " is the title of the second part of Stevens's "Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fictiom" 
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The metamorphosis of winter landscape and man in "The Snow M&' 
anticipates what Stevens in his later poem "Extracts From Addresses to the Academy 
of Fine Ideas" speaks of as "Ecstatic identities /Between one's self and the weather 
and the things /Of the weather. .. " (CP, 258). Once more this recalls 
C6zanne: 
As for me, I want to be a child and I delight in seeing, hearing, 
breathing, in being an ecstatic sensibility which seeks to express itself 
on canvas... I no more imitated Pissaro and Monet than I did the 
masters in the Louvre. I tried to produce work which was my own, 
work which was sincere, nalve... Yes I am the primitive of a new art. 
(italics mine) 92 
In its etymology, the Greek "ecstasy" refers to a "standing outside, "93 that is to say, a 
standing outside of one's conventional, "static" attitude to daily life, as it were. By 
"bracketing" the habitual schemata of poetry and painting, Stevens and Uzanne 
challenge us to become "an ignorant maif 'or "the primitive of a new art, " 
respectively. We remember that Husserl's method of "bracketing7' refers not to a 
rejection of the world, followed by isolation of the subject, but to a change of 
attitude. In a similar manner, Stevens and Uzanne insist that the perceiving subject 
must step out of the taken for granted world in order to see it clearly and thus regain 
it. Significantly, one of Stevens's letters points out that the poem "The Plain Sense 
of Things" is "an example of the necessity of identifying oneself with reality in order 
to understand and enjoy if' (Stevens, Letters, 464). The "plain sense of thinge'- 
another term for the epochal barrenness of the "first idea! ' - is highlighted but only to 
stress that our obj cctive "apprehendeV reality is grounded in pre-reflective 
92 C6zanne, C&anne By Himself, 291-92. 
93 Oxford Dictionary ofPhilosophy, ed. Simon Blackburn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 114. 
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C'ignoranf') intentionality. Stevens's work, then, promotes the interdependence 
between essential subjective experience and objectivity; it stresses the "Ecstatic 
identities / Between one's self and the weather. " 
We have already seen that phenomenological reduction lays open Husserl's 
"misty horizon". In a further elaboration of the Husserlian "horizon, " Martin 
Heidegger says, 
The concept "horizon7 in the vulgar sense presupposes precisely what 
we are designating as the ecstatic horizon. There would not be 
something like a horizon for us if there were not an ecstatic being- 
open-for ... 
94 
In this sense, moments of "Ecstatic Identities/ Between one's self and the weather" 
are moments of openness to the horizon, which underlies all our objective acts and 
expressions. 
Working back from this, Stevens's "Snow Man, " who "beholds / Nothing 
that is not there" is not as Regueiro reads it, "blinded to both the inner and outer 
worlds, ', 95 but suggests such an "ecstatic" openness to the world. He is open to 
everything and can see clearly the relationship between the pre-reflective and the 
reflective, internal and external realities, because he is filled with nothing: he 
"beholds / Nothing" only to see all; he is "the self that opens to the world and opens 
the world itSelf 9996 
Whereas Woolf terms such moments of ecstatic openness "moments of 
being, " Stevens refers to them as "crystallisations of freshness" (NA, 66) as they 
94 Martin Heidegger as quoted in David Farrell Krell, Intimations ofMortality: Time, Truth, 
and Finitude in Heidegger's Yhinking ofBeing (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1991), 68. 
95 Regueiro, The Limits ofImagination, 148. 
96 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 42. 
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crystallise what is both visible and invisible, objective and subjective. Consider the 
"Notes": 
It must be visible or invisible, 
Invisible or visible or both: 
A seeing and unseeing in the eye 
The weather and the giant of the weather, 
Say the weather, the mere weather, the mere air: 
An abstraction blooded, as man by thought. 
(CP, 38 5) 
Recalling Merleau-Ponty's "invisible inner frarneworle'(VI, 215-216) on which 
visibility rests, in Stevens's creative landscape the visible and the invisible, like the 
factual and the essential, are equally important parts of "an intrinsic couple" (CP, 
3 92). The visible world - "the weather" - rests on "the giant of the weather, " the 
invisible but ever-present ground of continuity, which Stevens, in "An Ordinary 
Evening in New Haven, " describes as the "never-ending meditation, / ... that is the 
giant himself' (CP, 465). Like the man in "Contrary Theses(H)", in his poetry 
Stevens again and again "walk[s] toward / An abstract, of which the sun, the dog, the 
boy, / Were contours" (CP, 270), and brings into focus the invisible inner framework 
of our world's visible contour: 
The less legible meaning of sound, the little reds 
Not often realised, the lighter words 
In the heavy drum of speech, the inner men 
Behind the outer shields, the sheet of music 
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In the strokes of thunder 
(CP, 488) 
Standing at once inside and outside his/her usual position, open to both "contour" 
and "abstract, " objective fact-world and subjective experience, the "ecstatic" subject 
"sees" and"unsees" the world "[b]y sight and insight as they are" (CP, 473), hence 
the visible world is exposed as suddenly strange and standing out, as 
... when we look at the sky for the first time, that is to say: not 
merely see it, but look at it and experience it and for the first time 
have a sense that we live in the center of a physical poetry ... (NA, 
65-66) 
Stevens's words recall Stein's description of Picasso: "No one had ever tried to 
express things seen as one knows them but as they are when one sees them without 
remembering having looked at them7'(Picasso, 15) and Woolf's Bernard, who, upon 
Percival's death, sees the world with the eyes of a child, "as on the first day of 
creation" (W, 220). Thus, regaining sight of the "wonder in the face of the world, " 
which Merleau-Ponty has called "the best formulation of the reduction" (PP, xiii), 
the "ecstatic" subject clearly sees his/her placement within both the visible and the 
invisible, the factual and the essential dimensions of experience. Once again we are 
presented with the paradox of perceptual experience - the paradox of the "eyc/1" - 
that phenomenology brings to light: "How is it that I am both a subject experiencing 
the world and an object within the world? iM 
This paradox sheds a clarifying light on our discussion of "The Idea of Order 
at Key West. " Although Stevens's singer does not perceive that the meaning of her 
song presupposes "the meaningless plungings" (CP, 129) of the sea, referring to a 
97 Kingswell, "Husserl's Sense of Wonder, " 99. 
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primordial "wild meaning" from which our clear expressions arise, the on-looking 
poet and his friend have a clearer view. They realise that singer and song are, as 
Stevens puts it in "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven, " "amassed in a total double- 
thing" (CP, 472), "double" because the human meaning of the song is both different 
from and an integral part of the "meaningless" stream of existence (the sea). The 
singer's song is at once distinguished from and defined by its context. This, we 
recall, is also 'Uzanne's enigma": "Man absent from but entirely within the 
landscape. "98 
Merleau-Ponty's elaboration of this enigma adds another element to 
Stevens's "double-thing": "The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is 
seen" ("Eye, " 162). The philosopher's "idea that every perception is doubled with 
counterperception ..., is an act with two 
faces. " (VI, 264), laying bare the 
reversibility and reciprocity of "flesh"between our "passive/active (visible-seeing)" 
(VI, 27 1) bodies, is clearly presented in the way in which Stevens has framed "The 
Idea of Order at Key West. " The woman thinks she sings for herself but is, in fact, 
seen and heard by the two onlookers. In turn, all three of them are seen/read by us. 
Perception, in other words, both frames and is framed. The phenomenological shift 
of attitude employed in Stevens's poem, then, emphasises the immediacy of 
perceptual experience and "states the space" between seer and seen, poet and object- 
world, reader and text. 
98 Deleuze and Guattari, Mat is Philosophy?, 169. 
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Grasping the "Jar" on the Nerves. 
The paradox of perceptual experience laid open through the reduction also sheds new 
light on Stevens's early Harmonium poem "Anecdote of the Jar. " Patricia Rae has 
pointed out that Stevens's "epochal spaces " are enclosed "shelters, " "ironically 
circumscribed spaces - jars, crystals, and mirrors, and huts and houses - or... 
spaces midway between the earth and the sky, " which "stress the lack of interaction 
between phenomenologically reduced experience and the outer world. "99 However, 
bearing in mind that the phenomenological "reduction, " ironically enough, is not a 
method leading to reductionism or introspection, denying interaction with the outer 
world, but to a clearer insight into the depth of our involvement with the world, it 
seems more reasonable to suggest that Stevens's "Anecdote, " like "The Idea of 
Order at Key West, " does not "stress the lack of interaction"' between inner and outer 
worlds, but is what Stevens in Opus Posthumous calls "a statement of a relation 
between man and world" (OP, 172). In the first stanza of the "Anecdote, " the jar -a 
figure of the poet's intentional creation, another "poem of the act of the mind" (CP, 
240) - is placed "upon a hill" "in Tennessee" and "mak[es] the slovenly wilderness 
Surround that hill" (CP, 76). The fact that the "wilderness! 'is "slovenly, " that is to 
say, careless or dirty, recalls "the varnish and dirt of generations" that Stevens 
suggests should be taken "off a picture" to see it in its intentional "first idea" 
(Stevens, Letters, 426-27). Step by step, the "Anecdote" too incorporates this 
movement of reduction. In the next stanza we are told that "[t]he wilderness rose up 
to it, / And sprawled around, no longer wild, " while the jar remains "upon the 
ground / And tall and of a port in air" (CP, 76), that is to say of an opening "in air". 
99 Rae, The Practical Muse, 165,155. 
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What Stevens's poem suggests is that the "wilderness" of preconceived knowledge 
and uncritical objectivity, which has gown for "generations, " covering up the 
original, bare ground beneath, is put out of play, and intentionality is opened up. 
Much like "The Snow Man' ', the jar "opens to the world and opens the world 
itself. "100 What is brought into focus, then, is not the "circumscribed spac(e]" of the 
jar, to use Rae's words, denying interaction with the ground on which it is placed, 
but the interchange between the essentially open jar and this ground. 101 "rhere is, " as 
Stevens writes in a letter, "a constant reference from the abstract to the real, to and 
fro" (Stevens, Letters, 434). Consider the final stanza of the "Anecdote": 
It took dominion everywhere 
The jar was gray and bare 
It did not give of bird and bush, 
Like nothing else in Tennessee. 
(CP, 76) 
In yet another reading of Stevens's poem, Helen Reguiero argues that "the jar in 
Tennessee imposes itself on reality... It draws reality into its ordered realm. .. But 
unlike everything else in Tennessee, it cannot bring the world into being, it cannot 
'give of bird and bush. 299102 On the basis of my discussion throughout this chapter, I 
want to stress an entirely different aspect of the poem and suggest that Stevens's 
open "jar, " like "Tbe Snow Man, " "behold[ing]/ Nothine' only to see all, lays "bare" 
that "gray" and "muddy" ground where all forms of creation, including the "giv[ing] 
of bird and busIP(CP, 76), take root. Stevens's jar is both "gray and bare" (CP, 76), 
100 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 42. 
101 Rae, The Practical Muse, 155 
102 Regueiro, The Limits ofImagination, 165. 
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anticipating the "gray particular of man's life, / The stone from which he rises" (CP, 
528), which Stevens speaks of in the late poem "The Rock. " By opening up the bare 
ground from which man's acts and creations rise, Stevens gets back to the "thing 
itself, " in Husserl's words. The "thing itself, " we have observed, is not a thing but a 
relation. Once again, then, the poet steps back into epochi, exposes the world in its 
pregivenness and stresses the implicit relation of consciousness to it. Stevens's 
"jar, " a figure for the poet's intentional creation, " "t[akes] dominion everywhere" 
because it, like consciousness itself, belongs to the world. It is in implicit relation to 
the "gray particular" which always, already underlies everything. 
What I am claiming, then, is that Stevens's jar is representative of "the thing 
itself. " Much like Woolf s Lily Briscoe, the poet attempts to "get hold of .. that 
veryjar on the nerves, the thing itself before it has been made anything" (L, 260). 103 
Significantly, the "nerves" in glass jars signify at once the separation and the joining 
of two halves, the idea of which sits well with both the paradox of Stevens's "total 
double thing" and what I have suggested is the double meaning of Bal's navel 
metaphor - that starting point for creative birth, which both points away from and 
back to the pre-reflective dimension of experience. Once again Stevens challenges us 
to reflect on this pre-reflective and plain ground from which the act of creation 
arises. In the words of Simon Critchley, Stevens's poetry "returns us to the plainness 
of the ordinary. . And yet poetry returns us to the ordinary as something 
extraordinary, strange and uncanny. "104 The reduction, we have learned, makes our 
familiar world seem strange and cold, bare and plain, but, as Judith Butler taught us 
103 For my pattern of thought in this section I am indebted to Mark C. Taylor's reading of 
Stevens's "Anecdote of the Jai" as a paradigm for Heidegger's thought on the origin of the work of 
art. See Taylor, Nots, 112-114. 
104 Critchley, "Me Philosophical Significance of a Poem, " 282. 
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"that strangeness is exposed as the condition of possibility of the ordinary" (italics 
mine). 105 Hence in Stevens's "An Ordinary Evening in New Haven": "rhe 
barrenness that appears is an exposing. / It is not part of what is absent, a halt / For 
farewells, as sad hanging on for remembrances. //It is a coming and a coming forth" 
(CP, 487; italics mine). Thus it seems reasonable to argue that the poet's inter- 
related images of "barrenness, "' "original cold" and ignorance are representative of "a 
zero of being which is not nothingness" (VI, 260) but that intentional relation with 
the world which is at once the "starting-point and basis" for creativity. 
Just as phenomenology, the"first philosophy, " presupposes the reduction, for 
Stevens, creative production, which will always start anew with the "first idea, " 
presupposes a "mere, " "bare" or "cold" zero-point, a white page: 
The paper is whiter 
For these black lines 
It glares beneath the webs 
Of wire, the designs of ink, 
The planes that ought to have genius 
The volumes like marble ruins 
Outlined and having alphabetical 
Notations and footriotes 
The paper is whiter. 
(CP, 221) 
105 J. Butler, introduction to Yhe Erotic Bird, xv. 
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A "Total Double-Thinp-11: The Fate of Perception 
To sum up what we have discussed so far, Stevens, like Woolf and Stein, dares to 
question the rational and open up the gigantic "a priori" dimension of experience. 
The poet points out that poetry, like philosophy, is "an art of perception. " Hence the 
"Notes" challenges us to a shift of attitude, to "become an ignorant man again" and 
return to the primacy of perception, which is "[a] little different from reality" (CP, 
344). This shift of attitude exposes to the subject the world as phenomenon, laying 
bare the horizon - the "a priori" framework - from which creativity, "ffie poem of 
the act of the mind, " comes into being. 
Whereas critics Helen Regueiro, Thomas J. Hines, Bernard Heringman, and 
Patricia Rae, in different ways, suggest that Stevens's early poems stress a separation 
of mind and world but that his later works promote a closer relation between the two, 
I have shown that Stevens's "act of the mind, " even in poems from the early 
collections Harmonium and Ideas of Order, is not enclosed or isolated but implicitly 
in and of the world. Not at any stage does the poet change his mind about a crucial 
point made clearly in The Necessary Angel: "The real is constantly being engulfed in 
the unreal ... [Poetry] is an illumination of a surface, the movement of a self in the 
rock. " Borrowing from Stevens's "The Rock, " the singer's song in 'The Idea of 
Order at Key West, " and the "jar" in "Anecdote of the Jai" "mak[e] meaning of the 
rock! ' (CP, 527), that "gray particular of man's life, / The stone from which he rises" 
(528). In calling attention to the relation between surface and "rock, " fact and 
essence (idea), our "artificial world" (CP, 252) and its underlying gigantic ground, 
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Stevens's poems open onto a central paradox of human experience: "not only are we 
dealing with what is given but also with what is presupposed in order for the giving 
to occur. "106 Stevens's poetry is phenomenological, although "without 
deliberation, "107 because it makes visible this usually invisible ground of acts and 
expressions, the "meal" context without which the "real" would not exist: "Real 
and unreal are two in one" (CP, 485). 
In my discussion I have consistently called attention to the fact that 
intentionality - the fact that subjectivity is already in an implicit relation to the world 
- is at once the "starting-point and basis" (Ideas, 245) of Stevens's aesthetic 
concerns. In accordance with the double meaning of Bal's navel metaphor, signifying 
at once a breaking away from and a pointing back to the origin of creation, his 
poems simultaneously highlight the "starting-poinf 'for an open-ended creative 
process and point back to the "basis" from which the poet's "first idea" arises: 
"meaninglese' and "barren' 'landscapes or cold wintry "nothingness. " Ratherthan 
describing a separation of mind and world, then, the complexities of Stevens's 
poems lie in a "total double-thine' (CP, 472) and stress the simultaneous 
differentiation and co-operation of mind and world, aspect and whole, unit and 
horizon, single note and "amassing harmony" (CP, 403). 
Stevens's "total double-thing" is fin-ther compounded in the above mentioned 
distinction between immediate (pre-reflective) sensory perception and "the moment 
after" (OP, 190) of the fully thought verbal expression. When demonstrating that 
Husserl's "concern in the phenomenological reduction was not so much with the 
106 Hart, "Me Experience of Poetry, " 288. 
107 Natanson, The Erotic Bird, 8. 
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objects of consciousness as with the structure of conscious experience, " Suzanne 
Cunningham expands on this idea: 
Husserl's position is seen most clearly in relation to an object which 
has obvious temporal aspects, like a musical piece. The listener can 
constitute a symphony only by constituting individually perceived 
notes into a unity. As soon as the first note has been heard it passes, 
making way for the next ... What is true of auditory perception, 
Husserl wants to claim, is true of perception in general. A temporal 
synthesis is required in order to interpret sensations of any sort as 
meaningfiil. log 
Seen in this light, "Tbe whole / The complicate, the amassing harmony" (CP, 403) 
that the Canon Aspirin seeks in Stevens's "Notes" can only be fully realised and 
interpreted as meaningfiil when the individually perceived "notes" have passed. 
"What makes the 'reality' of the thing" explains Merleau-Ponty, "is ... precisely 
what snatches it from our grasp. " (PP, 233). Immediate perception is not meaningful 
until it has become an imitation of something already experienced. In this section I 
hope to clarify how this "fate of perception" lies at the core of the patterns of re- 
beginning - the "never-ending meditatioif ' (CP, 465) - of Stevens's poetry. 
In the previous chapters, we have seen that the "fate of perception, " that is, 
our body's "slippery hold" on reality, is evoked in Lily and Bernard's creative 
processes in Woolf s To the Lighthouse and Yhe Waves, respectively, and in both the 
composition and reading process of Stein's Tender Buttons. Similarly, Stevens 
gestures toward the perceiver's slippery hold on things in "A Primitive Like an Orb": 
"It is and it / Is not and, therefore, is. In the instant of speech, / The breadth of an 
108 Suzanne Cunningham, Language and the Phenomenological Reduction (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhof, 1976), 8,44-45. 
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accelerando moves, / Captives the being, widens - and was there " (CP, 440; italics 
mine). Just as Husserl's ... pure' consciousness" - immediate perception before it is 
touched by our "theorizing reflection7 (Ideas, 114) - can never be fully perceived, so 
can Stevens's "poem of pure reality, untouched / By trope or deviation" (CP, 47 1) 
never be completely grasped by the poet's written "notes. " As "the tongue is an eye" 
(OP, 167), it will always be too late for that: "we never see the world except the 
moment after. " His "notes, " in other words, will always be moving "toward' but 
never reaching a "Supreme Fiction. " 
As already pointed out, it is this fate of perception that lies behind Merleau- 
Ponty's most crucial insight: "The most important lesson which the reduction 
teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction. "(PP, xiv). Due to this 
"impossibility, " the philosopher will aim for reduction again and again, hence he is a 
"perpetual beginner"whose "philosophy is an ever-renewed experience in making 
its own beginning" (PP, xiv). From this creative process of re-beginnings emerges 
what the late Merleau- Ponty terms "hyperdialectic, " the dialectic without synthesis 
discussed in the previous chapter, which he also terms 
the good dialectic ... which is conscious of the fact that every thesis 
is an idealization ... The point to be noted is this: that the dialectic 
without synthesis of which we speak is not ... scepticism... what 
we seek is a dialectical definition of being ... that must rediscover 
the being that lies before the cleavage operated by reflection, about it, 
on its horizon, not outside of us and not in us, but there where the two 
movements cross, there where "there is" something. (VI, 94-95) 
"Hyper-dialectic" is "hyper"because the "cleavage" between the pre-reflective and 
the reflective (due to our ability to reflect) cannot be closed: there is no "thesis. " Yet, 
248 
the philosopher stresses, whereas, "[t]he dialectic become thesis (statement) is no 
longer dialectical, " "[t]he failure of the thesis. .. discloses the Source of theses 
to which we have to return ... [t]o recommence perception" (Merleau-Ponty, VI, 
175). "[F]ailure" of the reduction, in other words, is a necessity for the 
phenomenologist as it is a perpetual reminder of the pre-reflective dimension of 
experience, which is the ground of all thought and meaning. Phenomenology never 
allows the perceiving subject to lose sight of the "Source of the theses" from which 
all forms of expression, including creativity, stem. 
I shall leave Stevens by pointing out how this dialectical process without 
synthesis reveals a new aspect of the "[m]ere repetitions" (CP, 405) or "never- 
ending meditation[s]" (CP, 465) that pervade his poems. As illuminated throughout 
this chapter, his poetry is perpetually disclosing the "source" of its own making, the 
"muddy centre" or the "giant. " Perpetually amazed at itself and at the world, 
The poem refreshes life so that we share, 
For a moment, the first idea ... It satisfies 
Belief in an immaculate beginning 
And sends us, winged by an unconscious will, 
To an immaculate end. We move between these 
Points: 
From that ever-early candor to its late plural. 
(CP, 382) 
This passage from the "Notes" echoes "rhe Man with the Blue Guitae': 
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Poetry is the subject of the poem, 
From this the poem issues and 
To this returns. Between the two, 
Between issue and return, there is 
An absence in reality 
(CP, 176) 
R. D. Ackerman has argued that Stevens's ... Notes' leaves us finally with either 
discovery without ftilfilment or fulfilment without discovery and no way in 
between, " hence the poet is "at the limits of phenomenology. "109 As already noted, 
however, in Stevens's creative processes, the emphasis falls less on result than on a 
shift of attitude. In stressing that "[w]e move between these points" (italics mine), it 
rather seems to me that Stevens directs our attention to the space of betweenness 
itself: the space "[b] etween issue and returre' (CP, 17,6) which is "absen[t] in 
reality, " that is to say, overlooked in our rational "apprehended" (CP, 468) reality. 
But, as "Poetry must be irrational"(OP, 162) and as "Poetry is the subject of the 
poem, " the poet highlights this usually invisible space of creative production itself, 
poised between the pre-verbal "gibberish" (CP, 395) of the "muddy centre" (CP, 
383) and our "apprehended" (CP, 468) language. "We move between these / points: 
From that ever-early candor to its late plural" (CP, 382). 
109 Ackerman, "Believing in a Fiction, " 79,83. 
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A Ha If- Way State 
Having reached the middle space of creative production itself, I will, once again, 
return to Patricia Rae's claim that Stevens's "epochal spaces", which "emphasize the 
middleness of his expressive landscapes, " "stress the lack of interaction between 
phenomenologically reduced experience and the outer world. "' 10 Although the 
epochi is a useful tool for describing this important "middleness, " I disagree that 
Stevens's middle landscapes are vacuum-like spaces of "peace" or "retreat" with 
"borders" that isolate the poetic creation from the outside world. 111 Once again it 
should be stressed that the epoch6 has no borders: it refers to a "mere change of 
standpoint, " providing a clear view and better understanding of our engagement with 
the world. Just as phenomenological analysis begins with the reduction, so does 
creative production for Stevens begin with the "first idea. " Just as "intentionality [is] 
.. is understandable only through the reduction" 
(PP, xvii), so are Stevens's middle 
spaces - his intentional creations or "poems of the act of the mind" - accessible only 
through a shift of standpoint, that is to say, through a suspension of the "varnish and 
dirt" that obscures the perceiver's outlook. In the previous chapter I stressed the 
point that Stein's "A Box" from Tender Buttons does not signify enclosure but 
opening in that it opens up a more original, "rudimentary" way of seeing. In a similar 
manner, the middleness of Stevens's "central" poetry does not close off the world, 
detaching the subject's intentional creation from it; rather, it takes the subject more 
deeply into it. Rather than stressing a lack of interaction with the world, then, the 
"epochal spaces" in Stevens's work, open onto the world! 
110 Rae, The Practical Muse, 154,155. 
111 Ibid., 165,215,163. 
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What I am suggesting, then, is that the "middleness" of Stevens's poems 
presuppose the reduction and is indicative of the open and open-ended space of 
creative production itself -a space which Merleau-Ponty thinks of as the "passage 
from the perceptual meaning to the language meaning7'(W, 176). The essential 
openness of this passage is, as we saw earlier, hinted at in "Anecdote of the Jar": the 
"jar" -a figure of "the poem of the act of the mind" - is open: it is "tall and of a port 
in air" (CP, 76), allowing an interchange with the world where poetry is embedded. 
In "The Irrational Element in Poetry, " Stevens refers to this interchange as the 
"transaction between reality and the sensibility of the poet from which poetry 
springs" (NA, 217). This "transactiore' takes place, again and again, between the 
"moment after"of our "apprehended" (CP, 468) reality and the "moment before, " as 
it were, when the "poem of pure reality" is still "untouched / By trope" (CP, 47 1) 
but has nevertheless touched the poet's "sensibility, " "an ecstatic sensibility, " in the 
words of Cezanne, "which seeks to express itself. "' 12 
To return to the phenomenological theme of perpetual beginning, for Stevens 
"Life is always new, it is always beginning. The fiction is part of this beginnin97 
(Stevens, Letters, 434). For this Modernist, "the central poem, is the poem of the 
whole, / The poem of the composition of the whole" (CP, 442), a "composition" in 
which every "poem is the cry of its occasion, / Part of the res and not about it" (CP, 
473). Being "Part of the res, " that is, in medias res or in the middle of things, 
Stevens's poems call attention to "a total double-thing" (CP, 472): they highlight 
their own process of becoming in the middle of the "giant, " which is always 
becoming. Hence Stevens's emphasis on betweenness and passing states. Consider 
"The Glass of Water": 
112 Uzanne, Cizanne By Himself, 291-92. 
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That the glass would melt in heat, 
That the water would freeze in cold 
Shows that this object is merely a state 
One of many between two poles. 
(CP, 197) 
The poet's "Notes" can only ever reflect "merely a state / One of many between two 
poles. " For, as Kevin Hart reminds us, "Everything begins with the reduction, but 
never so that it escapes the trial of beginning again and again. "' 13 As soon as the "a 
priori... the unapproachable" has been approached through language, the poet's 
original "first idea, " the "thing itself, " will already be in the past and the poet must 
begin again. The "poem of pure reality, untouched / By trope or deviation", then, 
always remains beyond the poet's grasp; it remains what Merleau-Ponty calls "a 
kind of original past, a past which has never been a presenf ' (PP, 242). 
Like Stein's "buttons" and Woolf s "mark, " then, Stevens's poetic "notes" 
are fissures, which simultaneously divide and join, bringing to light the passage of 
creative production itself - that passage between pre-reflective intentionality (the 
"first idea") and articulation; between the "poem of the idea! ' and "the poem of the 
words" (OP, 174). On the one hand, they open up a creative process but, on the other 
hand, they always point back to the pre-communicative source of this creativity. 
Stevens's "Notes" lie in the perpetual movement "toward a Supreme Fiction, " in 
between what Merleau-Ponty calls "an original past... which has never been 
preserif ' (PP, 242) and what is always still to become. In the final stanza of "An 
Ordinary Evening in New Haven, " we learn: "It is not in the premise that reality / Is 
a solid. It may be a shade that traverses /A dust, a force that traverses a shade' (CP, 
113 Hart, "The Experience of Poetry, " 289. 
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489). Poetry, Stevens tells us, "has to be living" (CP, 240). It has to reflect the 
"living" experience of a world of perpetual change. Hence, "Supreme Fiction, " 
which is part of the fluctuation of the whole of reality, can never be a "solid. " 
"Supreme Fictioe' lies neither in the written nor the unwritten, but in the living 
movement between mute perception and words, and ongoing movement toward, 
unfinished and infinite, between "that ever-early candoe' of the epochal "first idea" 
and the "late plural" of poetic trope. Although we try to totalise and making meaning 
of the world, this world is incomplete, hence all "art[s] of perception" (OP, 19 1) are 
never complete. Although our intentional acts are what Stevens in "Of Modem 
Poetry" calls "poem[s] of the mind in the act of finding / What will suffice, " (CP, 
239), sufficiency cannot be reached. 
I have used Merleau-Ponty's related notions of "interworld" and "flesh' 'to 
shed a new light on the "misf 'and spaces of betweenness that create the 
"unsubstantial territory" of Woolf s The Waves. "Flesh"is the unsubstantial 
phenomenon between seer and thing which is "not an obstacle between them; it is 
their means of communication7 (VI, 135). The structure of flesh, I have stressed, is 
chiasmatic: it refers neither to a dichotomy nor a unity between seer and seen, the 
invisible and the visible, mute perception and speech, but something in between. 
The imagery of in between or half-way states that pervade Stevens's poetry 
highlight a similar event that is both dichotomous and unitary. Like Stevens's 
"Supreme Fiction, " the "Angel" in "Angel Surrounded by Paysans, " is "half a figure 
of a sort, /A figure half seen for a moment" (CP, 497): neither wholly "thing" nor 
wholly "idea, " half fact and half essence, it is only ever half-caught before "quickly, 
too quickly" (CP, 497) it is gone. Likewise, the woman in "So-And-So Reclining on 
Her Couch, " "floats in the contention, the flux H Between the thing as idea and / The 
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idea as thing" (CP, 295) and in "A Lot of People Bathing in a Stream, " a poem 
which, like The Waves, could have been a poetic response to Uzanne's Bathers 
paintings, Stevens presents us with 
particular characters, addicts 
To blotches, angular anonymids 
Gulping for shape among the reeds. No doubt, 
We were the appropriate conceptions, less 
Than creatures, of the sky between the banks, 
The water flowing in the flow of space. 
It was passing a boundary, floating without a head 
And naked, or almost so, into the grotesque 
Of being naked, or almost so, in a world 
Of nakedness 
(CP, 371) 
Stevens's figures, who are "floating ... / ... naked ... into the groteque" and are 
"less / Than creatures, of the sky between the banks"; "particular characters, addicts / 
To blotches, angular anonymids / Gulping for shape, " reveal striking similarities 
with Uzanne's abstract bathers. Neither purely subjective nor purely objective, like 
CCzanne's unusually lively apples and thing-like people and the entwined people and 
objects in Woolf's novels, Stevens's half-imagery is "passing a boundary" (CP, 37 1) 
and making visible that "unapproachable' (OP, 194) space of betweenness that 
Merleau-Ponty calls "flesh, " which is "not matter, is not mind, is not substance, " 
255 
rather, it is a "general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the 
idea. " (Merleau-Ponty, VI, 139). It is "not an obstacle between [subject and object]; 
it is their means of communication" (VI, 135). 
So, "[d]oes the poet / Evade us, as in a senseless element? " (CP, 396) as 
"[t]he poem goes from the poet's gibberish to / The gibberish of the vulgate and back 
again"(CP, 396)? From our discussion we can conclude that he does not. His 
poems' emphasis on interaction between "evcr-carly candoe' and "late plural, " 
leading the reader into an "a perspective that begins again" (CP, 528), is neither 
"structureless, fluid, and volatile, " as described by a recent critic, 114 nor a sign of 
imaginative limitation, leaving the poetic self in isolation, despair or self-enclosure. 
On the contrary, it "satisfies / Belief in an immaculate beginning" (CP, 382; italics 
mine), suggesting that the poet's domain is one of perpetual opening. As Merleau- 
Ponty puts it, "the incompleteness of the reduction... is not an obstacle to the 
reduction, it is the reduction itself, the rediscovery of vertical being, " which "is to be 
understood not as an imperfection... but as a philosophical theme" (VI, 178). The 
impossibility of complete reduction to "ffie poem of pure reality" keeps the poet's 
creativity alive. Although it results in ongoing vacillations between "an immaculate 
beginning" and "an immaculate end, " the failure of reduction is not to be taken as a 
sign of futility but as a perpetual opening onto "the giant himself' (CP, 465), the 
infinite and "plain" ground of expression. In accordance with my discussion in the 
previous chapters, then, once again the reduction offers a key to this Modernist's 
creative cycle of perpetual beginning and stresses the ever-new and constantly 
possible. 
114 Theodore Sampson, A Cure of the Min& The Poetics of Wallace Stevens (Montreal: Black 
Rose Books, 2000), 170 
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As "the partaker partakes of that which changes him" (CP, 392), the self in 
Stevens is always in implicit relation to a pregiven and infinite world of change: he 
is, as "Sailing After LuncW'reminds us, "a pupil of the gorgeous wheel" (CP, 12 1), 
which turns and turns, leading to "never-ending meditation[s]" on creativity. 
Stevens's "gorgeous wheel" recalls Louis in Woolf s Yhe Waves: "I feel come over 
me the sense of the earth under me and my roots going down and down till they wrap 
themselves round some hardness at the centre. I recover my continuity ... I becomes 
a figure in the procession, a spoke in the huge wheel that turning, at last erects me, 
here and now" (W, 26). Louis's "roots" "wrap themselves round" the "invisible' 
frainework of the visible: the continuity and repetitions, which underlie our daily 
actions. These repetitions, which also underlie the "[m]ere repetitions" (CP, 405) of 
Stevens's work, are, as the poet puts it in "Notes, " 
A thing final in itself and, therefore, good: 
One of the vast repetitions final in 
Themselves and, therefore, good, the going round 
And round, the merely going round, 
Until merely going round is a final good. 
(CP, 405) 
Thus, in response to Hillis Miller's above mentioned claim that "a 
reconciliation [between imagination and reality in Stevens] turns out to be 
impossible, "" 15 1 would like to stress, borrowing from Merleau-Ponty, "we do not 
have to reassemble them into a synthesis: they are two aspects of the reversibility 
115 Miller, "Wallace Stevens's Poetry of Being, " 145. 
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which is the ultimate truth" (VI, 155). Stevens's "total double-thing" is in itself "a 
final good. " 
If there is a development from Stevens's early to his late poetry, this does not 
take place because the poet "discovers a new relation of self and world, " as 
suggested by Hines (Hines, 26-27), ' 16 or because his realisation of the "limits" of his 
imaginative creations forces him to "redescend into reality, " as argued by 
Regueiro, 117 or because "the facts of experience appear to contradict! 'what Rae 
interprets as the poet's enclosed "epochal space. "' 18 Neither does the poet's relation 
with the world change, nor does he realise the failure of his early poetic inquiry. 
Despite his awareness of the division between pure intentional experience - "the 
poem of pure reality" - and our familiar "apprehended" reality, Stevens never allows 
us to lose sight of the horizon of experience, the "shapeless giant' ' (CP, 219), where 
"the poem of the act of the mind" (CP, 240) is embedded. What does change, 
however, is the poet's confidence about articulating this complexity. His position 
shifts from being an onlooker of the paradox of human experience in his early poem 
"The Idea of Order at Key Wesf 'to being an integral part of the paradox itself in 
longer poems such as "Notes toward a Supreme Fiction, " "An Ordinary Evening in 
New Haven" and, most clearly, in the very final poem of The Collected Poems: "Not 
Ideas About the Thing But the Thing Itself" In this short poem, a "bird's cry" is 
heard by a nondescript perceiver "At the earliest ending of winter, " (CP, 534), which 
is the cold, barren season of epochal ignorance: 
That scrawny cry - it was 
116 Hines, The Later Poetyy of Wallace Stevens, 26-27. 
117 Regueiro, The Limits ofImagination, 190. 
118 Rae, Yhe Practical Muse, 172. 
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A chorister whose c preceded the choir. 
It was part of the colossal sun, 
Surrounded by its choral rings, 
Still far away. It was like 
A new knowledge of reality. 
(CP, 534) 
The "scrawny cry, " which is "part of the colossal sulf 'recalls "An Ordinary Evening 
in New Haven": "the poem is the cry of its occasion / Part of the res and not about it" 
(CP, 473). The fact that the perceiver in this final poem hears rather than sees the 
"cry" indicates that he is himself "part of the res" and immersed in the middle space 
where poetry comes into being: "the contention, the flux H Between the thing as idea 
and / The idea as thing" (CP, 295). As in the poem "Yellow Afternoon, " "Everything 
comes to him / From the middle of his field" (CP, 237) and now, immersed in 
Merleau-Ponty's "interworld, " that fleshy "intermundane space... where our gazes 
cross and our perceptions overlap" (VI, 48) and where the subjective and the 
objective "exchang[e] secrets, " in the words of Uzanne, Stevens's partly subjective 
and partly objective "man-s=7 (280) "speaks the poem as it is" (CP, 473). Thus, 
having shifted the perceiver's position from onlooker to insider, the "new knowledge 
of reality" that this final poem offers does not reject the approach of the early poems 
of "order"; rather, it stands one step closer to the unapproachable and insubstantial 
"thing itself, " "the poem of pure reality" that Stevens has always sought and is still 
seeking. 
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POSTFACE: 
LOOKING BACK AND OPENING UP 
As the reason destroys, the poet must create. 
--Wallace Stevens, OP (190) 
In this study I have brought to light intersections between American and English 
Modernist writers and mid-twentieth century phenomenological concerns with 
aesthetic production, arguing that the Modernist form of writing shares a kinship of 
method and concern with the phenomenological reduction. Using the reduction as 
my guiding theme, I have identified in the literary works of Virginia Woolf, 
Gertrude Stein and Wallace Stevens configurations of similar "shift[s] of 
standpoint, " which call attention to "the thing itself, " uncovering the creative 
subject's intentional experience of the object, and revealing this as the "starting-point 
and basis" for creative production. 
Drawing upon the generative dimension of Mieke Bal's metaphor of the 
"navel" as necessary connection and entry-point, I have shown that creative 
production for Woolf, Stein and Stevens begins and ends - only to begin again - at 
the "navel. " Just as through Woolf s "A Mark on the Wall" I began at the navel, I 
must also end at the navel and begin again. I will therefore finish this study not only 
by looking back on the previous chapters, but also by looking forward, beginning 
again, opening onto the present, and identifying in the work of contemporary 
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American poet John Ashbery (1927) and the box constructions of American artist 
Joseph Cornell (1903-77) examples of similar phenomenological concepts. In both 
looking backwards and opening up, I bring into focus a new connection and entry- 
point in between an "original past" (PP, 242) and what is still becoming, thereby 
creating a foundation for new research. 
My choice to look at Ashbery and Cornell in particular is not arbitrary. 
Ashbery has often been considered in the context of his Modernist predecessors., At 
the memorial service for Joseph Cornell, Ashbery delivered a moving reminiscence 
in which he referred to the artist as one of those "certain sphinxes; " "a man whose 
genius had affected me so strongly from afar. "2 Cornell seems to have been well 
versed in phenomenological terminology. In his diary, as recorded in Joseph 
Cornell's Theater of the Mind, he ponders over "the incroyable of 'experience' ... 
'phenomenology' ... so often the merely physical and the poetics of 
"stirrings". .. 
66cognisance". .. - wandering too much - 
V. Woolf - flash image -mirror ... 
" In 
another entry, he refers to an "eidetic image - an image (especially perceived by 
children) which receives a previous. optical impression with the clearness of 
,, 3 hallucination. As phenomenology is the study of essences or Eidos (Ideas), 
Edmund Husserl terms it the "eidetic science"(Ideas, 62). "Looking for the world's 
1 See, for instance, Perloff, The Poetics ofIndeterminacy; and Susan McCabe, "Stevens, 
Bishop, and Ashbery: A Surrealist Lineage, " The Wallace Stevens Journal 22, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 149- 
168. 
2 John Ashbery, foreword to Joseph Cornell's Theater of the Mind: Selected Diaries, Letters, 
and Files, ed. Mary Ann Caws (New York: Thames and Hudson) 10. Much recent scholarship has 
touched upon but not offered in-depth examinations of Cornell's influence on Ashbery. When 
commenting on the "dream processes" of Ashbery's poems, James Mccorkle briefly notes that 
Cornell's work, in particular his "memory theatres, " "serves as a metaphor for Ashbery's poetry. " See 
McCorkle, "Nimbus and Sensations: Eros and Reverie in the Poetry of John Ashbery and Ann 
Lauterbach, " in 7he Tribe ofJohn: Ashbery and Contemporary Poetry, ed. Susan Schultz (Alabama: 
The University of Alabama Press, 1995), 102,103,104. For other connections between Cornell and 
Ashbery, see John Shoptaw, On the Outside Looking Out: John Ashbery's Poetry (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994), 176; and Ward, Statues ofLiberty, 145. 
3 Comell, Joseph Cornell's Theater of the Mind, 437,311. 
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essence, " Merleau-Ponty told us, ". .. is looking for what it is as a 
fact for us, before 
any thematizatioif ' (PP, xv; italics mine). 
In opening onto the present, I primarily locate the poetry of Ashbery within a 
continuum of the Modernist attention to the phenomenological "thing itself' and 
bring to light his simultaneous connection with and detachment from the inquiries of 
Woolf, Stein and Stevens. Just as Woolf s "A Mark on the Wall, " Stein's "A Box, " 
and the "never-ending meditation[s]" (CP, 465) of Stevens's poetic "notes" offer not 
closure but opening, I will close the thesis by opening a few of Comell's boxes from 
the early and late 1940s and shed light on similar patterns of opening in Ashbery's 
poetry. 
Lookin Back 
In the previous chapters I have explored the ways in which Woolf's works expose 
the usually unperceived "hidden... pattern" "behind the cotton wool of daily life" 
(MB, 72), thus calling attention to the ground of pre-conceptual experience round 
which our acts of expression take shape and from which perceiving subjects arise in 
mutual and reciprocal relations. Stein's Tender Buttons seeks to "mean names 
without naming them" ("PG, " 141), that is, to unfold our primal perceptions of 
things without the obstructions of conventional acts of naming, thus attempting to 
restore original meaning to both the word and a twentieth century full of "cracks" 
(Picasso, 49). Throughout his poetry, Stevens too insists on seeing the world "clearly 
in the idea of if' (CP, 380) by removing the "varnish and dirt of generations"' 
(Stevens, Letters, 426-427). He too suggests that our pre-reflective intentional 
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experience of things is the source of the meaning of the world. Drawing upon 
Husserl's thoughts about the reduction and Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of this 
concept in his reflections on aesthetics and his concepts of "6cart, " "flesh, " and 
"hyperdialectic, " I have brought to light in the work of Woolf, Stein and Stevens 
configurations of the passage from primary perception to expression of the 
perceived, thus "stating the space" between subject and object-world and 
highlighting what I feel is an overlooked aspect of Modernist aesthetics at large. 
Taking my bearings from Mieke Bal's reading of the nail and the hole in a 
wall in Vermeer's Woman Holding Balance as "textual navel" -a "trac[e] of the 
work of art, " which includes the "worV of the reader -I also began this study at the 
navel. Opening up my discussion with a phenomenological reading of Woolf's "A 
Mark on the Wall, " I pointed out the generative dimension of Woolf's "Mark, " 
Stevens poetic "Notes, " and Stein's "Buttons" in Tender Buttons as necessary 
foundations and starting-points for aesthetic production. These "navels, " I have 
argued, are signs of simultaneous dependence on and detachment from the original 
ground of meaning, the "ground of pure pre-conceptual experience, " as Husserl 
terms it (Ideas, 27). On the one hand, they refer to our primal bond with the pre- 
reflective dimension of experience (the umbilical cord was once attached), but, on 
the other hand, they are points of opening or beginning (the umbilical cord has been 
cut). In this sense, the works I have examined point in two directions at once, 
expressing a tension between attachment and opening, basis and starting-point, 
leading the reader into processes of what Woolf calls "eternal renewal" (W, 247), 
what Stein refers to as "[b]eginning again and again " ("CE, " 23) and what Stevens 
terms the "never-ending meditation7 (CP, 465) of the "endlessly elaborating poem" 
(CP, 486). 
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I have identified these processes of "perpetual beginning" as literary 
versions of Merleau-Ponty's "hyperdialectic, " a dialectic without synthesis, at the 
core of which lies the impossibility of complete reduction. In Chapter Two, I 
demonstrated that the wave-like movements of Merleau-Ponty's dialectical 
speculations -a movement of perpetual reduction and expansion - takes place 
in the 
"fleshy opening" of Woolf s The Waves: an "unsubstantial territory" (W, 11) 
between subject and world, perceiver and perceived .4 In Woolf s abstract "play- 
poem, " the sentences of six beings interchange, highlighting how the perceiving and 
creative self is caught up in what Merleau-Ponty calls the "flesh of the world. " We 
are at once seeing/speaking/touching subjects and seen/heard/touched objects; we are 
at once distanced from and intertwined with the world. I argued that it is this paradox 
that pervades Woolf s "play-poem" and makes it expand and contract in wave-like 
movements. 
In the words of John Carvalho, "[s]trictly speaking, "flesY' is what we get at 
after pulling back the skin, what is protected by the casement of the epidermis"; "the 
secrets of Merleau-Ponty's "flesh are hidden in the entwined visibility and 
invisibility of human beings in the world. "5 In this sense, Stein's Tender Buttons too 
pulls the outer skin, lid, peel or dirt off our habitual fact-world, revealing "how you 
are feeling inside you to the words that are coming out to be outside you" C'PG, " 
125), thus opening the usually unperceived space of betweenness where the 
subjective and the objective, the invisible and the visible inter-relate. The "Word- 
objects" in Tender Buttons are presented as containers that must be opened ("A 
4 The term "fleshy opening" is Laurie McRobert's, "Breakdowns and Philosophy: On 
Deconstructions and Chaos, " in Breakdowns, eds. Bruce A. Butterfield and JUrgen Kleist (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1994), http: //pages. citenet/users/ctnizO565/breakdowns. html (accessed on 20 April 2004). 
5 John Carvalho, "Folds in the Flesh: Merleau-Ponty/Foucault, " Rereading Merleau-Ponty, 
295,308. 
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Box'), substances that must be uncovered CA Substance in a Cushion), fruit that 
must be peeled C'Orange") or "dirt" that must be removed by what "Glazed 
Glitter"calls "perhaps washing and polishing" (TB, 3). By "bracketing" outer facts, 
Stein leads us back to "see[ing]. .. fine substance[s] strangely" before the 
conventional structures of objectivity take over. Tender Buttons, I suggested in 
Chapter Three, offers a clear literary example of "hyperdialectic. " "Hyperdialectic" 
is inscribed in what Merleau-Ponty terms "6cart, " the temporal space of 
"distantiation" between pre-linguistic perception and expression, which is the 
"necessary condition for the production of meaning. ,6 The process of reading Stein's 
text, I pointed out, is tantamount to a passage through this ecart. Our experience of 
reading this obscure work can be described as a dialectical process without synthesis, 
an ongoing stretching back and forth between the pre-reflective and the reflective, 
substance versus cover, the essential "thing in itself' versus the factual thing as 
named. The engine of this process is the phenomenological reduction, always 
leaving the reader with a feeling of what Stein in "Composition as Explanation7 calls 
"beginning again and again. " 
"Hyperdialectic" is aware of the impossibility of completely grasping the pre- 
reflective "thing itself" Due to our apprehended language, through which we make 
experience meaningful, it is always already too late for that. As Merleau-Ponty 
writes in Yhe Visible and the Invisible: "The world is what I perceive, but as soon as 
we examine and express its absolute proximity, it becomes, inexplicably, 
irremediable distance" (VI, 8). In this light, I pointed out that Stevens's singer in 
"The Idea of Order as Key Wesf' is "observing the past" (OP, 190) and singing a 
song that cannot but be "beyond" (CP, 128) (later than) the "genius" of the sea, that 
6 Madison, "Merleau-Ponty and Derrida, " 104. 
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is, the pre-predicative ground of experience. Like Woolf and Stein, Stevens's work 
presents us with a "total double-thing" (CP, 472): it opens onto the space of 
correlation between essence (idea) and fact, between the pre-reflective "first idea" 
and "the moment after" of the fully thought and verbalised expression. Like Stein's 
"buttons" and Woolf's "mark, " then, Stevens's poetic "notes" are fissures, which 
simultaneously divide and join, bringing to light the passage of creative production 
itself - the passage from the "poem of the idea" to "the poem of the words" (OP, 
174). Bringing us back to Mieke Bal's "textual navel, " on the one hand, his poetic 
notes open up a creative process but, on the other hand, they always point back to the 
pre-communicative source of this creativity. Stevens's "Notes" lie in the perpetual 
movement "toward a Supreme Fiction, " in between "a kind of original past, a past 
which has never been presenf ' (PP, 242) and what is always still to become. 
Stein, Woolf and Stevens, then, share the phenomenological viewpoint that 
"[p]erception is not a state but a mobile activity, " hence the artwork - visual art or 
text - is never fixed but perpetually renewed. 
7 Like the phenomenologist, who knows 
that the world is "displayed only gradually and never 'in its entirety"' (PP, 208), it is 
"the novelist's task ... not to expound ideas or even analyse characters but to depict 
an inter-human event, ripening and bursting it upon us with no ideological 
commentary" (PP, 15 1). Just as Woolf s "The Mark on the Wall" leaves us not with 
closure but with opening and Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse tells herself to "[g]et 
that and start afresh, get that and start afresh" (L, 261), so does Bernard's struggle to 
find a "little language" in Woolf s The Waves seem like a "perpetual warfare. " In 
The Waves Woolf leaves us with the rhythmic breaking of the waves, the "incessant 
rise and fall and fall and rise again" (W, 234), echoing the inter-dependent and open- 
7 Natanson, Edmund Husserl, 85. 
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ended wave-like patterns of world and creative mind. Likewise, the "rudimentary" 
(TB, 4) nature of Stein's Tender Buttons, which any reader fails to get completely on 
the "button, " reflects "the living experience of an 'incomplete world. ,, 8 The 
structure of Stevens's "Notes" adds to our understanding of the "living" acts of 
creation that the three Modernists promote. This long poem is divided into three 
sections, entitled "It Must be Abstracf ' (CP, 3 80), "It Must Change" (CP, 3 89), and 
"It Must Give Pleasure" (CP, 398). Stevens's poems oscillate between the 
"Abstract" "immaculate beginning" of pre-reflective experience (the "first idea7) and 
$can inunaculate end" of apprehended reflection. In "mov[ing] between these / 
Points" (CP, 382), the reader too is forever moving toward, but never completely 
reaching a "Supreme Fiction. " Poetry "has to be living" (CP, 240): it has to reflect 
the "living" experience of a world of perpetual change. The poet's "notes" remain 
preliminary scribbles, emphasising that "It Must Change" and that such change is in 
itself the 'Tleasure" of creative production, "the going round / And going round, the 
merely going round, / Until merely going round is a final good" (CP, 405). The 
impossibility of complctc rcduction to Woolf s "csscntial thing, " Stcin's "thing in 
itself' and Stevens's "poem of pure reality" is what keeps creativity alive and is 
therefore a "final good. " 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the three writers shared awareness of the 
"fate of perception" does not lead to shared reactions. Although Woolf is aware that 
the "essential thing" cannot be pinned down in words, she never stops yearning to 
"give the moment whole" (Diary 3,209). Although Stevens knows that the "poem of 
pure reality" cannot be attained, he still ponders on "the poem of the mind in the act 
of finding / What will suffice" (CP, 239). Whereas Woolf s awareness of 
a Raynova, "Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Turning-Point, " 23 1. 
267 
unattainable wholeness is a physically painful experience, which throughout her life 
drove her to illness, in stressing the "final good" of "merely going round, " Stevens 
more willingly gives into the impossibility of sufficiency. Unlike Stevens and Woolf, 
Stein seems to lack the desire for wholeness or sufficiency and more directly accepts 
the "fate of perception. " Influenced by CCzanne's insight that "Each part is as 
important as the whole, " Tender Buttons suggests that the meaning of wholeness can 
be grasped only when understanding that "[a] whole is inside a part" (TB, 38-39). 
"Whole" meaning is not merely objective. Objectivity arises from an intending 
subjectivity. Meaning, then, cannot frame the artwork or text from the outside but is 
made and re-made from within through the phenomenological act of seeing/reading 
itself 
In different ways, then, the three writers anticipate or directly express an 
awareness of the subject's "slippery hold" on reality, thus rejecting finality and 
embracing openness. I have stressed and will stress again that this openness should 
not be taken as a sip of aesthetic failure or uncertainty, reflecting the subject's lack 
of grounding in a Modem world of rupture. The oscillating movements between pre- 
reflective and reflective experience, stating the space between the primal perception 
of the "mark, " "button' 'or "noW' and the articulation of the word, serve as openings 
onto and constant reminders of the underlying ground which makes experience 
possible, never allowing us to lose sight of the "wonder in the face of the world" 
which remains the key to all creativity. 
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Opening Up 
The phenomenological "fate of perception7' anticipated by high Modernists Woolf, 
Stein and Stevens lies at the core of contemporary poet John Ashbery's work. 9 Like 
his forebears, Ashbery considers the creative moment of insight in 
phenomenological terms. "The 'reality' of the thing, " as Merleau-Ponty calls it, is 
motivated precisely by the impossibility of fully "grasp[ing]" it (PP, 233): 
You see that you cannot do without it, that singular isolated moment 
that has now already slipped so far into the past that it seems a mere 
spark. You cannot do without it and you cannot have it. 10 
In his poem "The Task, " Ashbery tells us: "For these are moments only, moments of 
insight, / And there are reaches to be attained, /A last level of anxiety that melts / In 
becoming, like miles under the pilgrim's feet" (SP, 83). Ashbery is of course 
alluding to William Cowper's pre-Romantic poem "The Task7 (1785), in which 
references to physical wandering are plentiful. " In the light of the Romantic quest 
for "reconcilement of the external with the internal, "12 opening the way to the 
Romantic poet's divine moments of visions, which would transcend the common 
world, at first sight, the goal of Ashberys "Task! ' seems provocatively empty. It is, 
however, relevant to my argument that the wandering Pilgrim's "unfruitful" (SP, 83) 
9 As noted earlier, I have borrowed the term "fate of perception" from Geoff Ward, who, in his 
reading of Ashbery's "Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, " points out: "Merleau-Ponty's .. - 
phenomenology of perception sits well with Ashbery's poem. " See Ward, Statues ofLiberty, 156,165. 
My argument in this Postface can be taken as an expansion of Ward! s insight, locating both the work 
of Ashbery and that of Cornell in a continuum of what seems to be an overlooked aspect of modernist 
aesthetics at large. 
10 John Ashbery, Selected Poems (London: Penguin, 1985), 144. Herafter abbreviated as SP. 
11 William Cowper, The Task, (1785; Yorkshire: The Scholar Press Limited, 1973). 
12 Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, 131 
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destiny emphasises process over goal. There is no beginning, no middle and no end 
in Ashbery's wandering across "fugitive lands [which] crowd under separate names" 
(SP, 83) and there are no divine moments of vision. Instead, the poet speaks of "a 
casual moment of knowing that is here one minute and gone the nexf' (SP, 134; 
italics mine), offering what Merleau-Ponty calls "a direct description of our 
experience as it is"(PP, viii). Whereas the "spot of time" that haunts Wordswortlfs 
"Solitary Reaper" gives rise to a "powerful... emotion recollected in tranquillity"' 
3 
(my italics), and, as noted in the previous chapter, separates both poet from scene 
and reader from poem, Ashbery "states the space" - in Beckett's words - between 
perceiver and perceived, gesturing toward the embodied experience of both writing 
and reading. "You are wearing a text, "' he writes in "Crazy Weather": "The lines / 
Droop to your shoelaces and I shall never want or need / Any other literature than 
this poetry of mud" (SP, 22 1). 
Working back from this, the actual "reaches"' that are "to be attained"' in 
Ashbery's "The Task" are in fact the "miles under the pilgrim's feet, " suggesting 
both the artist's creative wanderings and the reader's act of wandering across the 
page, the poet's "paper city" (SP, 84). 14 Ashbery's twin "tasks" of life and poetry 
will always be, as "rhe Task" puts it, "preparing to begin again" (SP, 83), 
accentuating both the reader's and writer's pleasures of beginning again and again, 
of searching and re-searching. Thus, like Woolf, Stein and Stevens, Ashbery too is 
13 Wordsworth, The Complete Poetical Works, 192. 
14 For the notion of the act of reading as "wandering" I am influenced by Maýorie Perlofrs 
claim that the meanings of the words "wander" and "wandering" in Gertrude Stein's Melanctha 
(1909) should be understood in terms of what Ashbery, in an essay on Stein, calls a "way of 
happening. " See Perloff, The Poetics ofIndeterininacy, 93. But, whereas Perloff argues that this "way 
of happening" reveals uncertainty and groundlessness, thus locating the work of both Ashbery and 
Stein within a Post-Modem'ýpoetics of indeterminacy, " my interpretation of the word "wandering" 
emphasises the phenomenological notion of "perpetual beginning" as an opening onto the ground 
which underlies experience. 
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"preparing to begin again, " but unlike his forebears he reminds us that "his destiny / 
Is to return unfruitful" (SP, 83), implying that the inter-twined processes of writing 
and reading are continual movements toward becoming but not, as in the work of 
Stevens, "toward a supreme fiction. " Whereas Stevens speaks of "the poem of the 
mind in the act of finding / What will suffice" - despite his awareness that 
sufficiency cannot be found - the point of Ashbery's "poem of the mind" is not 
merely the "act of finding, " but the direct acknowledgment of the impossibility of 
completely finding. At no point does Ashbery offer moments of rest or express a 
desire for wholeness. What is there, visible to the eye, is the perpetual change of a 
very fast moving reality, which is where the poet's "act[s] of finding" take place: 
we and everything around us are moving forward continually, ... 
we are being modified constantly by the speed at which we travel and 
the regions through which we pass, so that merely to think of 
ourselves as having arrived at some final resting place is a 
contradiction of fundamental logic. (SP, 137-138) 
Thus, like Virginia Woolf, Ashbery seems to be catching "an incessant shower of 
innumerable atoms ... as they fall" (CD, 8), 
but whereas Woolf yearns for 
wholeness, for Ashbery the atoms simply keep on falling. His direct acceptance of 
the impossibility of complete reduction is more like Stein's. Ashbery too "[a]ct[s] so 
that there is no use in a centre' (TB, 43), acknowledging that "The conclusion came 
when there was no arrangemenf ' (TB, 44). 
Throughout this thesis I have stressed that the epoche points to a central 
paradox in human experience, which I have called the paradox of the "eye/I. " 
Merleau-Ponty elaborates this paradox in his notion of "flesh, " the unperceived 
space in between subjectivity and objectivity, seer and seen. This paradoxical 
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"between, " which is neither complete presence nor absence, neither purely subjective 
nor purely objective, is, it seems to me, the essence of Ashbery's work. His poems do 
not oscillate between Stevens's "immaculate beginning7' and "immaculate end"; 
rather the paradox of what Ashbery, in "Clepsydra, " calls "[t]he half-meant, half- 
perceived / motions ,, 15 recalling Stevens's half way states, is their "real' meaning: 
it mattered precisely because it was a paradox and about to be 
realized here on earth, in human terms; otherwise one would have 
forgotten it as quickly as any morning dream that clings to you in the 
first few waking moments ... (SP, 145) 
The paradox of the "eye/I" central to Ashbery's phenomenological poetry not 
only reflects the artist's simultaneous separation from and interrelation with his 
object-world, but also leaves us with a sense what he, in "Self-Portrait in a Convex 
Mirror, " calls "looking through the wrong end of the Telescope" (SP, 203), thus 
giving voice to the "fate of perception" that his predecessors anticipated. The 
"reality" of the "thing itself, " which triggered the creative processes of Stein, Woolf 
and Stevens, then, are "snatche[d]" from both the writer's and readers' grasps. 
The figure of speech "looking through the wrong end of the telescope' 
significantly echoes "Through the Big End of the Opera Glass, " the title of a 1943 art 
exhibition at the Julien Levy Gallery, featuring the work of Joseph Cornell and 
Marcel Duchamp. Pointing out that this paradox is incorporated in Cornell's boxes, 
suggesting an increasing "distance between spectator and object viewed, " Jodi 
Hauptman takes it as a sign of the "impossible interplay of longing and futility, " thus 
raising Lacanian spectres of melancholic subjectivity or nostalgia, detaching the 
15 John Ashbery, Setf-Portrait in a Convex Mirror (Manchester: Carcanet New Press, 1972), 63. 
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artist from his world and the seer from the seen. 16 Cornell was obsessed with 
sightings of young women, in particular pictures of or images related to female film 
stars such as Lauren Bacall, Jennifer Jones and Greta Garbo. In an attempt to hold 
onto these muses, Cornell displayed their pictures in glazed boxes, and thus they 
became, in the words of Jodi Hauptman, "[a] pleasure to watch, but impossible ever 
to reach. "17 Taking my bearings from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of 
perception, I want to highlight a wholly different aspect of this lack of grasp of the 
object. Rather than revealing a void of nostalgic loss or lack, I suggest that the 
threshold between subject and object promoted by Comell's boxes highlights a 
phenomenological mutuality and reversibility between seer and seen, artist and 
world, spectator and artwork. These glazed boxes, at once displaying their gazing 
women and reflecting our act of looking, are, I suggest, promoters of ethically self- 
reflective and reciprocal seeing. 
In his diary entries, Cornell repeatedly ponders on wanting to incorporate in 
his boxes and collages "fresh wonder, " "wonderment, " or the "wondrously new. "18 
[W]onder' in the face of the world, " Merleau-Ponty told us, is "[t]he best 
formulation of the reductioW' (PP, xxi). Wonder, we have seen, is by its very nature 
pre-reflective: still open to the essence of the world, the child looks at it in wonder. 
The "visual magic" of the "soap bubble sets, marbles, and toy birds" displayed in 
Cornell's boxes were for the first time met by Ashbery when he was "about ten years 
old, "momentarily swe[eping]" the astonished boy into "the unbiased seeing of 
16 Jodi Hauptman, Joseph Cornell. - Stargazing in the Cinema (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999), 4,212n8,49,5. 
17 Ibid., 4. 
'a Comell, Joseph Cornell's Theatre ofthe Mind, 279,280,310. 
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childhood, " restoring wonder to the "paraphemalia7' seen with a "force... so delicate 
and powerful that one hesitates to talk much about it. 1119 
Much like Ashbery, Joseph Cornell was an "enchanted wanderer, ', 20 Who 
wandered through New York to collect flotsam and jetsam: engravings, prints, 
newspaper articles and photographs of legendary film stars, which he would place in 
glazed boxes. He referred to his wanderings as "a type of image-search, "21 a 
terminology that Hauptman interprets as "an aesthetic, attitude, and method that 
reconfigures portraiture as exploration, research, collection. " Hauptman underscores 
the traditional view of Cornell as a "voyeue' whose boxes not only disclose the 
found object but also appear as "traps, capturing, framing and holding their subjects 
tightly away from the spectator outside, "22 both characterising Cornell as nostalgic 
dreamer, trapped in the past, and detaching the seer from the seen. In contrast with 
this, it rather seems to me that the both "delicate" and "powerful" force of Cornell's 
constructions, "swe[eping]" the young Ashbery back into "the unbiased seeing of 
childhood, " triggers a release from our preconceived and "biased" notions about the 
world and a return to a more primordial vision, a primary perception of the thing 
seen, which is also the starting- point of the artist's creative process. Rather than 
cutting off the artist/artwork from the world, the seer from the seen, this vision, I 
argue, restores openness onto the world. 
In calling attention to this "openness, " I not only underscore my promotion of 
phenomenology as a clue to Modernist aesthetics, but also want to release the poetic 
19 Ibid., 9-10. 
20 "Enchanted Wanderer" is one of Comeirs so-called "journey albums" dedicated to the film 
star Hedy Lamar. See Hauptman, Stargazing in the Cinema, p. 2. 
21 Comell as quoted in Hauptmax4 Stargazing in the Cinema, 1. 
22 Hauptman, Stargazing in the Cinema, 1,49. 
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inquiries of Cornell and Ashbery from the "trap, " which is usually assigned to the 
avant-garde, of "isolating the object, breaking off its ties with the rest of the 
world, "23 thus turning it into a nostalgic "'fetishistic substitute for a lost object. m24 
This fetishism brings us back to Eagleton's "autonomous, self-regarding, 
impenetrable modernist artifact" referred to in Chapter One. We recall that 
Eagleton's isolated and alienated Modernist art work is a result of what he calls a 
"bracket[ing] off' -a negation - of external facts, which stands in stark contrast to 
the Husserlian method of "bracketing" as an opening onto the world. 
We recall that Husserl's reduction, which operates through the method of 
"bracketing, " argues against what is usually understood as reductionism. It does not 
reduce the subject's viewpoint, thus creating a division between subject and object, 
seer and seen, but insists on "a new kind of practical outloole' (Crisis 1,169), 
bringing to light their implicit relation. 
Cornell's boxes and Ashbery's poems, I suggest, bring into focus exactly this 
relation, revealing a perhaps surprising image of these artists as not merely engaged 
with processes of wandering, physical and metaphysical, but as practical 
phenomenologists. Just as Cornell's boxes display vast amounts of flotsam and 
jetsam found on his wanderings through New York, Ashbery's poems display 
"endless lists of things" (SP, 145), unrelated and "broken" images, accumulated on 
textual wanderings through the poet's "paper city" (SP, 84). The artists' journeys 
through cities of things stress phenomenological interrelation with the world as a 
condition for creative production. 
23 Diana Waldman, Joseph Cornell (New York: George Braziller, 1977), 14. 
24 Hal Foster as quoted in Hauptman, Stargazing in the Cinema, 33. 
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I can perhaps best condense my argument by returning to Stein's "A Box": "it is 
so rudimentary to be analysed and see a fine substance strangely. " Just as Stein's "A 
Box" opens onto the "rudimentary" (undeveloped) first perception of the thing seen, 
so are Comell's boxes creative products of what Gilles Deleuze calls "the self that 
opens to the world and opens the world itself. "25 What the Comell box presents us 
with, then, is not enclosure but disclosure of a more original way of seeing, not 
entrapment but opening up. 
By "bracketing" our usual world of facts, the reduction lays bare what Merleau- 
Ponty calls the "invisible inner framework7 of the visible (VI, 215-216). Like Stein's 
"A Box, " it takes the lid off the box and exposes what is contained within this 
container. What we are left with is a more immediate experience of "the thing itself' 
before it is concealed by our habitual ways of seeing and modes of expression. What, 
one might ask, then, is this: Is the see-through glass of Cornell's boxes, at once 
enclosing and disclosing the objects of his "image searches, " comparable to 
phenomenological brackets? It certainly was to Ashbery. "Each of Cornell's works, " 
he writes in an art chronicle, "is an autonomous visual experience, with its own 
natural law and its climate: the thing in its thingness; revealed, not commented on: 
and with its ambience intact. ', 26 
Just as Cornell would collect his objects along the margins of New York, from 
junk shops and flea markets, so do Ashbery's poems display a de-centralised self 
who is "living on the margin" (SP, 87). Not only do the wanderings of these 
wonderers take place at margins or thresholds, but phenomenological thresholds of 
25 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 42. 
26 Ashbery, Reported Sighthings, 16. Hereafter abbreviated as RP. 
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perception are also incorporated into the structures of their work. Beautiful female 
film stars triggered Cornell's wanderings and explorations but, paradoxically 
enough, they were also the ones who ended them. This paradox is incorporated into 
the construction of Cornell's boxes. Displayed behind glass, a clear vision of these 
women only becomes real at the moment that they become unreachable. Ashbery 
tells us: 
... Cornell's boxes embody the substance of 
dreams so powerfully 
that it seems that these eminently palpable bits of wood, cloth, glass 
and metal must vanish the next moment, as when the atmosphere of a 
dream becomes so intensely realistic that you know you are about to 
wake up ... (RS, 16-17) 
Cornell's glazed boxes - microcosmic versions of his journeys as a wandering 
voyeur - invite us not only to look at his found objects but also to reflect on our own 
acts of seeing. Merleau-Ponty's "mirror-phenomenon" of "flesh, " "the idea that 
every perception is doubled with counterperception .... is an act with two 
faces" 
(VI, 255,264), allows us to articulate this threshold between the seeing and the seen. 
If we take a look at Cornell's Medici Slot Machine (1942; Figure 7), his Medici 
Princess (c. 1948; Figure 8) and the Penny Arcade Portrait ofLauren Bacall (1945- 
46; figure 9), we notice a wall of glass, a threshold between the objects and 
ourselves. This glass, tantamount to phenomenological brackets, underpins the fine 
line between distance and closeness, being seen and seeing. Precisely like Comell's 
subjects, always staring at us from the centre of their constructions, we, the 
spectators, are what Merleau-Ponty terms "Visible-seer[s]" (VI, 260): just as they are 
the visible objects of our acts of seeing, so are we the visible objects towards which 
their gaze is directed. Their vision reciprocates ours, underscoring the simultaneity 
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of subject and object-world: "every perception is doubled with counterperception 
, is an act with two faces. " 
Like the glazed fronts of Comell's boxes, bracketing the ordinary, enclosing in 
order to disclose not just his chosen subjects but also the viewer in an important way, 
the mirror surface of Ashbery's poem "Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror" functions 
as the fine line between affirmation and denial. The poem, which takes its name from 
and is a meditation on Parmigianino's painting, opens as follows: 
As Parmigianino did it, the right hand 
Bigger than the head, thrust at the viewer 
And swerving easily away, as though to protect 
What it advertises. A few leaded panes, old beams, 
Fur, pleated muslin, a coral ring run together 
In a movement supporting the face, which swims 
Toward and away like the hand. 
(SPý 18 8) 
Just as Parmigianino's head "swims / Toward and away like the hand" "as though to 
protect / What it advertises, " this long poem "veers in and out" (SP, 198) of focus, 
making us 'wander and wonder. Ashbery's swimming hand gestures: "the 'reality' of 
the thing is ... precisely what snatches it from our grasp. " We think that we have a 
grasp of what we see and then again we don't. The metaphor of "swimming" 
supports the movement of the painter's hand "thrust at the viewer. " Continually 
expanding and contracting, very much like waves in a sea, this waving hand at once 
pulls us in and yet pushes us away, challenging us to reflect on our own acts of 
reading, looking or touching, making us realise that we are at once visible objects 
and seeing subjects, tactile and touching, separate from and intertwined with the 
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visible world. Perpetual phenomenological reduction and expansion is the engine of 
the aft of perception. 27 
Like the face in the sky in Cezanne's The Large Bathers and the hidden "lady. . 
. writing" in Woolf s The Waves, the 
hand of Ashbery's Parmigianino gestures 
"come here" and then pushes us away. Again, Ashbery may have learned this 
phenomenological lesson from Cornell, since the seductive eyes of Cornell's Lauren 
Bacall, and the gazes of the Medici boy and Princess - whose poses and clothes are 
reminiscent of Parmigianino's Mannerist sitters - also gesture "come here" and then 
push us away, signalling "a combination / Of tenderness, amusement and regret, so 
powerful / In its restraint that one cannot look for long" (SP, 189). What this tension 
between regret and pleasure suggests is that our objective, expressed vision of the 
seen, like the artist's finished work of art, will only ever be a "convex mirror, " the 
seer's "reflection once removed" (SP, 188), that is to say, a belated and often slightly 
distorted expression of the intentional moment of insight, the "thing itselU "The 
words, " writes Ashbery, "are only speculation / (From the Latin speculum, mirror): / 
They seek and cannot find the meaning of the music" (SP, 189). Our slippery hold 
on reality, making us unable completely to "box" it up is the regrettable and yet 
pleasurable reality of Cornell and Ashbery's perceptual reconstructions. 
27 Mary Ann Caws has invoked a notion of thresholds and self-reflexivity in Ashbery's "Self- 
Portrait"which might seem consonant with the one I am arguing for. Claiming that Ashbery's poem 
challenges us to "reflect on the reflecting of and on reflecting, " she locates this self-reflexivity within 
a Surrealist attention to "weeping eye and pointing fmger, both already metagestural in that they 
concern vision and are seen, pointing and are pointed to" as seen in the work of Breton, de Chirico 
and Max Ernst. But whereas Caws' notion of this perceptual "threshold" guides us into what she calls 
an "inscape rather than outlook... an inner scene ... a private space, " my phenomenological 
standpoint aiming to release the poetics of Cornell and Ashbery from notions of entrapment or 
internalisation, rather points to the perpetual inter-relation and interaction between inside and outside. 
The reduction points out that objectivity arises from the intending subject. See Mary Ann Caws, The 
Eye in the Text: Essays on Perception, Mannerist to Modernism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1981), 51,68,19. 
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The poetic inquiries of Cornell and Ashbery, then, open onto the realm of 
possibility from which creativity arises, constantly sweeping us back to the primacy 
of perception, the "unbiased seeing of childhood. " Just as we can only see clearly 
when the lid is off a Comell box, so does Ashbery's work promote perpetual 
openness, preparing us "to begin again" (SP, 83), challenging us to wander in 
wonder fluough the space between being and meaning, primary perception and 
expression, the complete closure of which would mean the end of desire, and the end 
of creativity itself. Ashbery's poem 'Taradoxes and Oxymorons" is a witty and 
moving description of this paradoxical process, recalling the unreachable muses in 
Cornell's boxes and stressing the phenomenological "fate of perception": 
This poem is concerned with language on a very plain level. 
Look at it talking to you. You look out a window 
Or pretend to fidget. You have it but you don't have it. 
You miss it, it misses you. You miss each other. 
The poem is sad because it wants to be yours, and cannot be. 
(S. P, 283) 
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